Opinion
J-S40037-16 No. 2477 EDA 2015
06-10-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DWAYNE SPURELL, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 26, 2013 in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Criminal Division, No(s): CP-23-CR-0004494-2012 BEFORE: BOWES, MUNDY and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
Dwayne Spurell ("Spurell") appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of five counts of robbery, and one count of criminal conspiracy. We affirm in part, and vacate and remand in part.
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701, 903(a).
The trial court set forth in its Opinion the procedural history underlying this appeal, which we incorporate herein by reference. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/15/15, at 1-8.
Though it appears that Spurell filed his court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement two days late, we, like the trial court, will overlook this defect, for the reasons set forth in the trial court's Opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/15/15, at 9.
On appeal, Spurell presents the following issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or commit an error of law by denying [Spurell's April 15, 2013] [M]otion for dismissal for [the Commonwealth's]
violation of [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 600 [(hereinafter, "Rule 600 Motion")], where charges were filed against him [on] May 13, 2005[,] and he was not brought to trial until April 16, 2013, notwithstanding that [Spurell] was incarcerated and under county supervision, with his whereabouts known by the Commonwealth, from 2008 through 2011?Brief for Appellant at 3-4.
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or commit an error of law by allowing the matter to proceed to trial, where charges were filed against [Spurell on] May 13, 2005[,] and he was not brought to trial until April 16, 2013, notwithstanding that [Spurell] was incarcerated and under county supervision, with his whereabouts known by the Commonwealth, from 2008 through 2011?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or commit an error of law by failing to timely rule on [Spurell's June 27, 2013] Post[-]Sentence Motion alleging a violation of his Rule 600 speedy trial rights [(hereinafter, "Rule 600 Post-Sentence Motion")], and therefore denying the [M]otion as a matter of law without reaching a decision on the merits, where charges were filed against him [on] May 13, 2005[,] and he was not brought to trial until April 16, 2013, notwithstanding that [Spurell] was incarcerated and under county supervision, with his whereabouts known by the Commonwealth, from 2008 through 2011[?]
4. [] Is [Spurell] entitled to remand and resentencing where his sentence included [a] mandatory minimum period of incarceration pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712[,] which has since been deemed constitutionally invalid?
We will address Spurell's first two issues together, as they both challenge the trial court's purported abuse of discretion in failing to rule that the Commonwealth committed a Rule 600 violation. We review such claims according to the following principles:
In evaluating Rule 600 issues, our standard of review of a trial court's decision is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but[,] if in reaching a conclusion[,] the law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.Commonwealth v. Thompson , 93 A.3d 478, 486-87 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations, brackets and ellipses omitted).
The proper scope of review is limited to the evidence on the record of the Rule 600 evidentiary hearing, and the findings of the trial court. An appellate court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.
Additionally, when considering the trial court's ruling, this Court is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule 600. Rule 600 serves two equally important functions: (1) the protection of the accused's speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of society. In determining whether an accused's right to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given to society's right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it. However, the administrative mandate of Rule 600 was not designed to insulate the criminally accused from good faith prosecution delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth.
So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy trial rights of an accused, Rule 600 must be construed in a manner consistent with society's right to punish and deter crime. In considering these matters, courts must carefully factor into the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous law enforcement as well.
Spurell argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 600 Motion because the evidence established that the Commonwealth violated his speedy trial rights by failing to exercise due diligence in locating him and bringing his case to trial. See Brief for Appellant at 7, 11-14. Spurell points out that he was not brought to trial until April 2013, nearly eight years after the charges against him were filed. Id. at 7. Additionally, Spurell contends that
on at least three [] occasions in 2008, 2009, and 2011[, he] was apprehended and/or brought to court and incarcerated in Philadelphia County and Pennsylvania state correctional institutions. At each of these arrests, the Commonwealth should and would have been notified that the suspect had been apprehended in another jurisdiction, at which point the Commonwealth would lodge its detainer and proceed with prosecution. ... [A]t a very minimum, the Commonwealth should have been on actual notice of [Spurell's] apprehension in July of 2008 by the Philadelphia Police Department, and the prosecution against him should have proceeded at that point.Id. (footnote added). In light of the foregoing, Spurell argues, it cannot be said that the police exercised due diligence in locating him and prosecuting the instant case against him. Id. at 12-13.
