Opinion
J-S83033-18 No. 900 WDA 2018
03-15-2019
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DOMINIQUE LEE MOFFATT, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order May 30, 2018 in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0000046-2014 BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
Dominique Lee Moffatt ("Moffatt") appeals from the Order dismissing his second Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). We affirm.
The PCRA court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history as follows:
The case concerns a robbery by [Moffatt], and his co-conspirators, Michael Toran [("Toran")] and Eric Akins [("Akins")], of Barbato's Restaurant on West Sixth Street in Erie, Pennsylvania on October 5, 2013.
On November 12, 2014, following a two-day jury trial, [Moffatt] was convicted of [robbery, criminal conspiracy to commit robbery, terroristic threats, two counts of recklessly endangering another person, and receiving stolen property].
On January 27, 2015, [Moffatt] was sentenced to an aggregate of 12 to 24 years of incarceration. On January 28, 2015, in response to a Motion to Modify and/or Reconsider Sentencing, the [trial court] modified the sentence to an aggregate of 10 to 20 years of incarceration.
On October 29, 2015, [Moffatt], pro se, filed a Petition for [PCRA] relief. Attorney William Hathaway [("Attorney Hathaway")] was appointed as PCRA counsel. In the Supplement to [the PCRA Petition] filed January 28, 2016, PCRA counsel requested reinstatement of [Moffatt's] right to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc, and an appeal nunc pro tunc from the judgment of sentence. On April 28, 2016, the [c]ourt granted the PCRA [Petition].
On May 31, 2016, Attorney Hathaway filed a Motion for New Trial and/or Arrest of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc, challenging the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. The [c]ourt denied the post-sentence [M]otion on June 2, 2016. Attorney Hathaway timely filed a Notice of Appeal and a court-ordered [Pa.R.A.P.] 1925(b) Statement. In the 1925(b) Statement, [Moffatt] generally challenged the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. In the [Pa.R.A.P.] 1925(a) Opinion, the [c]ourt found the sufficiency and weight claims were waived as vague.
On direct appeal, [this] Court agreed [that] the appellate claims were waived as too vague to allow for proper review and analysis of the issues. Accordingly, on April 12, 2017, [this] Court affirmed the judgment of sentence without reaching the merits of the issues presented. On August 29, 2017, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied [Moffatt's] Petition for Allowance of Appeal.
On October 30, 2018, [Moffatt] filed a [second] pro se PCRA [Petition] alleging a violation of the Constitution of Pennsylvania or the Constitution or laws of the United States, ineffective assistance of counsel, improper obstruction by Commonwealth officials of [Moffatt's] right to appeal, and the imposition of an
illegal sentence by checking off boxes on the PCRA form [P]etition. In support of the claims, [Moffatt], pro se, asserted his sentence was harsh [] and the convictions were based upon inconsistent testimony of Commonwealth witnesses.PCRA Court Notice of Intent to Dismiss Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, 5/4/18, 1-4 (internal citations and footnotes omitted, footnotes added). On May 30, 2018, the PCRA court denied Attorney Harmon's Petition for Leave to withdraw and dismissed Moffatt's second PCRA Petition. Thereafter, Moffatt filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement.
On November 13, 2017, the [c]ourt appointed Attorney Michael Harmon [("Attorney Harmon")] as PCRA counsel. On December 13, 2017, Attorney Harmon filed a "no-merit" letter and a Petition for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel. Attorney Harmon advised [that] the legality of the sentence claim was without merit. Attorney Harmon acknowledged [that Moffatt] received a prior record score of "refel" [sic] due to prior adjudications as a minor, and the guidelines were calculated under the deadly weapon enhancement. Attorney Harmon further noted the sentences [for robbery and terroristic threats] were within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines....
On January 24, 2018, Attorney Harmon filed an Amended [PCRA Petition challenging the effectiveness of Attorney Hathaway.]
As a result of the reinstatement of his direct appeal rights, Moffatt's judgment of sentence became final on November 29, 2017, at the conclusion of the ninety-day period during which Moffatt could have sought review by the United States Supreme Court. Thus, Moffatt's second Petition was timely filed under the PCRA.
On appeal, Moffatt raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether [Attorney Hathaway] was ineffective in failing to properly preserve [Moffatt's] challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his criminal conviction in the above-captioned matter[,] as [Moffatt] was not identified by any witness at the crime scene as being one of the alleged perpetrators; the Commonwealth did not present any forensic evidence that would establish that [Moffatt] was a perpetrator at the scene of the crime; and[] the only evidence presented by the Commonwealth to establish that [Moffatt] was at the
scene of the crime was testimony from a previously[-]recorded interview of an alleged accomplice[,] who later recanted said statement at the time of trial[?]Brief for Appellant at 7.
2. Whether [Attorney Hathaway] was ineffective in failing to properly preserve [Moffatt's] challenge to the weight of the evidence regarding his criminal conviction in the above-captioned matter[,] as [Moffatt] was not identified by any witness at the crime scene as being one of the alleged perpetrators; the Commonwealth did not present any forensic evidence that would establish that [Moffatt] was a perpetrator at the scene of the crime; and[] the only evidence presented by the Commonwealth to establish that [Moffatt] was at the scene of the crime was testimony from a previously[-]recorded interview of an alleged accomplice[,] who later recanted said statement at the time of trial[?]
