Opinion
19-P-1506
10-23-2020
COMMONWEALTH v. Cordell A. SCOTT.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
A Boston Municipal Court jury convicted the defendant of operating a motor vehicle after his license had been suspended or revoked in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 23. The conviction was based, in part, on evidence that a Massachusetts State Trooper stopped the defendant for speeding on Interstate Highway 93 on July 2, 2017, and later charged him after learning that the defendant's license had been suspended or revoked. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) records from the registry of motor vehicles (RMV) were improperly admitted, (2) the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant had notice that his license had been suspended or revoked, and (3) testimony of the arresting trooper was improperly admitted. We affirm.
The defendant was also charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI). The OUI charge is not before us because the defendant was acquitted in a separate trial.
Discussion. 1. RMV records. The judge admitted two packets of documents from the RMV over the defendant's objection. The first was a redacted notice and driver's history dated December 2, 2014, addressed to the defendant at 349 Park Street in Dorchester, notifying him that his driver's license would be revoked for four years effective January 3, 2015, for being a habitual traffic offender. The second packet of documents contained the defendant's driver's license photograph, biographical information, and driver's license history. The defendant claims that these documents should not have been admitted because they "did not contain an original certification or an original signature from a representative of the RMV." We disagree.
RMV records fall within the public records exception to the rule against hearsay and are prima facie evidence of the existence of facts contained in those records. See G. L. c. 90, § 30 ; Mass. G. Evid. § 803(8)(B) (2020). Copies of these public records can be authenticated by the attestation of the officer who has charge of the records. See Mass. G. Evid. § 901(b)(7)(B) (2020). An attestation can be in the form of an original signature or an original mark or stamp. See Commonwealth v. Martinez-Guzman, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 167, 171 (2010) (RMV records bearing original stamped signature of registrar rather than original signature were properly attested and admissible). Here, both exhibits bore an original stamped attestation of the registrar certifying that the records were true copies of RMV records. Accordingly, the judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the RMV records in evidence. See Commonwealth v. Torres, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 272, 278 (2014) (evidentiary rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion).
"Certified copies of such records of the registrar, attested by the registrar or the registrar's authorized agent, shall be admissible as evidence in the courts of the [C]ommonwealth to prove the facts contained therein." G. L. c. 90, § 30.
The defendant's reliance on Commonwealth v. Deramo, 436 Mass. 40 (2002), is misplaced. In Deramo, the Supreme Judicial Court held that RMV records which bore a photocopy of an attestation, rather than the original mark, were inadmissible. See id. at 49. Here, it is undisputed that the stamped attestations were original marks. Therefore the records were properly certified and admitted pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 30.
2. Sufficiency of the evidence. To obtain a conviction for operating a motor vehicle after license suspension or revocation, the Commonwealth was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that (1) the defendant operated a motor vehicle, (2) at the time of the operation the defendant's license was suspended or revoked, and (3) the defendant had notice that his license had been suspended or revoked. See Commonwealth v. Royal, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 168, 170 (2016). The defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he received notice of his suspension or revocation. The defendant also argues that, even assuming that the RMV records were properly admitted, the evidence did not sufficiently connect him to those records. We address these arguments in turn.
The jury found that the Commonwealth did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspension or revocation was for the specified statutory offense of OUI. However, the jury returned a guilty verdict on operating after suspension or revocation, a lesser included offense.
"The element of notice can be proved by evidence showing that the defendant had actual (or constructive) knowledge of the suspension." Commonwealth v. Cueva, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 780, 787 (2019). "The Commonwealth need not prove that the defendant in fact received the notice. Rather, proof that the RMV properly mailed the notice is sufficient." Id., citing Commonwealth v. Crosscup, 369 Mass. 228, 239 (1975) (proper mailing is prima facie evidence of receipt). Here, the certified RMV records included a contemporaneous "USPS mailing confirmation" that the notice of revocation was received by the United States Postal Service on December 4, 2014, addressed to Cordell Scott at 349 Park Street, #2, Dorchester. This was the last known residential address provided to the RMV by the defendant, and the RMV was permitted to rely on the accuracy of that address. See Commonwealth v. Lora, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 136, 144 (1997). Therefore, this case is unlike Cueva, supra at 787-788, where the conviction was set aside because there was no evidence that the notice was mailed to the defendant. Viewing all of the documentary evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979), a rational juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had constructive notice of the suspension or revocation when the notice was mailed to him at his last known address.
The defendant was required to report any change of address to the RMV in writing within thirty days of the change. See G. L. c. 90, § 26A.
We note that in addition to the notice that was mailed to the defendant, the evidence included a certified docket sheet from the defendant's second OUI conviction in July 2013, indicating that a two-year license suspension was part of the sentence imposed on that date. The jury could have reasonably inferred that the defendant was present for the imposition of that sentence and would therefore have been aware that license revocation was a potential consequence of an OUI conviction.
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The Commonwealth was also required to prove that the defendant was the same Cordell Scott referred to in the RMV records. We agree with the defendant that "[m]ere identity of name is not sufficient to indicate an identity of person." Commonwealth v. Koney, 421 Mass. 295, 302 (1995). Here, however, there was more than identity of name. The RMV records identified the defendant by name, address, driver's license number, and date of birth. The records also included a photograph of Cordell Scott and a reference to his height as "6'06." When viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, this detailed identifying information of the Cordell Scott whose records were maintained by the RMV, considered together with the trooper's in-court identification of the defendant as the person he stopped on Interstate Highway 93, was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the same Cordell Scott referred to in the RMV records. See id. at 303 (photograph on Massachusetts identification card was reliable evidence from which jury could infer that defendant was connected to address where notice of revocation was mailed).
3. Trooper's testimony. The defendant moved, in limine, to exclude testimony from the trooper regarding his "determination that Mr. Scott's license was suspended." After a hearing, the judge allowed the trooper to testify as follows: "I learned that [the defendant] was operating with a license that was suspended or revoked due to alcohol related offenses." On appeal the defendant contends that this statement was inadmissible hearsay. The Commonwealth argues that the statement was not hearsay because it was not offered for its truth, but merely to explain the trooper's actions.
We have previously held that "an officer's testimony that he ‘ran ... the [defendant's driver's] license number through the Registry of Motor Vehicles’ and it ‘came with a status of suspended’ –- was inadmissible hearsay." Royal, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 169. Because we see no material difference between the officer's testimony in Royal and the trooper's testimony here, we conclude that it was error to admit the statement. However, we agree with the Commonwealth that the trooper's testimony, even if improperly admitted, did not prejudice the defendant. First, the testimony was cumulative of the RMV records that showed that the defendant's license was revoked. See Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 407 Mass. 663, 670 (1990) (mistaken admission of hearsay testimony not prejudicial error if cumulative of other evidence). Second, we cannot reasonably conclude that the jury was influenced by the trooper's testimony where they found the defendant not guilty of operating a motor vehicle after suspension for the statutory offense of OUI. Simply put, we are confident that the error "did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect." Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994).
Judgment affirmed.