Opinion
21-P-478
11-02-2022
COMMONWEALTH v. LUIS MORALES.
Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass.App.Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
Meade, Wolohojian & Singh, JJ.
There was also circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer that the defendant was the shooter. Both victims gave a detailed description of the shooter that matched the defendant's appearance at the time of his arrest and his appearance in the Facebook messages that were used to arrange the drug deal. The jury also had text messages between one victim and a number, listed as "Luis" in the victim's contacts, in which they discussed the victim buying crack cocaine from the defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 2 3.0
After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of two counts of armed robbery, two counts of armed assault with intent to murder, two counts of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, carrying a firearm without a license, and carrying a loaded firearm without a license. On appeal, he claims that there was insufficient evidence to establish his identity as the perpetrator. We affirm.
"When analyzing whether the record evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, an appellate court is not required to ask itself whether j_t_ believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" (quotation omitted). Commonwealth v. Rocheteau, 74 Mass.App.Ct. 17, 19 (2009). "Rather, the relevant 'question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979) .
It is a basic tenet of law that the Commonwealth must establish as an essential element of any crime that the defendant is the same person who is the subject of the indictment and the same person referred to in the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Davila, 17 Mass.App.Ct. 511, 512 (1984). "Proof of the identity of the person who committed the offense may be established in a number of ways and '[i]t is not necessary that any one witness should distinctly swear that the defendant was the [person], if the result of all the testimony, on comparison of all its details and particulars, should identify [the defendant] as the offender.'" Commonwealth v. Blackmer, 77 Mass.App.Ct. 474, 483 (2010), quoting Davila, supra. "The Commonwealth is entitled to the reasonable inferences that a jury may draw from its evidence on identification, . . . and the inferences drawn by the jury need only be reasonable and possible, not necessary or inescapable." Blackmer, supra (quotation omitted).
Here, the defendant's claim is without merit because not only was there direct evidence of the defendant's identity based on the testimony of one of the victims, which the jury was entitled to credit, but also because there was ample circumstantial evidence to identify the defendant as the shooter. See Commonwealth v. Gonzalez Santos, 100 Mass.App.Ct. 1, 3 (2021) ("the victim's testimony, as credited by the jury and evidenced by their verdicts, suffices to support the defendant's convictions").
At trial, the Commonwealth's evidence disclosed that the two shooting victims endeavored to sell marijuana to the defendant. One of the victims testified that the defendant shot both of them in the course of the sale negotiations. In the past, that victim and the defendant had been cellmates at a house of correction. The same victim, with "a hundred percent" certainty, also identified the defendant as the shooter in a photographic array. This direct evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant's identity as the shooter. See Commonwealth v. Aitahmedlamara, 63 Mass.App.Ct. 76, 78 n.3 (2005); Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 23 Mass.App.Ct. 184, 185 (1986). 1
In an attempt to counter the direct evidence of the defendant's identity as the shooter, the defendant claims the victim's testimony was "suspect and should never have been put before the jury." However, the sufficiency of the evidence "is to be measured upon that which was admitted in evidence without regard to the propriety of the admission." Commonwealth v. Farnsworth, 76 Mass.App.Ct. 87, 98 (2010) .
The defendant also claims that the victim who identified him, being the beneficiary of a nonprosecution agreement for the unconsummated drug sale, was not truthful. He adds that the victim's testimony was also contradictory. Neither claim is a factor in the sufficiency of the evidence equation. See Gonzalez Santos, 100 Mass.App.Ct. at 3. See also Commonwealth v. Akara, 465 Mass. 245, 253 (2013) ("Questions of credibility are to be resolved in the Commonwealth's favor" [quotation omitted]); Commonwealth v. Ragland, 72 Mass.App.Ct. 815, 832 (2008) ("The task of assessing the cogency of evidence and resolving conflicting testimony ... is the exclusive province of the jury"). There was more than sufficient evidence to establish the defendant's identity as the person who shot the victims. The judge properly denied the motion for a required finding of not guilty.
Judgments affirmed.