Opinion
2568 EDA 2022 J-S11037-23
10-24-2023
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. EDUARDO MENDEZ Appellant
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 15, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0001707-2021
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM
KING, J.
Appellant, Eduardo Mendez, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury trial convictions for two counts of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance ("PWID"), possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and criminal conspiracy. We affirm.
35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (16), (32), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903, respectively.
In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/15/22, at 1-5).
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
Were the verdicts of guilty not supported by sufficient evidence?
Did the [trial] court err in holding that Appellant's arrest was supported by probable cause?
Did the trial court err in precluding Appellant from presenting evidence that he was represented by the Bucks County Public Defender's Office?
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant by imposing a manifestly excessive sentence at the high end of the aggravated range, relying on improper factors and the nature of the offense and failing to consider all relevant factors?(Appellant's Brief at 10) (reordered for purposes of disposition).
Our standard of review for sufficiency claims is as follows:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the [trier] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 964 (Pa.Super. 2016), appeal denied, 641 Pa. 63, 165 A.3d 895 (2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa.Super. 2011)).
Additionally, the following principles govern our review of an order denying a motion to suppress:
An appellate court's standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by [those] findings and may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.Commonwealth v. Ford, 175 A.3d 985, 989 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied, 647 Pa. 522, 190 A.3d 580 (2018).
Our standard of review of a trial court's admission or exclusion of evidence is well established and very narrow:
Admission of evidence is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be reversed absent a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion. Not merely an error in judgment, an abuse of discretion occurs when the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as shown by the evidence on record.Commonwealth v. M. Montalvo, 604 Pa. 386, 403, 986 A.2d 84, 94 (2009), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 857, 131 S.Ct. 127, 178 L.Ed.2d 77 (2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). When reviewing the denial of a motion in limine, we apply the same standard as to other evidentiary rulings. Commonwealth v. Sami, 243 A.3d 991, 997 (Pa.Super. 2020) (noting that motion in limine is procedure for obtaining ruling on admissibility of evidence prior to trial).
"The threshold inquiry with the admission of evidence is whether the evidence is relevant." Commonwealth v. Stokes, 78 A.3d 644, 654 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 625 Pa. 636, 89 A.3d 661 (2014). "Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable, or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding the existence of a material fact." Id. See also Pa.R.E. 401 (defining relevant evidence). Nevertheless, "[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Pa.R.E. 403.
Further, "[c]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an appellant to an appeal as of right." Commonwealth v. Phillips, 946 A.2d 103, 112 (Pa.Super. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1264, 129 S.Ct. 2450, 174 L.Ed.2d 240 (2009). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary aspects of sentencing issue:
[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P 902 and 903;
(2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1183 (Pa.Super. 2005)). When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant must invoke this Court's jurisdiction by including in his brief a separate concise statement demonstrating a substantial question as to the appropriateness of the sentence under the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571 Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).
This Court reviews discretionary sentencing challenges based on the following standard:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is more than just an error in judgment and, on appeal, the trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, bias or ill-will.Commonwealth v. McNabb, 819 A.2d 54, 55 (Pa.Super. 2003) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hess, 745 A.2d 29, 30-31 (Pa.Super. 2000)).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Brian T. McGuffin, we conclude Appellant's issues merit no relief. The trial court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions presented.
Regarding Appellant's sufficiency of the evidence claims, the court initially found that Appellant waived these claims by failing to specify in his Rule 1925(b) statement the elements of each crime that he alleges was insufficient to sustain each conviction, particularly where Appellant raised sufficiency challenges to multiple offenses. (See Trial Court Opinion at 8). The court further found that even if Appellant had properly preserved his claims, Appellant's sufficiency arguments lacked merit. Specifically, the
Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to establish the existence of a conspiracy between Appellant and his co-conspirator, Giovanni Rosales, where Appellant travelled approximately 1,500 miles from Texas to Pennsylvania with Mr. Rosales, drove Mr. Rosales to the "sample buy," carried the black backpack in which the drugs were found into a hotel room that Mr. Rosales rented for the day, remained in the room with Mr. Rosales for hours while Mr. Rosales set up a subsequent "bulk buy," and left the room with Mr. Rosales at approximately the time when the "bulk buy" was scheduled to occur. The court noted that proof of a conspiracy between Appellant and Mr. Rosales negates the need to prove that Appellant constructively possessed the controlled substances and paraphernalia to sustain his remaining convictions. In any event, the court found that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to establish Appellant's constructive possession of the drugs because a surveillance video showed Appellant carrying an air compressor and the backpack containing the drugs into the hotel room. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, Appellant's physical handling of the drugs and the surrounding circumstances of Appellant's involvement with Mr. Rosales throughout the day was sufficient to demonstrate that Appellant had the ability and intent to exercise control over the contraband. (See id. at 9-14).