Specifically, Spurell asserts that concerning each of the three above-mentioned arrests, authorities should have entered his information into the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC") database, as "[p]roper protocol would require that the suspect be ran through the NCIC database each time he was apprehended to check for outstanding warrants, and the appropriate agency be notified if a warrant or detainer existed." Brief for Appellant at 12.
The trial court's Opinion aptly set forth the relevant law concerning Rule 600, addressed Spurell's claims in detail, and thoroughly discussed the unique circumstances concerning the delay in bringing Spurell to trial. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/15/15, at 10-28. The trial court rejected Spurell's claims, determining that no Rule 600 violation had occurred, as (1) the unusual events that caused the delay were outside of the Commonwealth's control; and (2) the police acted with due diligence, and exercised reasonable efforts to locate Spurell's whereabouts, despite unforeseeable breakdowns that had occurred in this case following his commitments beginning in 2008. See id. The trial court's exhaustive, sound analysis and determination is supported by the law and the record, and we therefore affirm on this basis in rejecting Spurell's first two issues. See id.
In his third issue, Spurell contends that the trial court erred by failing to rule on his timely-filed Rule 600 Post-Sentence Motion. Brief for Appellant at 15. Spurell points out that "[n]o decision was ever reached on the merits of the [M]otion; rather[,] it was apparently lost or misfiled for over two [] years and ultimately denied as a matter of law." Id.
The trial court addressed this claim in its Opinion, explained the breakdown in the court's procedures that caused the court to not be alerted as to the filing of the Rule 600 Post-Sentence Motion, and determined that Spurell's claim does not entitle him to relief. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/15/15, at 56-61. As the trial court's thorough analysis is sound and supported by the record, we affirm on this basis as to Spurell's third issue. See id .
As an addendum, we observe that the trial court held a hearing on Spurell's Rule 600 Motion prior to trial, and correctly denied the Motion. Accordingly, we, like the trial court, are puzzled by the relief that Spurell seeks on this claim. See , e.g., Brief for Appellant at 15 (asserting that "[b]ecause a decision was never rendered on the merits of [Spurell's Rule 600] Post Sentence Motion, the matter should be remanded to the trial court for a hearing on the same."); see also Trial Court Opinion, 12/15/15, at 57.
In his final issue, Spurell argues that the mandatory sentences imposed on him under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712 (sentences for offenses committed with firearms) are illegal pursuant to Alleyne v. United States , 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), and its progeny. Brief for Appellant at 15; see also Alleyne , 133 S. Ct. at 2163 (holding that "facts that increase mandatory minimum sentences must be submitted to the jury" and must be found beyond a reasonable doubt).
Relevantly, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712 provides that "[p]rovisions of this section shall not be an element of the crime[,]" and that in order for the five-year mandatory minimum sentence under subsection 9712(a) to apply, the court must determine at sentencing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the requirements were met. Id. § 9712(b).
The Commonwealth and trial court agree that Spurell's mandatory minimum sentences are illegal. See Brief for the Commonwealth at 14-15; Trial Court Opinion, 11/18/15, at 4 n.21.
Initially, we observe that although Spurell did not raise this claim in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement, we may address it sua sponte because it implicates the legality of his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Newman , 99 A.3d 86, 90 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (stating that "a challenge to a sentence premised upon Alleyne [] implicates the legality of the sentence and cannot be waived on appeal."); Commonwealth v. Vargas , 108 A.3d 858, 876 n.13 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that "legality of sentence questions are not waivable and may be raised sua sponte by this Court.") (citation and brackets omitted).
Spurell is correct that Alleyne rendered section 9712 constitutionally infirm in its entirety because the statute allows the sentencing court to determine, by only a preponderance of the evidence, whether the mandatory minimum sentence applies. See Commonwealth v. Valentine , 101 A.3d 801, 811-12 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding that section 9712 is unconstitutional as a whole). Accordingly, the mandatory minimum sentences that the trial court imposed pursuant to section 9712 are illegal and must be vacated. Because our decision upsets the trial court's overall sentencing scheme, we vacate Spurell's judgment of sentence in its entirety, and remand for resentencing, without consideration of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712. See Commonwealth v. Ferguson , 107 A.3d 206, 213-14, 216 (Pa. Super. 2015) (vacating entire sentence pursuant to Alleyne and remanding for resentencing on all counts, where the sentence encompassed both counts subject to mandatory minimum sentencing provisions and counts not subject to mandatory minimum sentencing provisions).
Spurell's convictions affirmed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 6/10/2016
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