Opinion
J-S44005-15 No. 718 WDA 2014
08-05-2015
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. MARK LEONARD Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 20, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0004911-2013
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and JENKINS, J. MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.:
A jury found Mark Leonard guilty of first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison without parole. We affirm.
The following evidence was adduced during trial: on two occasions in December 2012, Leonard sold cocaine to the victim, Jayemond Bailey. Tr. 132-33. The first transaction was a sale of powdered cocaine for $350.00. Tr. 133. Bailey claimed that he was unable to turn the cocaine powder into crack cocaine, and Leonard refunded the purchase price. Id. Bailey then purchased a larger quantity of powdered cocaine from Leonard for $700.00. Id. Bailey again complained about the cocaine's quality, but this time, Leonard refunded only half of the purchase price, causing a rift between the two men. Tr. 134.
The testimony from the two-day trial is in a single transcript with consecutive page numbers.
Subsequently, Leonard's dog was poisoned and his house was burned down. Tr. 134, 146. Leonard believed that Bailey perpetrated these deeds. Tr. 146.
In the late evening of January 10, 2013 and early morning of January 11, 2013, Leonard was in the Street Stars Bar in McKeesport, Pennsylvania. Tr. 95-96. Shannon Battle, a bar patron, observed Leonard drinking in the bar. Tr. 101. Close to 1:00 a.m., Battle heard several gunshots from the direction of the bathroom, then a pause, then several more gunshots. Tr. 98-99. Police officers found Bailey on the bathroom floor, gasping for breath. Tr. 25-27. He died later that night. Tr. 28. An autopsy revealed that Bailey died from 14 gunshot wounds to his trunk and extremities, including one to his lung and heart and another to his liver. Tr. 105-13.
Detective Kinavey of the Allegheny County police found 12 spent 9mm shell casings on the floor where the victim had been killed. Tr. 51. All of these casings matched each other and came from the same firearm. Tr. 73. In addition, some bullets were collected from the bathroom floor that had "mushroomed," a deformity which occurs when a projectile strikes a hard object. Tr. 56, 58-59. The Commonwealth argued without objection that the mushrooming indicated that Leonard had fired straight down while Bailey was already prone. Tr. 201.
Tynisia Randolph, a bar patron, went into the bathroom after the shooting to provide aid to Bailey. Tr. 89. Noticing a firearm underneath Bailey's arm, Randolph concealed the gun in her hoodie and discarded it in an alley behind the bar. Tr. 90. A police officer found the gun that night. Tr. 33, 35, 71. Its magazine was loaded to capacity, but there was no bullet in the chamber. Tr. 72, 87. Nor was this gun associated with any ballistic evidence recovered from the bathroom. Tr. 88. In short, the evidence indicates that this gun belonged to Bailey, and that Bailey did not fire the gun while in the bathroom with Leonard.
Video surveillance of the interior of the bar showed Leonard running from the area of the shooting wearing a multi-colored striped shirt and a hat with a Miami Heat logo. Tr. 68, 86. He fled on foot and threw his gun off a nearby bridge. Tr. 135-36. He later admitted that the firearm was a 9mm semiautomatic handgun, which matched the shell casings found at the scene of the shooting. Tr. 136-37.
Detective Kinavey received information concerning Leonard's identity and learned that he had been present in the bar that night with his girlfriend, Ebony Windleton. Tr. 68-69, 90. Later on January 11th, Detective Kinavey visited Windleton's residence, which was less than one mile from the bar, and observed Windleton leaving her house with a backpack. Tr. 75-76. When the detective asked what she was doing, she said she was removing clothing from her residence that belonged to Leonard because she no longer wanted it there. Tr. 76. Windleton consented to a search of the backpack, which contained the shirt and Miami Heat hat that Leonard was seen wearing in the surveillance video and a box of 9mm ammunition. Tr. 76-80.
An arrest warrant was issued for Leonard. Tr. 121-22. Over the next 2½ months, Detective Dwyer, a member of both the Allegheny County Sheriff's Office and the United States Marshal's Fugitive Task Force, searched for Leonard at 20-30 different residences and handed his business cards to anyone he interviewed. Tr. 123-24. Detective Dwyer was aware that Leonard was associated with a specific vehicle. Tr. 124. On March 28, 2013, Detective Dwyer and his partner located the target vehicle parked outside of a residence in Wilkinsburg. Id. Detective Dwyer alerted the Task Force (12 detectives), who formed a perimeter around the house. Id. Detective Dwyer knocked on the door; some small children opened the door several minutes later, and eventually their mother came to the door. Tr. 125. When showed Leonard's photograph, she said that he resembled a man who could be in the basement. Id. The officers entered the residence and found Leonard hiding in the basement rafters above the furnace. Tr. 126. Leonard was carrying one of Detective Dwyer's business cards in his pocket. Id. After his arrest, Leonard told Detective Kinavey that he shot Bailey in self-defense after Bailey pulled a gun from his waistband. Tr. 134-35.
