Opinion
J-S45003-16 No. 74 WDA 2015
07-06-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. ANTHONY JAMES PRYOR, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of December 10, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0011693-2014 BEFORE: OLSON, DUBOW AND PLATT, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, Anthony James Pryor, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on December 10, 2014 in the Criminal Division of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, following his bench trial convictions for firearms and drug offenses. On appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court's order denying his motion to suppress inculpatory statements to police. We affirm.
On December 16, 2013, at approximately 2:47 a.m., Officer Leo Gigliotti of the Baldwin Borough Police Department stopped a vehicle traveling along Becks Run Road for a suspected window tint violation. Appellant was a passenger in that vehicle. When Officer Gigliotti made contact with Appellant, Appellant gave him a series of false names and birthdates. Officer Gigliotti attempted computer verification of the names and birthdates and confirmed that they were not Appellant's. At that time, Officer Gigliotti informed Appellant that he was now involved in an official investigation and risked prosecution for false identification if he continued to falsify his identity. For investigatory purposes, the officer placed Appellant in handcuffs and seated him in the back of the police cruiser until Appellant properly identified himself. When Officer Gigliotti secured proper identification for Appellant, he formally placed Appellant under arrest for false identification and issued warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
At some point, Officer Falcione, also of the Baldwin Borough Police Department, joined the vehicle stop. Officer Falcione's first name does not appear in the record.
Meanwhile, as the officers continued their investigation of the vehicle, they discovered a bag containing heroin and a handgun. They found more heroin and a second handgun in the driver's purse. The officers then informed Appellant that the driver would be "going to jail" and placed the contraband in the front seat of the police cruiser, in view of Appellant. Appellant then claimed possession of the contraband, stating, "Everything in that bag is mine."
On September 12, 2014, the Commonwealth filed an information charging Appellant with the following offenses: persons not to possess a firearm, carrying a firearm without a license, possession with intent to deliver (heroin), knowing and intentional possession of a controlled substance (heroin), knowing and intentional possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), possession of a small amount of marijuana, and false identification to law enforcement. Appellant thereafter moved to suppress his statement admitting possession of the contraband. The trial court convened a hearing on December 10, 2014, following which the court denied Appellant's motion. Appellant's bench trial immediately ensued and, upon conclusion, the court found Appellant guilty of all seven counts in the information. The court then imposed an aggregate prison term of three to ten years, followed by a three-year term of probation. This appeal followed.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on January 9, 2015. On January 20, 2015, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). After receiving an extension of time, Appellant filed his concise statement on September 18, 2015. The trial court issued its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on December 21, 2015.
Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:
Did the [suppression court] err in failing to suppress [Appellant's] statements to police [made while] in custody, during an official investigation, [and] without notifying the [Appellant] of his right to remain silent as required by Miranda v. Arizona ?Appellant's Brief at 5.
We note our well-settled standard of review:
In reviewing a suppression court's denial of a suppression motion, the appellate court may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those findings and may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. Nonetheless, the appellate court exercises plenary review over the suppression court's conclusions of law.Commonwealth v. Poplawski , 130 A.3d 697, 711 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted).
Appellant's sole claim is that the trial court erred in refusing to grant suppression because his incriminating statements were the product of custodial interrogation, or its functional equivalent, that occurred before Officer Gigliotti issued Miranda warnings. To address Appellant's contentions, we first consider whether the record supports the trial court's finding that Officer Gigliotti informed Appellant of his Miranda rights before Appellant made his incriminating statement. Although our affirmance of the trial court's finding is dispositive of the claims Appellant raises on appeal, we nevertheless address Appellant's contention that the trial court erred in finding that the challenged statement constituted a spontaneous utterance, and not a response to the functional equivalent of custodial interrogation.
At the suppression hearing, the court heard testimony from Officer Gigliotti and from Appellant. The court found that Officer Gigliotti acted properly and pursuant to a lawful investigation in placing Appellant in handcuffs and seating him in the police car. The court also determined, however, that "th[is] situation constituted custody." From the time Officer Gigliotti placed Appellant into custody until the time of Appellant's arrest for false identification, neither officer informed Appellant of his rights to counsel and against self-incrimination. Officer Gigliotti testified that Appellant's arrest for false identification triggered the issuance of Miranda warnings. N.T. Suppression, 12/10/14, at 12-13 and 16. Officer Gigliotti further testified that he arrested Appellant before either officer recovered contraband from the vehicle. Therefore, Appellant received his Miranda warnings before he viewed the contraband items that prompted his admission. Based upon this testimony, the court concluded that the Commonwealth met its burden of proof in demonstrating that Appellant received Miranda warnings prior to his admission. Id. at 69.
