Opinion
J-S32015-17 No. 2313 EDA 2016
06-29-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. DENNIS L. PRENDES Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order June 15, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-48-CR-0001246-2012 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., STABILE, J., and FITZGERALD, J. MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. --------
Appellant, Dennis L. Prendes, appeals from the order entered in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his first petition brought pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). We affirm.
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
In its opinion, the PCRA court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them.
Throughout the opinion, the PCRA court cites Megan's Law as the statute governing Appellant's sexual offender registration requirements. Megan's Law, however, expired on December 20, 2012. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9791-9799.9. The Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) became effective in its place. See 42 Pa.C.S.A §§ 9799.10-9799.41. SORNA governed Appellant's January 11, 2013 SVP hearing and dictates Appellant's registration requirements. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.13.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
WHERE TRIAL COUNSEL'S ERRORS LED TO A JURY THAT WAS PRONE TO CONVICT WHICH, IN TURN, LED TO THE PLEA OF GUILTY, AFTER COUNSEL SAW A DEADLOCKED JURY'S TALLY SHOWING IT FAVORED CONVICTION, PANICKED AND ESSENTIALLY FORCED APPELLANT TO TAKE THE PLEA, DID THE [PCRA] COURT ERR IN NOT PERMITTING THESE CLAIMS TO BE PRESENTED AT A PCRA HEARING?(Appellant's Brief at 2).
WHERE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN ADVISING [APPELLANT] TO PLEAD GUILTY, DID THE [PCRA] COURT ERR IN NOT GRANTING A NEW TRIAL?
WHERE COUNSEL COERCED [APPELLANT] TO PLEAD GUILTY, DID THE [TRIAL] COURT ERR IN NOT GRANTING A NEW TRIAL?
WHERE AFTER[-]DISCOVERED EVIDENCE MET ALL THE TESTS FOR THE GRANT OF A NEW TRIAL, DID THE [PCRA] COURT ERR IN NOT GRANTING RELIEF IN THE PCRA PROCEEDING OR HOLD A HEARING ON THIS ISSUE?
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Michael J. Koury, Jr., we conclude Appellant's issues on appeal merit no relief. The PCRA court opinion comprehensively discusses and disposes of the questions presented. ( See PCRA Court Opinion, filed September 8, 2016, at 17-33) (finding: (1) Appellant's PCRA petition sought to raise various claims of counsel's ineffectiveness during trial; however, these claims do not address validity of Appellant's guilty plea or legality of Appellant's sentence; as such, these claims are waived, and PCRA court properly prohibited Appellant from exploring, at PCRA hearing, counsel's alleged ineffectiveness during trial; (2) with respect to trial counsel's handling of jury's straw vote, trial counsel shared straw vote with Appellant and informed Appellant that straw vote made trial counsel less confident in likelihood of acquittal; trial counsel also discussed outcome of various scenarios with Appellant on numerous occasions, including during jury deliberations; trial counsel's actions were based on twenty years of experience as criminal defense attorney; under these circumstances, Appellant failed to establish counsel's advice about straw vote lacked reasonable basis or prejudiced Appellant; with respect to trial counsel's handling of SORNA implications, counsel prepared memorandum for Appellant prior to trial, which described SORNA implications of guilty plea including possibility of lifetime registration as sex offender; Appellant acknowledged possibility of lifetime registration as sex offender in both his written and oral plea colloquies; further, counsel supplemented Appellant's oral plea colloquy to address December 2012 amendments to statute, which extended required registration periods; significantly, even if counsel had failed to inform Appellant of SORNA implications, it would not have undermined validity of plea because sex offender registration requirements are collateral consequence; thus, Appellant's claims that counsel was ineffective when he advised Appellant about guilty plea fail; (3) while Appellant alleges counsel's references to possible thirty-year sentence scared him, Pennsylvania law required trial counsel to inform Appellant of permissible sentencing ranges; as such, trial counsel's references to potential thirty-year sentence did not unlawfully induce Appellant's guilty plea; additionally, trial counsel's recommendation that Appellant enter plea prior to jury's verdict was reasonable and did not coerce Appellant's guilty plea; to succeed on claim, Appellant had to establish jury's verdict offered potential for success substantially greater than entry of guilty plea; nevertheless, Appellant merely speculates jury would not have reached verdict or would have acquitted Appellant of most serious charges; under these circumstances, counsel's advice to enter plea prior to jury's verdict did not unlawfully induce Appellant's guilty plea; finally, Appellant's allegations of coercion directly contradict his plea colloquies and his testimony at PCRA hearing; record indicates Appellant freely and voluntarily entered his guilty plea; thus, Appellant's claims that trial counsel coerced his guilty plea fail; (4) alleged after-discovered evidence does not exculpate Appellant as it merely impeaches credibility of Commonwealth's polygraph analyst; further, Appellant waived challenge to credibility of Commonwealth's polygraph analyst through entry of negotiated guilty plea; because impeachment evidence does not establish basis for relief and Appellant waived this claim through entry of guilty plea, court properly denied relief and limited exploration of claim at PCRA hearing). The record supports the court's analysis and belies Appellant's allegations of coercion and counsel's ineffectiveness, where the plea colloquy makes clear Appellant entered his guilty plea of his own volition, calmly, fully informed, and expressly satisfied with the services of his counsel. ( See N.T. Guilty Plea, 9/18/12, at 22-40; R.R. at 33-51.) Appellant is bound by his statements made under oath in the course of his plea and cannot, during post-sentencing or collateral proceedings, attack the plea on grounds which contradict the statements he made in his plea colloquy. See Commonwealth v . Pollard , 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa.Super. 2003) (stating Pennsylvania law presumes defendant who entered guilty plea was aware of what he was doing and bears burden of proving otherwise). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the PCRA court's opinion.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 6/29/2017
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