Leonard filed timely post-sentence motions challenging the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. The trial court denied these motions, and Leonard filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Leonard and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Leonard raises six issues on appeal, which we have re-ordered and restated for the sake of convenience:
1. The Commonwealth failed to rebut the defendant's claim of self-defense when it failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that (a) [] Leonard was the initial aggressor, (b) [] Leonard had a duty to retreat, (c) [] Leonard used excessive force, and (d) Leonard's belief that he was in danger of death or serious bodily injury was unreasonable.Brief For Appellant, at 6-7.
2. The trial court erred in finding that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction of murder in the first degree.
3. The verdict of guilt for murder of the first degree was against the weight of the evidence.
4. The trial court erred when it sustained the Commonwealth's hearsay objection to statements made to Detective Kinavey by Tynisia Randolph because these statements were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted therein.
5. The trial court erred when it refused to give a voluntary intoxication instruction.
6. Trial counsel was ineffective because she (i) failed to file a written petition for habeas corpus in advance of trial asking the trial court to dismiss the count of homicide in the first degree, (ii) failed to file a pre-trial motion to suppress [Leonard's] statement, and (iii) failed to call eyewitness Irvin Green during the trial.
Leonard's first and second arguments are challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. Our standard of review for such challenges is well-settled:
[W]hether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the [Commonwealth as the] verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.Commonwealth v. Gonzalez , 109 A.3d 711, 716 (Pa.Super.2015).
In his first argument, Leonard contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) he was the aggressor; (2) he had a duty to retreat; (3) he used excessive force; (4) his belief that he was in danger of death or serious bodily injury was unreasonable. More simply stated, Leonard contends that the Commonwealth failed to refute his claim of self-defense.
An individual may use force upon or toward another person "when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion." 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(a). A person may use deadly force "[if] the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death [or] serious bodily injury." 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2). The Commonwealth has the burden of disproving self-defense and fulfills this burden by proving any one of the following: (1) the defendant did not reasonably believe that it was necessary to kill to protect himself from imminent death or great bodily harm; (2) the defendant was not free from fault in provoking or continuing the difficulty which resulted in the slaying; or, (3) the defendant violated a duty to retreat or avoid the danger. Commonwealth v. Rivera , 108 A.3d 779, 791 (Pa.2014).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence disproves Leonard's claim of self-defense. Leonard and Bailey had a history of animosity in the month before the shooting. Bailey had demanded that Leonard refund the entire amount ($700.00) that Bailey had paid Leonard for powdered cocaine. Leonard refused, and shortly thereafter, Leonard's dog was poisoned and his house was burned down. Leonard suspected that Bailey was the wrongdoer and thus had a strong motive for retaliating violently against Bailey. The sheer number of gunshot wounds (14) suffered by Bailey, and the fact that Bailey did not shoot his own gun during the incident, demonstrates that Leonard was the aggressor bent upon exacting revenge against Bailey.
Other facts point to the same conclusion. Shannon Battle heard the shooter pause between two series of shots. The resumption of shooting after Bailey had surely been incapacitated by the first series of shots reflects a considered decision on Leonard's part to kill Bailey. Furthermore, the "mushrooming" of the bullets collected from the bathroom floor suggests that Leonard fired straight down on Bailey as Bailey lay helpless on the floor.
Also of significance are Leonard's actions following the shooting: he fled the scene and threw his gun off a bridge, his girlfriend attempted to get rid of clothes he was wearing at the time of the killing and a box of ammunition that fit the murder weapon, he evaded capture for 2½ months until authorities found him hiding in the basement of a residence in a neighboring borough, and he knew that police were looking for him due to his possession of Detective Dwyer's business card. In Commonwealth v. Dollman , 541 A.2d 319 (Pa.1989), our Supreme Court held that evidence of the defendant's efforts to conceal a killing - first burying the body, then exhuming and burning body parts and leaving burnt remains in a bag for the garbage collectors - was admissible where the pivotal issue was whether the defendant had acted in self-defense. The Court reasoned: "Human experience teaches that persons who commit justifiable homicides, without malice, do not ordinarily feel compelled to destroy the victim's body. Rather, it is those who harbor a guilty conscience, believing their acts not to have been justified, who are most likely to conceal evidence of their deeds." Id. at 322; see also Commonwealth v. Johnson , 838 A.2d 663, 681 (Pa.2003) (noting flight and concealment can constitute circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt). Under Dollman and Johnson , Leonard's flight and concealment after the shooting and his steps to eliminate all evidence linking him to the event undercuts his claim of self-defense.