Our standard of review regarding an order dismissing a PCRA petition is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Ortiz , 17 A.3d 417, 420 (Pa. Super. 2011). "The PCRA court's findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record." Id.
To be eligible for relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCRA petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel's action or omission; and (3) there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different absent such error. Commonwealth v. Spotz , 18 A.3d 244, 260 (Pa. 2011). "A PCRA petitioner must address each of these prongs on appeal." Commonwealth v. Wholaver , 177 A.3d 136, 144 (Pa. 2018).
In both issues presented on appeal, Moffatt claims that Attorney Hathaway rendered ineffective assistance by failing to preserve his challenges to the sufficiency and weight of evidence presented at trial. Brief for Appellant at 12, 20. Moffatt's argument fails to address both the second and third prongs of an effectiveness claim. Instead, Moffatt essentially recycles the substantive portions of his arguments from his direct appeal, which issues were dismissed for vagueness. See id. at 18-19, 22-23; see also Commonwealth v. Moffatt , 997 WDA 2016 (Pa. Super. 2017) (unpublished memorandum at 5-8).
It is not the role of this Court to generate Moffatt's arguments for him. "When an appellant fails to meaningfully discuss each of the three ineffectiveness prongs, he is not entitled to relief, and we are constrained to find such claims waived for lack of development." Commonwealth v. Fears , 86 A.3d 795, 804 (Pa. 2014) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, both of Moffatt's claims are waived.
Even if Moffatt's claims were not waived, Moffatt still would not have prevailed, as "counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a [] claim [that is without merit]." Id. at 804. In both instances, Moffatt has failed to prove that the underlying claims are of arguable merit, let alone that he was prejudiced as a result of Attorney Hathaway's failure to preserve the same. See Spotz , supra.
We note that "unsupported speculation" does not establish a reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would have been different. Commonwealth v. Charleston , 94 A.3d 1012, 1026 (Pa. Super. 2014). Here, Moffatt fails to offer even unsupported speculation that he was prejudiced by Attorney Hathaway's actions or omissions.
In addressing the arguable merit to Moffatt's claims, we observe that Moffatt's underlying sufficiency challenge relies on a lack of forensic evidence, the absence of eye-witness testimony specifically implicating him, and an alleged recanting of co-conspirator Akins's incriminating statement made to police. Brief for Appellant at 18-19.
In assessing [a] sufficiency challenge, we must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, the trier of fact could have found that the Commonwealth proved each element of the crime[s] beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence need not preclude every possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented.Commonwealth v. Giron , 155 A.3d 635, 638 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). "The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proof by means of wholly circumstantial evidence, and the jury, which passes upon the weight and credibility of each witness's testimony, is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence." Commonwealth v. Ramtahal , 33 A.3d 602, 607 (Pa. 2011).
Regarding Moffatt's first claim, the PCRA court set forth the relevant law, addressed Moffatt's claim, and concluded that it lacks merit. See PCRA Court Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 5/4/18, 8-20. Upon our review of the record, we agree with and adopt the sound reasoning of the PCRA court in determining that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to prove every element of the crimes for which Moffatt was convicted. See id. Thus, we discern no arguable merit to Moffatt's claims, and are unable to afford him relief on this basis.
Moffatt also challenges Attorney Hathaway's failure to preserve his claim that the verdicts are against the weight of the evidence. Again, Moffatt avers that a lack of forensic evidence, the absence of eye-witness testimony specifically implicating him, and an alleged recantation of co-conspirator Akins's incriminating statement made to police necessarily undermine the jury's verdicts. Brief for Appellant at 22-23.
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence ... an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court's determination that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.Commonwealth v. Clay , 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The jury was free to believe any portion of Akins's testimony, including the recorded confession implicating Moffatt, as well as his testimony at trial whereby he confirmed that his guilty plea specifically named Moffatt as an accomplice. See N.T., 11/12/14, at 13. The jury was also free to reject any portion of Akins's testimony, including his testimony at trial where he stated that he was "coached" to implicate Moffatt, did not understand that Moffatt was implicated by his guilty plea, and/or was "high" when he spoke to police. See id. at 14, 17-18, 28. As Moffatt points out, testimonial evidence provided the basis for his convictions. See Brief for Appellant at 22-23. As credibility determinations fall within the exclusive province of the jury, see Ramtahal , supra , we fail to discern from the record any arguable merit to Moffatt's claims and conclude that he is not entitled to relief. See Commonwealth v. McClure , 144 A.3d 970, 977 (Pa. Super. 2016) (holding that it is an encroachment upon the province of the jury to manipulate its discretion in determining credibility).
Based upon the foregoing, we find that the PCRA court's determination was supported by the record and free of legal error. As such, we affirm the PCRA court's dismissal of Moffatt's second PCRA Petition.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 3/15/2019
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