Opinion
16-P-516
04-28-2017
COMMONWEALTH v. Kristen LANGATHIANOS.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant appeals her convictions of assault and battery and resisting arrest, arguing that the trial judge gave an erroneous jury instruction on witness credibility and abused his discretion by not accepting her guilty plea. We affirm.
Background. The jury could have found the following facts. In December of 2014, police officer Steven Beland was dispatched to a residence in Lowell, where he saw the defendant standing outside, looking "upset and angry." Officer Beland went inside the house and told the defendant to remain outside. Despite his instruction, the defendant pushed open the front door and "r[an] up the stairs towards the second floor." As the officer "started making [his] way upstairs, [he] could hear yelling and screaming, and two female voices from the top of the staircase." When he arrived on the second floor, he observed the defendant "pulling [the] hair" of another woman, later identified as Ashley Holt, and "striking" her. The father of the defendant's child stepped between the two women and "tried to break it up" but "start[ed] to get hit as well in the struggle between the two of them."
Officer Beland grabbed the defendant's arms and told her that she was under arrest. He tried to pull the defendant backwards, but she continued to "maintain[ ] her hold on Ms. Holt and was pulling Ms. Holt as well." The officer then attempted "a knee strike to [the defendant's] thigh area ..., trying to get her to release Ms. Holt." This caused both the officer and the defendant to fall backwards on the floor. When the defendant "continu[ed] to lash out, trying to punch at Ms. Holt," Officer Beland "kicked her in the thigh trying to get her lying back down." At this point another officer arrived on the scene and helped to "try[ ] to maintain control over [the defendant,]" who "continu[ed] to kick and struggle." Eventually, the officers pulled the defendant down the stairs and were able to subdue her.
The defendant testified to her own version of the incident at trial. She conceded that she got into an "altercation" with Holt but denied "swing[ing]" at her, stating that they were merely "holding on to each other." The defendant also testified that she told the officer that she was "not resisting" and attempted to comply with his orders.
Discussion. 1. Jury instruction. The defendant argues that the judge erred in giving the following instruction on witness credibility:
"You have heard from a number of witnesses, you must decide which witnesses to believe, and how much weight to give their testimony. If some testimony conflicts with other testimony, you must figure out which testimony, if any, is true. You may believe everything that a witness says, some of it, or none of it. For example, if the witness said the car ran the red light travelling 40 miles per hour, you might believe that the car ran the red light, but you might not believe that it was traveling 40 miles per hour. When you don't believe someone's testimony, you have to find some evidence about the issue that you do believe" (emphasis supplied).
According to the defendant, by telling the jury that they "have to find" evidence that they do believe, the judge invaded the jury's factfinding function and impermissibly shifted the burden to the defendant to disprove her guilt. Because the defendant did not preserve this issue for appeal, we review to determine whether there was any error and, if so, whether it resulted in a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. St. Louis, 473 Mass. 350, 359 (2015).
We observe at the outset that the judge's instruction did not substantially differ from the model jury instruction, which reads in relevant part: "When you disbelieve a witness, it just means that you have to look elsewhere for credible evidence about that issue." Instruction 2.260 of the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court (2009). The Supreme Judicial Court has upheld the validity of this instruction, concluding that it does not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 439 Mass. 362, 367 (2003) ; Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. 213, 223 (2005).
Nonetheless, the defendant contends that the judge's use of "have to find" (versus "have to look elsewhere") materially changed the meaning of the instruction by leaving no room for the jury to disbelieve all of the evidence. As her argument goes, a reasonable jury would have understood the instruction to mean that, if they disbelieved the defendant's testimony, they would "have to" believe Officer Beland, who provided the only other testimony about the defendant's altercation with Holt. But the instruction, when read in light of the entire charge, is not reasonably susceptible to the defendant's interpretation. When reviewing an instruction, we refrain from "scrutinizing bits and pieces removed from their context." Commonwealth v. Cundriff, 382 Mass. 137, 153 (1980). Instead, "we evaluate the instruction as a whole, looking for the interpretation a reasonable juror would place on the judge's words." Commonwealth v. Glacken, 451 Mass. 163, 168-169 (2008), quoting from Commonwealth v. Niemic, 427 Mass. 718, 720 (1998).
Here, the charge as a whole would have made clear to a reasonable jury that disbelief of the defendant's testimony did not require them to believe Officer Beland's testimony but, rather, that they were entitled to believe or disbelieve evidence as they saw fit. Indeed, immediately before the "have to find" language, the judge informed the jury that "[i]f some testimony conflicts with other testimony, you must figure out which testimony, if any, is true. You may believe everything that a witness says, some of it, or none of it." The judge also stated several times that the jury were the "sole and exclusive" finders of fact and that it was up to them to determine whether to believe a witness and how much importance to give a witness's testimony. In addition, the judge made clear that the Commonwealth had the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that "[t]he defendant is not required to call any witnesses or produce any evidence, since she is presumed to be innocent." Finally, the judge advised the jury that they were to "consider all of [his] instructions as a whole" and should not "give special attention to any one instruction." In light of these instructions, the disputed language would not have led a reasonable jury to believe that they were required to credit Officer Beland's testimony if they did not credit the defendant's testimony. We are satisfied in these circumstances that the judge's minor deviation from the model jury instruction did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Thomas, 439 Mass. at 367.
2. Rejection of guilty plea. The defendant next argues that the judge abused his discretion by rejecting her guilty plea because he "did so for the improper purpose of saving time." The defendant initially withdrew her plea after the judge informed her that his sentence would exceed the terms that she had requested. But once the judge instructed the clerk to "get the jury," defense counsel stated, "she is signing, Your Honor." The judge replied that he would "not allow [her] to sign if she feels compelled." When defense counsel then stated that "she doesn't feel compelled," the judge conducted the following colloquy:
THE COURT : "All right, Ms. Langathianos are you going to accept the dispositions of the court when it calls?"
THE DEFENDANT : "Yes, Your Honor."
THE COURT : "Yes or no?"
THE DEFENDANT : "Yes, Your Honor."
THE COURT : "All right. Ms. Langathianos you read the facts the Commonwealth recited, are those facts true?"
THE DEFENDANT : "No, Your Honor."
THE COURT : "Thank you, get the jury. We are not waiting any more. Get the jury."
"A judge is afforded wide discretion in determining whether to accept a guilty plea." Commonwealth v. Gendraw, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 677, 684 (2002). Here, the judge was within his discretion to reject the defendant's plea, given that she refused to admit that the facts recited by the Commonwealth were true. Although she argues (for the first time on appeal) that the judge could have accepted her plea as an Alford plea, "there is no constitutional right to have [a] plea accepted. The matter is wholly discretionary with the judge." Commonwealth v. Dilone, 385 Mass. 281, 285 (1982). Even where a "judge ha[s] a practice of not accepting an Alford plea," rejection of a plea pursuant to that practice does not create an "appellate issue." Ibid. Accord Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 404 Mass. 378, 389 (1989) ; Gendraw, 55 Mass. App. Ct. at 684. Accordingly, the judge here would have had no obligation to accept an Alford plea, had the defendant tried to tender one.
Judgments affirmed.
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).