Leonard insists that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he provoked Bailey or became the aggressor: "There was no testimony that [] Leonard verbally assaulted the decedent in the bar that night, physically provoked the deceased, followed the decedent into the bathroom, or provoked the attack once in the bathroom ... Additionally, it cannot be said that [] Leonard arranged for the decedent to be present in the bar." Brief For Appellant, at 20. This attempt to focus on what is not in the record sidesteps the critical question of what evidence is in the record, the question we have addressed at some length. What is in the record proves that Leonard was the aggressor.
Relying on Commonwealth v. Fisher , 420 A.2d 427 (Pa.1980), Leonard contends that the prodigious number of shots fired do not undermine his claim of self-defense. In Fisher , the defendant and the victim were arguing when the victim shot the unarmed defendant in the leg from a distance of 4-6 feet. The defendant grabbed the gun from the victim and struck the victim about the head 14 times with the butt of the gun, killing him. The Supreme Court held that
the immediate circumstances surrounding the altercation, viz. that [defendant] and the victim were struggling for control of a gun and that [defendant] was stunned and incapacitated by serious injuries inflicted only moments before by the victim - were adequate to justify [defendant's] belief that the amount of force he used was necessary.Id. at 428-29. Fisher is not on point. Unlike Fisher , Bailey did not fire his weapon at Leonard; nor could he, because there was no bullet in the chamber of his gun. And unlike the frenzy of blows in Fisher , Leonard paused between the first and second series of shots. The second series was even less necessary (and more egregious) than the first. The torrent of gunshots in this case resembles decisions in which our Supreme Court rejected claims of self-defense due to use of excessive force. See Commonwealth v. Harris , 703 A.2d 441, 449 (Pa.1997) ("[A]ppellant could not have reasonably believed that it was necessary to use the amount of force he employed. Assuming arguendo that the victim did fire his weapon at Appellant, which assumption is wholly unsupported by the record, Appellant's use of force exceeded that which would have been necessary to save his life. Appellant fired one shot, which disabled the victim and caused him to fall onto another store employee. At that point, no further force would have been necessary and Appellant would have had the duty to retreat. Appellant, however, shot the victim five more times, killing him. Such use of excessive force could not support a defense of self-defense"); Commonwealth v. Tilley , 595 A.2d 575, 582 (Pa.1991) (when one of two shots paralyzed victim, third shot to victim's face was unnecessary to save his life or prevent bodily harm and thus constituted excessive force).
Finally, Leonard argues that his state of mind prevented him from forming the intent to act as the aggressor. Leonard points to the trial testimony of Dr. Alice Applegate, an expert in the field of forensic psychology, that Leonard was "in a state of extreme anxiety and stress" at the time of the shooting because "he believed his life was in danger." Tr. 162. In Dr. Applegate's opinion, "[the] shooting was not volitional, [because Leonard] did not have any control over it. And during the shooting, he experienced dissociative amnesia, he blacked out." Tr. 163.
Dr. Applegate's testimony does not help Leonard for two reasons. She conceded that her diagnosis only indicated that Leonard "experienced a violent situation," not that he acted in self-defense. Tr. 169. Moreover, the jury was not required to believe Dr. Applegate's opinion, because "although the Commonwealth is required to disprove a claim of self-defense ... a jury is not required to believe the testimony of the defendant who raises the claim." Commonwealth v. Houser , 18 A.3d 1128, 1135 (Pa.2011).
In his second argument on appeal, Leonard challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the elements of malice and specific intent. To prove first degree murder, the Commonwealth must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a human being was unlawfully killed; (2) the defendant was responsible for the killing; and (3) the defendant acted with malice and a specific intent to kill. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a); Commonwealth v. Thomas , 54 A.3d 332, 335 (Pa.2012). First-degree murder is an intentional killing, i.e., a "willful, deliberate and premeditated killing." 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a) and (d). The jury can infer specific intent to kill as well as malice from the use of a deadly weapon upon a vital part of the victim's body and/or shooting the victim multiple times. Commonwealth v. Diggs , 949 A.2d 873, 877 (Pa.2008) ("because [defendant] shot the victim multiple times at close range, the jury was permitted to infer that he acted with malice"); Commonwealth v. Moore , 937 A.2d 1062, 1076 (Pa.2007) (victim's death through two gunshots to back, one of which penetrated his heart, established malice and specific intent to kill); Thomas , 54 A.3d at 335-36 (deliberate and repeated use of a firearm to shoot the victim in the chest and/or abdomen establishes defendant's specific intent to kill). Under these authorities, the 14 gunshots, one of which punctured Bailey's heart and lung and one of which struck his liver, clearly support the inference of malice and specific intent to kill. The same inference arises from Leonard's flight after the shooting, his attempts to destroy evidence of the shooting, and his avoidance of the police for 2½ months after the incident. Johnson , 838 A.2d at 681 (flight and concealment are circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt). Thus, Leonard's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails.
