Opinion
J-S28045-18 No. 1538 MDA 2017
08-03-2018
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant, v. DOMINIC JARRELL MCLAURIN, Appellee
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered September 26, 2017 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County, Criminal Division at No(s): CP-41-CR-0000640-2016 BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the Order granting Dominic Jarrell McLaurin's ("McLaurin") pre-trial Motion to Preclude the admission, at trial, of statements set forth in his prison intake document. We affirm.
The Commonwealth has certified that the suppression court's Order will terminate or substantially handicap its prosecution, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant history underlying the instant appeal as follows:
By Information filed on April 28, 2016, [McLaurin] was charged with two counts of possession with intent to deliver controlled substances[] and related counts. The charges ar[o]se
out of an incident that allegedly occurred on [February 3, 2016,] when Trooper Tyson Havens and Trooper Edward Dammer of the Pennsylvania State Police were on patrol in the Newberry section of Williamsport, confronted [McLaurin,] who was seated in the driver's seat of a motor vehicle and, after further investigation, discovered eight packs of heroin in the vehicle.
A jury was selected on August 22, 2017[,] and the case was scheduled for a jury trial to begin on September 26, 2017.
Prior to the jury being brought into the courtroom and sworn, the parties met with the court for the purpose of [McLaurin] raising oral motions.
[McLaurin's] first motion consisted of a [M]otion in limine to preclude the use of [] McLaurin's intake document from the Lycoming County Prison. On September 22, 2017, the Commonwealth filed a Notice of Intent to Introduce Certified Records pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 902(11). Among the records were a [m]edical [a]dmission form[,] dated March 1, 2016, apparently completed by a prison nurse[,] which, among other things, reads as follows:
"Street drug use: denies", "current prescribed medication: Percocet, ten milligrams—twenty milligrams/daily—since 2015", and a medication administration record noting under "medication" "Tramadol 50 mg's ... 3 days prn" and ["]Tramadol 50 mg ... 3 days prn."
The medication administration record also indicated[,] under "hour"[,] the numbers 8 and 12 for the first Tramadol entry[,] and the number 6 for the second Tramadol entry. The medical administration record also included the initials of a person under the numbers 16, 17 and 18[,] corresponding to the 8 and 12 entries[,] and initials of a person under the numbers 15, 16 and 17[,] corresponding with the 6 entry.
The Commonwealth intended to introduce the [m]edical [a]dmission form for the purpose of proving that [McLaurin] denied street drug use[,] thus proving that the drugs allegedly
possessed by him[, approximately one month prior to his arrest,] were for the purpose of distribution and not personal use.Trial Court Opinion, 12/19/17, at 1-3 (footnotes added).
[McLaurin] objected to the use of the form[,] arguing that it was hearsay and prejudicial.
The Commonwealth argued that it was admissible as a business record certified under Rule 902(11).
Further, the Commonwealth wanted to introduce portions of the [medical intake documents,] where[in] [McLaurin] allegedly admitted to taking Percocets [sic], as well as [McLaurin's] detox observation record from March 1, 2016[,] to March 4, 2016. The Commonwealth argued that "it indicates that [McLaurin] exhibited zero symptoms of detox and received no treatment for detox." The Commonwealth argued that the detox observations prove that [McLaurin] was "not withdrawing from anything."
In addition to [McLaurin's] hearsay and prejudice argument, [McLaurin] contended that it was not relevant. Specifically, the incident occurred on February 3, 2016[,] and [McLaurin] was admitted to the Lycoming County [P]rison on March 1, 2016[,] after he was taken into custody.
In its Opinion, the trial court mistakenly states that the incident took place on January 3, 2016. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/19/17, at 1.
After a hearing, the trial court granted McLaurin's Motion to Preclude, at trial, the admission of the medical intake forms, concluding that the forms' statement regarding McLaurin's narcotics use was prejudicial, not relevant, and constituted impermissible hearsay. N.T., 9/26/17, at 10. The trial court additionally concluded that evidence regarding McLaurin's admission that he was taking Percocet on March 1, 2016, without expert testimony, would confuse the jury and cause the jury to speculate as to whether McLaurin possessed narcotics for personal use in early February 2016. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/19/17, at 3.
The Commonwealth filed a Notice of Appeal, followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters complained of on appeal.
The Commonwealth presents the following claims for our review:
I. Whether the trial court erred by misapplying the law in granting [McLaurin's] Motion to Preclude Evidence?Brief for the Commonwealth at 7.
II. Whether the trial court erred by precluding the evidence based on the timeliness of discovery[,] when less severe remedies were available?
III. Whether the trial court erred by granting [McLaurin] relief, in part, on grounds not asserted in his Motion to Preclude Evidence?
Our standard of review of an order granting or denying a motion in limine is well settled:
When ruling on a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion in limine, we apply an evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of review. The admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and a trial court's ruling regarding the admission of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous.Commonwealth v. Mangel , 181 A.3d 1154, 1158 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Moser , 999 A.2d 602, 605 (Pa. Super. 2010)).
In reviewing the trial court's Order, we are cognizant that "[e]vidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence[,] and the fact is of consequence in determining the action." Pa.R.E. 401. However, "[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of ... unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Pa.R.E. 403.
