Opinion
14-P-1322
11-06-2015
COMMONWEALTH v. RANDY A. LeBLANC.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant, Randy A. LeBlanc, was convicted after a jury-waived trial of leaving the scene of property damage in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24(2)(a). We affirm.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the judge was warranted in finding that on February 12, 2013, Michael McCarthy was in Athol at the home of his girlfriend, Jessica Desaulniers. McCarthy telephoned his friend, the defendant, who agreed to pick him up and take him to the store. The defendant arrived at the home driving his big, "[r]aised-up," Ford truck, which he parked in the driveway, front end first. McCarthy exited the home and entered the defendant's truck. The round trip from Desaulniers's house to the Cumberland Farms store took about ten minutes. When the defendant returned to Desaulniers's home, he backed his truck onto the home's driveway. When McCarthy got out of the defendant's truck, he noticed that the Chevrolet Cavalier sedan that was parked in the driveway, with its front end facing the street, had been pushed back against a trailer and its hood was "pushed up." Despite waving his arms to hail the defendant, the defendant "just left."
The defendant admitted to McCarthy that his truck had collided with the other vehicle in the driveway. The defendant also told the investigating police officer that he had entered the driveway too fast and when he tried to stop, his truck slid into the Cavalier. That officer also observed damage to the right front bumper of the defendant's truck. The defendant told the officer that he would pay for the damage to the Cavalier. He also apologized to Desaulniers's mother, the Cavalier's owner, and promised "to work something out." The defendant, however, failed to make any payments for the damage to the Cavalier.
Discussion. The parties obtained leave of court to file supplemental briefs on a question of law that they regarded as unsettled and potentially dispositive -- namely, whether in a prosecution for leaving the scene of a motor vehicle collision that causes property damage, without stopping and making one's identity known, the Commonwealth must prove that the collision occurred on a public way. However, our analysis leads us to conclude that the parties misunderstand the principal precedent interpreting G. L. c. 90, § 24(2)(a).
In Commonwealth v. Platt, 440 Mass. 396, 400 n.5 (2003), the Supreme Judicial Court, reviewing a conviction under § 24(2)(a), determined that the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was sufficient to establish that the defendant was the operator of the vehicle. The court made the following observation: "To support a conviction on the charge of knowingly leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage, the Commonwealth must present legally sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to conclude the defendant operated the motor vehicle at the time of the accident resulting in property damage." Id. at 401. However, contrary to the assumption made by the parties in the case before us, the court in Platt did not state that the collision or incident resulting in damage to another person's vehicle or property must occur at the same precise moment in time as the defendant's operation on a public way. In fact, an examination of the facts in Platt demonstrates that this is not required.
In Platt, a homeowner "was roused from his sleep by his neighbors. He went outside and saw a vehicle on his front lawn 'with the wheels up in the air' and considerable damage to his property. [The homeowner] did not see anyone except the neighbors and the police in or around the overturned vehicle." Id. at 397. Although no one was seen in or near the vehicle, the ensuing police investigation resulted in evidence that the defendant was operating the vehicle in question "immediately prior to the accident," which occurred on the homeowner's private property. Id. at 397, 401-402. In the case before us, the evidence was uncontroverted that both immediately before and after the collision that caused damage to the vehicle in the driveway, the defendant operated his truck on a public way. For this reason, we reject the defendant's claim that G. L. c. 90, § 24(2)(a) requires proof that the collision causing the property damage must itself occur on a public way.
The remaining issue raised by the defendant is that an honest, good faith, but mistaken belief that the operator has given adequate notice before leaving the scene of a collision causing property damage satisfies the operator's statutory duty. However, under § 24(2)(a), the operator in a case such as this is required to "make known his name, home address, and the registration number of his motor vehicle." Platt, supra at 400 n.5. It is not a defense that the defendant believed that he was known to persons at the scene. See Commonwealth v. Joyce, 326 Mass. 751, 752-753 (1951) (defendant's good faith belief that one or more persons at the scene knew his identity, residential address, and the registration number of his vehicle was not a defense).
It is unnecessary for us to consider the Commonwealth's argument that as written, the portion of § 24(2)(a) relevant here does not require proof of operation on a public way.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Vuono, Agnes & Maldonado, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------
/s/
Clerk
Entered: November 6, 2015.