"[This] [c]ourt finds that such actions are proper; but, nonetheless, that would clearly mean ... that the situation constituted custody and that an objective, reasonable person would determine that[,] although the officer has characterized it as a detention for purposes of investigation, which it was, that ... [Appellant] was not free to leave." N.T. Suppression, 12/10/14, at 67.
The record supports the trial court's findings of fact. In finding that Officer Gigliotti issued Miranda warnings before Appellant uttered his incriminating statement, the court referenced Officer Gigliotti's testimony, as corroborated by his police report. Because the court's factual assessment finds support in the record, we are bound to accept the trial court's narrative of the events. See Poplawski , 130 A.3d at 711. Moreover, since Appellant received his Miranda warnings and chose to speak rather than invoke his right to remain silent or consult with counsel, there is no basis for suppressing the challenged statement.
Appellant contends that he declared possession of the contraband while Officer Gigliotti was in the process of ascertaining Appellant's identity. Therefore, in Appellant's chronology, Appellant incriminated himself while in custody but before his formal arrest and prior to his receipt of Miranda warnings. Appellant argues that Officer Gigliotti's testimony lacks credibility and that we should reject it as inconsistent with his earlier testimony at Appellant's preliminary hearing. Appellant relies on the following exchange that took place at the suppression hearing:
Defense Counsel: Isn't it true at the preliminary hearing you testified that [Appellant] had not been advised of his rights prior to making the statement?N.T. Suppression, 12/10/14, at 19.
Officer Gigliotti: Yes.
Defense Counsel: Okay. Now your testimony is [Appellant] had been advised of his rights?
Officer Gigliotti: Yes.
Defense Counsel: And both times you were under oath; correct?
Officer Gigliotti: Yes.
The trial court considered this issue at the suppression hearing and found that Officer Gigliotti placed Appellant under arrest for false identification and issued Miranda warnings before either officer at the scene recovered contraband from the vehicle. To make this determination, the trial court compared Officer Gigliotti's testimony at the suppression hearing with his police report from the day of the incident. The court found that the officer's testimony at the suppression hearing set forth the same chronology of events as his police report from the date of Appellant's arrest. Id. at 20-23. Since Appellant's version of events is contradicted by the record as a whole, we cannot entertain it. See Poplawski , 130 A.3d at 711.
Although the preceding conclusion is dispositive of this appeal, we shall consider Appellant's claim that the trial court erred in determining that his statement was a spontaneous utterance and not the product of custodial interrogation or its functional equivalent. Here, Appellant argues that he was in custody and subject to interrogation from the moment Officer Gigliotti handcuffed him, seated him in the rear of the patrol car, and questioned him about his identity. Appellant asserts that the officer's continued inquiries regarding his identity and the placement of contraband into the police cruiser within his view constituted the functional equivalent of custodial interrogation. In the absence of Miranda warnings, Appellant asserts that the incriminating statements he uttered under these circumstances must be suppressed.
The Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and against self-incrimination counteract "the inherently compelling pressures of custodial interrogation." Commonwealth v. Colavita , 993 A.2d 874, 88 n.9 (Pa 2010) (citation omitted).
To safeguard an uncounseled individual's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, suspects subject to custodial interrogation by law enforcement officers must be warned that they have the right to remain silent, that anything they say may be used against them in court, and that they are entitled to the presence of an attorney.Thompson v. Keohane , 516 U.S. 99, 107 (1995).
[The United States Supreme Court has] held that an individual in police custody subject to interrogation must affirmatively invoke his or her Miranda rights; thus mere silence in the face of police
questioning after being given Miranda warnings is insufficient to invoke Miranda rights.Commonwealth v. Briggs , 12 A.3d 291, 318 n.27 (Pa. 2011), citing Berghius v. Thompkins , 560 U.S. 370 (2010).