Leonard also insists that the evidence only demonstrates the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter, i.e., a killing under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by the victim. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2503(a). This argument is irrelevant. All that matters in a challenge to the sufficiency to the evidence of first degree murder is whether the evidence satisfies the elements of this offense, not some lesser offense such as voluntary manslaughter.
Leonard next argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence. The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. Commonwealth v. Forbes , 867 A.2d 1268, 1273-74 (Pa.Super.2005). A new trial is not warranted because of "a mere conflict in the testimony" and must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the credibility of witnesses. Commonwealth v. Bruce , 916 A.2d 657, 665 (2007). Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice. Id. On appeal, "our purview is extremely limited and is confined to whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the jury verdict did not shock its conscience. Thus, appellate review of a weight claim consists of a review of the trial court's exercise of discretion, not a review of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence." Commonwealth v. Knox , 50 A.3d 732, 738 (Pa.Super.2012). An appellate court may not reverse a verdict unless it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice. Forbes , 867 A.2d at 1273-74.
Leonard bases his weight of the evidence argument on two rather insignificant details. First, Leonard assails the testimony of Shannon Battle, the witness at the bar who heard the pause between the series of shots, by arguing that Battle's testimony that Bailey was in the bar for about 45 minutes before the shooting, Tr. 97, flew in the face of video surveillance footage showing his arrival 10½ minutes before the shooting. This discrepancy is quite understandable: Battle was not socializing with Bailey that night, so a person in her position would not find his time of arrival memorable. Leonard also makes much of the fact that Bailey was charged with aggravated assault in 1995 for a shooting incident. Tr. 155. The fact that Bailey was charged with aggravated assault two decades ago hardly demonstrates that he was the aggressor on the night in question.
The jury was free to accord more weight to the evidence marshaled against Leonard instead of the minor inaccuracy in Battle's testimony or the fact that Bailey had an old aggravated assault charge (or, for that matter, Dr. Applegate's opinion that the shooting was not volitional). Therefore, the trial court acted within its discretion by denying Leonard's challenge to the weight of the evidence.
Leonard next asserts that the trial court erred by sustaining the Commonwealth's hearsay objection to statements by Tynisia Randolph to Detective Kinavey. Leonard has waived this argument.
Detective Kinavey testified on direct examination that following Leonard's arrest 2½ months after the shooting, Leonard claimed that he shot Bailey in self-defense. On cross-examination, defense counsel inquired whether, before speaking with Leonard, Detective Kinavey spoke to anyone else who "suggest[ed] to you that [Leonard] would be raising a self-defense claim?" Tr. 147. Detective Kinavey answered: "I don't believe so, no." Id. Defense counsel inquired whether Detective Kinavey had spoken with Randolph, who was present in the bar on the night in question but did not appear at trial. Id. Detective Kinavey answered that he spoke with Randolph. Defense counsel asked: "And in your conversations with Ms. Randolph, did she say [Leonard] and she had spoken about the incident?" Id. The Commonwealth objected on the ground that the question called for hearsay, and defense counsel responded: "I would argue that it would have an effect on the listener and that this detective wouldn't have been aware." Tr. 147-48. The trial court sustained the Commonwealth's objection.
Leonard now argues that defense counsel did not seek the admission of Randolph's statement to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. Instead, "these statements were relevant to demonstrate ... that [] Leonard had mentioned self-defense prior to his interview with the Pittsburgh police ... [and] would also be relevant for the jury to consider whether [] Leonard had subsequently fabricated his version of events." Brief For Appellant, p. 42. Thus, Leonard claims that he told Randolph immediately after the shooting that he acted in self-defense, so the trial court should have permitted defense counsel to introduce Leonard's statement during Detective Kinavey's cross-examination as a prior consistent statement, i.e., a statement introduced to refute the notion that Leonard fabricated the excuse of self-defense at the time of his arrest.
