Opinion
J-S60017-18 No. 736 MDA 2018
12-21-2018
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. MARTY WILLIAM MANESS Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 31, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-29-CR-0000143-2016 BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J. MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant Marty William Maness appeals from the judgment of sentence following his convictions for possession with intent to deliver and drug delivery resulting in death. Appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and that his sentence was unreasonable. We affirm.
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) and 18 Pa.C.S. § 2506(a), respectively.
The trial court ably set forth the facts of this case and summarized the testimony presented at trial in its opinion denying Appellant's post-sentence motion. See Trial Ct. Op., 4/3/18, at 3-9. On October 6, 2017, a jury found Appellant guilty of the aforementioned crimes. On October 31, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 108 to 240 months' incarceration.
Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on November 6, 2017, seeking in relevant part, a new trial or a modification of his sentence. On April 3, 2018, the trial court issued an opinion and order denying Appellant's post-sentence motion, and set forth its detailed reasoning for doing so. See generally Trial Ct. Op., 4/3/18.
We note that the trial court's denial of Appellant's post-sentence motion exceeded the 120-day disposition period. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a). However, on February 13, 2018, the trial court granted Appellant's motion for an extension of time due to a change in defense counsel. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(b) ("Upon motion of the defendant within the 120-day disposition period, for good cause shown, the judge may grant one 30-day extension for decision on the motion.").
On May 2, 2018, Appellant timely appealed to this Court. Appellant filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and the trial court issued an opinion relying on its April 3, 2018 opinion.
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
1. Whether the Commonwealth's evidence was sufficient to prove that [Appellant] possessed a controlled substance, being heroin or fentanyl, and delivered, either or both of those substances to [John Murray (the Victim).]
2. Whether the Commonwealth's evidence was sufficient to prove that [Appellant] delivered either heroin or fentanyl to [the Victim] and that that same heroin or fentanyl was subsequently used by [the Victim] resulting in his death[.]
3. Whether, in the alternative, the weight of the evidence was so weak and inconclusive such that no possibility of guilt should have been determined that [Appellant] delivered heroin or fentanyl to [the Victim.]
4. Whether, in the alternative, the weight of the evidence was so weak and inconclusive such that no possibility of guilt should have been determined that the same heroin or fentanyl
determined to have been delivered by [Appellant] was used by [the Victim] resulting in his death[.]Appellant's Brief at 6-7 (full capitalization omitted).
5. Whether [Appellant]'s sentence, while being within the sentencing guidelines, should be modified as being unreasonable considering the circumstances of the case[.]
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant argues that the testimony of the witnesses, Melvin Pete Bowman and James Anthony Day, was not credible. Id. at 23. He claims that Bowman did not testify that he saw the Victim use the heroin. Id. at 20-21. Appellant further argues that Bowman "lied about his drug use that day and evening." Id. at 21. Regarding Day, Appellant claims that Day reported that he did not know what happened to the Victim and denied any drug use. Id. at 22. Appellant continues that Day "change[d] his story" after being incarcerated for a month and a half. Id. at 23.
We apply the following standard when reviewing a sufficiency claim:
Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. [T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded to each witness's testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh
the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder.Commonwealth v. Palmer , 192 A.3d 85, 89 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).
After our careful review of the record in this matter, we agree with, and adopt, the trial court's reasoning regarding this issue. See Trial Ct. Op., 4/3/18, at 10-11. We emphasize that issues regarding credibility of witnesses are challenges to the weight of the evidence and not challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Boxley , 838 A.2d 608, 618 (Pa. 2003) (holding that claims regarding credibility of witnesses "although couched as challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, essentially go to the weight of the evidence. The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence, and to assess the credibility of witnesses." (citation omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant delivered heroin or fentanyl to the Victim, and that this delivery was responsible for the Victim's death. See Palmer , 192 A.3d at 89.
Weight of the Evidence
Appellant argues that during the search of Appellant's home, the police did not find evidence of heroin or fentanyl. Appellant's Brief at 25. Appellant further argues that "no items commonly associated with drug dealing were present from the search such as cash, drug receipts, or drug records." Id. He continues that "[i]t is clear from Trooper [Bradley] Huff's testimony and the testimony of Mr. Bowman and Mr. Day that the evidence taken as a whole does not lead to a conclusion that [Appellant] was actively participating in the drug trade. Id. at 26. Appellant contends that because "the [t]rial [c]ourt did not give the weight necessary to [these] facts," he is entitled to a new trial. Id.
Our standard of review regarding challenges to the weight of the evidence is well-settled:
A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, an appellate court reviews the exercise of the trial court's discretion; it does not answer for itself whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. It is well settled that the [fact-finder] is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and a new trial based on a weight of the evidence claim is only warranted where the [fact-finder's] verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it shocks one's sense of justice. In determining whether this standard has been met, appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge's discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted where the facts and inferences of record disclose a palpable abuse of discretion.Commonwealth v. Landis , 89 A.3d 694, 699 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
We have explained that
[a] new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of the trial court is to determine that notwithstanding all the evidence, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them, or to give them equal weight with all the facts, is to deny justice. A motion
for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict; thus the trial court is under no obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner.Id. (citation omitted).
After careful review of the record, we agree with the trial court's reasoning regarding this issue. See Trial Ct. Op., 4/3/18, at 10-11. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the verdict was not so contrary to the evidence so as to shock one's sense of justice. See id. at 12; Landis , 89 A.3d at 699.
Modification of Sentence
Appellant argues that he took steps to save the Victim's life and that he called 911. Appellant's Brief at 27-28. He claims that this showed a "strong level of compassion on his part." Id. at 27. Appellant contends the trial court did not consider these mitigating factors, and therefore, the sentence was unusually excessive. Id. at 28.
Appellant is challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Therefore, before reaching the merits of Appellant's claim, we inquire into:
(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether [the a]ppellant preserved his issues; (3) whether [the a]ppellant's brief includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the [S]entencing [C]ode.Commonwealth v. Corley , 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).
Instantly, Appellant preserved his issue in a post-sentence motion and timely appealed from the denial of his post-sentence motion. Appellant also included in his brief a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement. Further, Appellant has raised a substantial question for our review. See Commonwealth v. Zeigler , 112 A.3d 656, 662 (Pa. Super. 2015) (stating that "an excessiveness claim in conjunction with an assertion that the court did not adequately consider a mitigating factor may present a substantial question" (citation omitted)).
Our standard of review in this context is as follows:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.Commonwealth v. Raven , 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
After carefully reviewing the record, we agree with, and adopt, the trial court's reasoning as to this issue. See Trial Ct. Op., 4/3/18, at 13. We further add that the transcript of the sentencing hearing reveals that the trial court considered the pre-sentence investigation report, as well as the evidence submitted at trial. See N.T. Sentencing, 10/31/17, at 6; see also Commonwealth v. Seagraves , 103 A.3d 839, 842 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding that when "the trial court has the benefit of a pre-sentence report, we presume that the court was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant's character and weighed those considerations along with any mitigating factors" (citation omitted)). The trial court also considered Appellant's "offenses, [his] criminal history, [his] work history, [his] education history, [his] family relationships, substance abuse history, and some additional information regarding [his] current drug and alcohol, mental health treatment history, and employment record." N.T. Sentencing, 10/31/17, at 6. Finally, the trial court found that prior efforts to rehabilitate Appellant were unsuccessful and that he was "a danger to [the] community as an addict and as a source and supplier of heroin." Id.
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion to modify his sentence. See Corley , 31 A.3d at 296.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 12/21/2018
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