Opinion
18-P-1611
01-16-2020
COMMONWEALTH v. Neil E. LYONNAIS.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle and receiving a stolen motor vehicle. On appeal, he claims there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of receiving a stolen motor vehicle. He also claims the trial judge erred in permitting the admission of evidence of uncharged conduct, and that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel in failing to object to this evidence and for failing to request a limiting instruction. We affirm.
The unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle charge was filed.
1. Sufficiency of evidence. The defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to convict him of receiving a stolen motor vehicle because the Commonwealth failed to prove that he knew the vehicle was stolen. We disagree.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979). A person's knowledge may be proved by inferences from the facts and circumstances of the case. See Commonwealth v. Dellamano, 393 Mass. 132, 136-137 (1984). Furthermore, a rational inference of guilty knowledge may be drawn from one's possession of recently stolen property. See Commonwealth v. Burns, 388 Mass. 178, 183 (1983).
Here, the Commonwealth presented evidence that the defendant told the officer he borrowed the car "a few days ago," which was within several days of when the car had been reported stolen. See Burns, 388 Mass. at 183. The defendant told the officer that his friend "Jose" lent him the car, however he did not know Jose's last name. The defendant's conduct when the officer informed him that he was driving a stolen car demonstrated consciousness of guilt. A rational jury could have concluded the defendant knew the car was stolen based on the fact that he was in possession of the recently stolen car, as well as his implausible explanation for his possession of it and his consciousness of guilt. As such, there was sufficient evidence supporting his conviction.
The defendant "completely changed," his face flushed red, and he attempted to move over to the passenger seat of the car.
That the defendant can posit innocent explanations for his possession of the stolen car does not inform our inquiry under the Latimore standard. See Commonwealth v. Romero, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 791, 800 (2011), rev'd on other grounds, 464 Mass. 648 (2013) (prosecution has no "affirmative duty to rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt" [quotation and citation omitted] ). Furthermore, contrary to the defendant's claim, the evidence was not equally consistent with innocence. See Commonwealth v. Croft, 345 Mass. 143 (1962). Even assuming that the Croft axiom retains any vitality, see Romero, supra at 799-801, the concept applies, if at all, "to situations in which any view of the Commonwealth's evidence, however favorable, still requires a leap of conjecture with respect to essential elements of the crime charged in order to obtain a conviction." Commonwealth v. Latney, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 423, 426 (1998). The defendant's claim here simply asks that we view the evidence and weigh the inferences in his favor, but this we cannot do. In the end, the jury's conclusion of guilt did not require a leap of conjecture with respect to the defendant's knowledge, and that evidence was simply not in equipoise with the defendant's theory of innocence. See Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 259, 265 (2010).
2. Uncharged conduct. At the time of the stop, the defendant was wearing "multiple layers of pants," all of which "had brand new [store] tags on them." The defendant claims this evidence was improperly admitted "bad acts" evidence, which created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. We disagree.
The defendant also claims that the judge abused his discretion by admitting the evidence and for not providing a limiting instruction. Because the evidence was not objected to, and no request was made for such an instruction, we can ascribe no abuse to an exercise of discretion that did not occur. In these circumstances, "we review under the even more demanding substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice standard" (quotation omitted). Commonwealth v. Hanino, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 489, 493 (2012).
To determine whether the evidence created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, and keeping in mind that "[e]rrors of this magnitude are extraordinary events and relief is seldom granted," we ask four questions: "(1) Was there error? (2) Was the defendant prejudiced by the error? (3) Considering the error in the context of the entire trial, would it be reasonable to conclude that the error materially influenced the verdict? (4) May we infer from the record that counsel's failure to object or raise a claim of error at an earlier date was not a reasonable tactical decision?" (Citations omitted.) Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 297-298 (2002). "Only if the answer to all four questions is ‘yes,’ may we grant relief." Id. at 298. See Commonwealth v. Coutu, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 686, 693 (2015).
To be admissible, evidence must be relevant, and if relevant, admissibility still depends on whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect in the context of the facts and issues presented. See Commonwealth v. Gray, 463 Mass. 731, 751 (2012). "It is well settled that the prosecution may not introduce evidence of a defendant's prior or subsequent bad acts for the purpose of demonstrating bad character or propensity to commit the crime charged." Commonwealth v. Barrett, 418 Mass. 788, 793 (1994). However, such evidence may be admissible "to establish a common scheme or plan, pattern of operation, intent, motive, or state of mind at the time of the crime." Commonwealth v. Cardarelli, 433 Mass. 427, 434 (2001). See Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(2) (2019).
Here, the pants evidence had probative value as part of a contemporaneous act which formed part of the backdrop to the unfolding scene of the incident. Such evidence may properly be admitted because the prosecution is "entitled to present as full a picture as possible of the events surrounding the incident itself." Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 269-270 (1982). See Commonwealth v. Robidoux, 450 Mass. 144, 158-159 (2007) ; Commonwealth v. Longo, 402 Mass. 482, 489 (1988) ("The Commonwealth is entitled to ‘show the whole transaction of which the crime was a part’ " [citation omitted] ).
Even assuming the evidence should have been excluded because the prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, or even if the evidence was misused in the prosecution's unobjected-to closing argument, it did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. As recounted above in part 1, the Commonwealth presented a strong case that permitted the jury to infer that the defendant knew the car was stolen without resort to the inferior inference provided by the apparently stolen pairs of pants he was wearing. This diminishes or eliminates any prejudice to the defendant the pants evidence could have caused. In other words, even if there was an error, when we consider it in the context of the entire trial, it would not be reasonable to conclude that the error materially influenced the verdict. See Randolph, 438 Mass. at 298. Because we do not answer all four of the Randolph inquiries in the affirmative, the defendant has failed to establish that the error created a substantial risk that justice miscarried. See id.
On appeal, the defendant makes no separate claim relative to the prosecutor's closing argument.
Given our result, we do not reach the fourth Randolph inquiry. See Randolph, 438 Mass. at 298.
Because there is no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the evidence or for not requesting a limiting instruction. See Commonwealth v. Curtis, 417 Mass. 619, 624 n.4 (1994) ; Commonwealth v. Farnsworth, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 87, 100 (2010).
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Judgment affirmed.