An individual must be both in police custody and subject to interrogation to trigger the Miranda rights. Commonwealth v. Heggins , 809 A.2d 908, 914 (Pa. Super. 2002). Statements volunteered by an individual outside the context of custodial interrogation will not be suppressed for lack of Miranda warnings. Id.
A person is "in custody" of law enforcement when physically deprived of freedom of action in any significant way or "placed in a situation in which [he or she] reasonably believes that [his or her] freedom of action or movement is restricted." Commonwealth v. Sepulveda , 855 A.2d 783, 790 (Pa. 2004). This test depends on whether a reasonable person in the position of the one being interrogated would believe his or her freedom of action to be restricted. Id. The interrogating officer's subjective intent does not control. Id.
Interrogation is defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers." Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444. It includes not only express questioning but also "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Rhode Island v. Innis , 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980). The inquiry into whether language or conduct is likely to elicit an incriminating response is necessarily contextual, and it must be made on a case-by-case basis. See id. However, consideration is limited to those outcomes that could have been foreseen by a law enforcement officer at the time in question. Id. The subjective purpose or intent of the law enforcement officer is of "little importance" to this determination. Commonwealth v. Ramos , 532 A.2d 465, 468 (Pa. Super. 1987) (restating Innis ).
We agree with the trial court's conclusion that Appellant was in police custody when he made his statement. We cannot agree, however, that Appellant's admission was the product of interrogation or its equivalent. Instead, Appellant's admission was voluntary and spontaneous and, consequently, admissible against him. See Commonwealth v. Cruz , 71 A.3d 998, 1003 (Pa. Super. 2013) ("Statements not made in response to custodial interrogation are classified as gratuitous and are not subject to suppression for lack of Miranda warnings."), quoting Commonwealth v. Heggins , 809 A.2d 908, 914 (Pa. Super. 2002).
In this case, Appellant asserts, in part, that Officer Gigliotti's continued questioning about his identity constituted interrogation. The trial court, however, determined that "the officers [had] every right to determine [Appellant's] proper [identification]" as part of the valid investigatory stop. N.T. Suppression, 12/10/14, at 66. During an investigatory stop:
An officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions.Commonwealth v. Proctor , 657 A.2d 8, 10-11 (Pa. Super. 1995), quoting Berkemer v. McCarthy , 468 U.S. 420 (1984); see also , Commonwealth v. Jackson , 519 A.2d 427, 430 (Pa. Super. 1986) (determining an individual's identity is a necessary part of an investigatory stop). Questioning an individual during an investigatory stop, to determine his or her identity and to allay any reasonable suspicions the officer might have, is not interrogation. Officer Gigliotti was not required to issue Miranda warnings to Appellant before asking for his name.
***
The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinion that [investigatory stops] are subject to the dictates of Miranda.
Even if the circumstances of Appellant's detention ripened into custodial arrest, the law limits the definition of interrogation to police speech or conduct that foreseeably elicits an incriminating response under the circumstances. See Innis , 446 U.S. at 300. When Officer Gigliotti spoke to Appellant about the consequences of continuing to falsely identify himself, neither Officer Gigliotti nor Officer Falcione had recovered contraband from the vehicle. N.T. Suppression, 12/10/14, at 14-15. The officers asked Appellant nothing about the contents of the car. Id. at 11. Since the officers had no reason to suspect Appellant of possessing weapons or drugs, there is no basis in the record to infer that they should have known that inquiring about Appellant's identity would elicit an incriminating admission about unlawful firearms or drug possession.
We also reject Appellant's claim that the placement of a bag containing heroin and a weapon into a police vehicle, while Appellant watched, constituted the functional equivalent of interrogation. The definition of police conduct that requires Miranda warnings excludes acts "normally attendant to arrest and custody." Innis , 446 U.S. at 300. Securing illicit drugs and weapons in a police cruiser following their seizure constitutes a routine act attendant to an arrest. Since the placement of contraband inside a police vehicle is an act normally associated with seizure and arrest, we cannot agree with Appellant that the officers should have known that their actions would elicit an incriminating response.
In sum, the record supports the trial court's finding that Appellant made his incriminating statement after Officer Gigliotti issued Miranda warnings. In the alternative, suppression is not warranted in this case because Appellant's statement was spontaneous and voluntary and not the product of police interrogation or its functional equivalent. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 7/6/2016