The Commonwealth claims that the trial court misapplied the law in granting McLaurin's Motion to Preclude. Brief for the Commonwealth at 12. In support, the Commonwealth asserts that the statements in McLaurin's medical intake forms are admissible pursuant to Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 803(4) (Statement Made for Medical Diagnosis or Treatment) and 803(6) (Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity). Brief for the Commonwealth at 12-13. In support, the Commonwealth states that it provided to the trial court a notarized certification that McLaurin's prison medical records "were made at or near the time of the occurrence of the matters set forth [therein], or from information transmitted by [] a person with knowledge for those matters;" were kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity; and were made as a regular practice. Id. at 14. The Commonwealth proffers that McLaurin, if addicted to street drugs, would have been unable to obtain them during his incarceration. Id. As such, McLaurin "would be in danger of withdrawing[,] which would require medical treatment." Id.
Further, the Commonwealth contends that McLaurin's statement in the medical intake forms, regarding a hernia in his back and his prescription for Percocet, were made for the purpose of continuing medical treatment. Id. Therefore, the Commonwealth posits, the statements in McLaurin's medical intake forms "fell under the hearsay exceptions found in Pa.R.E. 803(4) and (6)." Brief for the Commonwealth at 15.
The Commonwealth also argues that the observations set forth in one of the medical forms, McLaurin's Detox Observation Record, should be admissible under Pa.R.E. 803(4) and (6) "as a business record exception to hearsay[,] as it was part of the certified records provided to [McLaurin]." Brief for the Commonwealth at 15. The Commonwealth proffers that a symbol used in the record (a "0" with a line through it) indicated that McLaurin showed no symptoms of "detoxing," and that "no treatment was provided to [McLaurin] for detoxing." Id. The Commonwealth contends that the meaning of the zero with a line through it is a universal symbol that any lay person would understand. Id. at 16. According to the Commonwealth, under these circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion when it precluded information provided on the Detox Observation Record as hearsay. Id.
Initially, we observe that in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement, the Commonwealth preserved the following issue regarding the admissibility of McLaurin's medical documents: "The trial court erred when it granted [McLaurin's] [M]otion to Preclude Evidence." Commonwealth's Concise Statement, 10/18/17, at ¶ 1. The Commonwealth did not identify the trial court's alleged misapplication of Rules of Evidence 803(4) or 803(6) as issues to be raised on appeal. Consequently, the Commonwealth's claim as to the records' admissibility, pursuant to Rules of Evidence 803(4) and 803(6), is not preserved for appellate review. See Commonwealth v. Hill , 16 A.3d 484, 491 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating that "[a]ny issues not raised in a [Rule] 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.") (emphasis omitted)).
In its first claim, the Commonwealth additionally argues that "[t]he trial court erred when it ruled that the medical record evidence was not relevant and extremely prejudicial." Brief for the Commonwealth at 16. The Commonwealth asserts that the information in McLaurin's medical forms "is extremely material as it would show that [McLaurin] denied street drug use[,] and that he was not detoxing from drug use." Id. at 17. The Commonwealth further argues that there is probative value to this information "because the fact that [McLaurin] denied street drug use tends to establish the proposition that the drugs found were held with the intention to deliver them, not personally use them." Id. The Commonwealth points out that it would be presenting expert testimony to establish that "if a street drug user were to suddenly stop using the street drug, the user almost always detoxes." Id. Thus, the Commonwealth asserts, the evidence would "make the fact that [McLaurin] was a drug dealer more probable than it would be without the evidence Id.
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed this claim and concluded that it lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/19/17, at 4-9. We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court, as set forth in its Opinion, and affirm on this basis as to McLaurin's first claim. See id.
In its Opinion, the trial court incorporated its on-the-record statement of its reasoning, as set forth in the Notes of Testimony of the hearing on McLaurin's Motion in Limine. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/19/17, at 4-6.
We will address the Commonwealth's second and third claims together. In its second claim, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court improperly precluded the admission of the prison medical forms based on the timeliness of discovery, when less severe remedies were available. Brief for the Commonwealth at 20. The Commonwealth acknowledges the trial court's statement that it did not fault the Commonwealth for the timeliness of its production of the medical records. Id. at 21. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth disputes the trial court's statement that "three working days was not as sufficient amount of time to obtain appropriate rebuttal testimony or to determine if [McLaurin] would like to testify." Id. According to the Commonwealth, suppression of the records was not warranted, and the more appropriate remedy would be a continuance. Id.
In its third claim, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred by granting McLaurin relief, in part, on grounds not asserted in McLaurin's Motion in Limine. Id . According to the Commonwealth, McLaurin's Motion sought to preclude evidence regarding his prison medical forms "based upon the evidence being prejudicial, hearsay, and the lapse in time between the alleged incident and the prison intake date." Id. at 22. The Commonwealth argues that the trial court raised the timeliness issue sua sponte, and relied on the timing of discovery, in part, in granting McLaurin's Motion. Id. The Commonwealth points out that during argument on McLaurin's Motion in Limine, the trial court improperly inquired as to whether Commonwealth's evidence would infringe on McLaurin's right to remain silent. Id. The Commonwealth argues that the trial court's reliance on issues not raised by McLaurin constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id.
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed these claims and concluded that they lack merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/19/17, at 10. We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court, as set forth in its Opinion, and affirm on this basis with regard to the Commonwealth's second and third claims. See id.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 08/03/2018
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