Additionally, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Detective Jarrod Eisenhauer, who was qualified as an expert in the field of drug trafficking investigations. Detective Eisenhauer testified that typically when there are two individuals involved in a transaction, the higher-ranking individual will attempt to insulate himself from exposure and the lower-ranking individual will handle the drugs during the sale and undertake tasks such as securing lodging.
Regarding Appellant's claim that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of his flight prior to arrest and the $3,300.00 found on his person, the court found that the police officers had probable cause to arrest Appellant. Prior to his arrest, police observed Appellant drive Mr. Rosales to the "sample buy," remain with him for the remainder of the day while an additional transaction was set up, carry a bag and an air compressor into a hotel room with Mr. Rosales, look up and down the hallway with Mr. Rosales multiple times, and leave the room together at approximately the time of the second sale. Here, the circumstances clearly demonstrate that police had probable cause to suspect that Appellant was not merely present but participating in the criminal activity. (Id. at 15-16).
Appellant cites to United States v. Butts, 704 F.2d 701 (3rd Cir. 1983) and Commonwealth v. Shaw, 476 Pa. 543, 383 A.2d 496 (1978) to support his claim that the police did not have probable cause. In Butts, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that probable cause did not exist to arrest the defendant who was merely sitting in the backseat of a car that the individuals being surveilled were about to enter. The Court noted that at the time of the arrest, the police officers who arrested the defendant had no other information about him and did not know what connection he had to the individuals who the police suspected of criminal activity. In Shaw, our Supreme Court found that probable cause did not exist where the only information the police had about the defendant was a general statement that he associated with the perpetrators of the crime. Our Supreme Court noted that police officers did not have any information to indicate that the defendant was at the scene of the crime or involved with the criminal activity. Here, Appellant was present at the first sale, remained with Mr. Rosales the whole day while Mr. Rosales set up the second sale, and left with Mr. Rosales in time for the second sale. Accordingly, the instant case is factually distinguishable from both Butts and Shaw.
With respect to Appellant's claim that the court erred in denying his motion in limine seeking to present evidence that Appellant's counsel was a public defender, the court determined that Appellant failed to establish that he was entitled to introduce such evidence for the purpose of suggesting to the jury that he was indigent. The court further found that introduction of such evidence risked confusing the jury and increased the likelihood that the verdict would not be based on the facts presented but rather on Appellant's perceived economic status. (See Trial Court Opinion at 16-17).
The court further explained that it acted within its discretion in sentencing Appellant. At the sentencing hearing, the court stated that it took into consideration Appellant's personal history, his rehabilitative needs, and the letters from his mother and sister but ultimately found that Appellant's criminal history, his refusal to take accountability and the impact of his actions on the community warranted a sentence in the aggravated range. (See Trial Court Opinion at 20-22). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court's opinion.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, preserved his claim in a timely post-sentence motion, and included in his brief a Rule 2119(f) statement. As presented, Appellant's claim concerning an excessive sentence in combination with the court's failure to consider certain mitigating factors and reliance on impermissible factors arguably raises a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 629 Pa. 636, 105 A.3d 736 (2014) (stating: ""[A]n excessive sentence claim-in conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors-raises a substantial question"). See also Commonwealth v. Trimble, 615 A.2d 48 (Pa.Super. 1992) (holding defendant's claim that court failed to consider factors set forth under Section 9721(b) and focused solely on seriousness of defendant's offense raised substantial question).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.