"[F]or a claim of error to be preserved for appellate review, a party must make a timely and specific objection before the trial court at the appropriate stage of the proceedings; the failure to do so will result in waiver of the issue." Commonwealth v. Shamsud-din , 995 A.2d 1224, 1228 (Pa.Super.2010). Defense counsel did not argue to the trial court that Randolph's statement to Detective Kinavey (or Leonard's underlying statement to Randolph) was admissible under the prior consistent statement doctrine. Defense counsel gave different reasons for admission, namely, to show the "effect" it had on Detective Kinavey and "this detective wouldn't have been aware" (of what defense counsel failed to say). Consequently, Leonard has waived his prior consistent statement argument.
Even if Leonard preserved this issue for appeal, it is devoid of merit. Pa.R.E. 613, Pennsylvania's rule governing the admission of prior consistent statements, provides in relevant part:
(c) Witness's Prior Consistent Statement to Rehabilitate. Evidence of a witness's prior consistent statement is admissible to rehabilitate the witness's credibility if the opposing party is given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness about the statement and the statement is offered to rebut an express or implied charge of:Id. (emphasis added). To be admissible, the prior consistent statement must have been made before the motive to lie existed. Commonwealth v. Hutchinson , 556 A.2d 370, 372 (Pa.1989) (requiring that, to be admissible, prior statement must have been made before any corrupt motive has arisen); see also Pa.R.E. 613(c) cmt ("the use of the consistent statement will depend upon ... all of the circumstances that prompted the making of the consistent statement; the timing of that statement, although not conclusive, is one of the factors to be considered").
(1) fabrication, bias, improper influence or motive, or faulty memory and the statement was made before that which has been charged existed or arose; or
(2) having made a prior inconsistent statement, which the witness has denied or explained, and the consistent statement supports the witness's denial or explanation.
Pa.R.E. 613(c)(2) has no bearing on this case. We will focus our discussion on Rule 613(c)(1).
The italicized language in Rule 613(c) demonstrates that the only admissible statements under this rule are prior consistent statements of the witness on the stand - here, Detective Kinavey - to rehabilitate that witness. Leonard improperly attempts to use this rule to introduce a statement by a non-witness, Randolph, concerning what another non-witness, Leonard, told her. In addition, this evidence is inadmissible under Rule 613 because: (1) there was no charge of fabrication, bias, etc. against Detective Kinavey and thus no reason to rehabilitate him; (2) the persons who made the underlying statements, Randolph and Leonard, were unavailable for cross-examination; and (3) Leonard's statement to Randolph took place subsequent to the shooting, after the motive to lie already existed. Hutchinson , 556 A.2d at 372.
Leonard did not testify during trial.
In his penultimate argument, Leonard claims that the trial court erred in refusing to give a voluntary intoxication instruction to the jury. "[O]ur standard of review when considering the denial of jury instructions is one of deference—an appellate court will reverse a court's decision only when it abused its discretion or committed an error of law." Commonwealth v.Baker , 24 A.3d 1006, 1022 (Pa.Super.2011). When evaluating jury instructions, the charge must be read as a whole to determine whether it was fair or prejudicial. The trial court has broad discretion in phrasing its instructions, and may choose its own wording so long as the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for its consideration. Id.
The defendant may offer evidence of voluntary intoxication "whenever it is relevant to reduce murder from a higher degree to a lower degree of murder." 18 Pa.C.S. § 308. To be eligible for a voluntary intoxication instruction, however, the evidence must show that the defendant was unable to form the specific intent to kill because he or she was so overwhelmed or overpowered by drugs to the point of losing his or her faculties at the time the crime was committed. Commonwealth v. Marinelli , 690 A.2d 203, 220 (Pa.1997) (trial court properly refused to give voluntary intoxication charge because, even though there was testimony that defendant consumed some alcohol prior to the killing, there was no evidence that he had been overwhelmed or overpowered by alcohol). Evidence that the accused ingested alcohol or other intoxicating drug -- without more -- does not warrant a voluntary intoxication instruction. Commonwealth v. Padilla , 80 A.3d 1238, 1263 (Pa.2013).
Although there was testimony that Leonard consumed alcohol at the bar prior to shooting Bailey, there was no evidence that Leonard was overwhelmed or overpowered by alcohol. Thus, the trial court properly denied his request for a voluntary intoxication instruction.
In his final argument, Leonard accuses trial counsel of providing ineffective assistance. We will not address these claims. Claims of ineffectiveness cannot be raised on direct appeal and can only be raised in a motion for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act. Commonwealth v. Grant , 813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa.2002).
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/5/2015