Summary
In Commonwealth v. Gable, 323 Pa. 449, 187 A. 393 (1936), this Court held that where the trial judge charged, in referring to the evidence produced by the Commonwealth, that it contained every element necessary to make out a crime of murder in the first degree, and that if such testimony were believed it would be the duty of the jury to render such a verdict, that such instructions did not constitute an improper expression of opinion by the court, where the charge in its entirety left the finding of fact up to the jury.
Summary of this case from Commonwealth v. JordanOpinion
May 11, 1936.
October 5, 1936.
Criminal law — Evidence — Confession — Reference to other crimes — Murder — First degree — Death penalty — Review of evidence presented by Commonwealth — Immediate reference to defense of insanity — Charge of trial court — Verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity — Confinement in state institution — Opinion of court as to punishment — Reasonable doubt.
1. Where a voluntary confession is made to police officers, the whole is admissible in evidence, even though it may contain admissions of other offenses unrelated to the one for the commission of which the defendant is on trial. [452]
2. On appeal from conviction and sentence on an indictment charging defendant with murder, in which the jury fixed the penalty at death, it was held that it was not error to admit in evidence the written confession of the defendant, although it contained references to the commission by him of other crimes not connected with the homicide; and this was especially so where it appeared that in the confession the defendant admitted all the details of the crime and that these admissions definitely established that the murder was of the first degree and warranted the death penalty, that when the defendant took the stand, he repeated what he had stated in the confession in full detail, and that the defense was not that defendant had not committed the crime but that at the time he was irresponsible. [452-3]
3. A court cannot be convicted of error in the order in which it gives a jury instructions, provided the instructions are adequate when announced. [453]
4. It was not error for the trial judge to review the evidence of the Commonwealth and to instruct the jury that if they believed it, their duty was to find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree with the death penalty, without at that specific time referring expressly to the affirmative defense of insanity, where the trial court subsequently gave full instructions on the insanity defense. [453]
5. In a homicide case, where the defense is insanity, it is not error for the trial judge to refuse to state, when requested so to do, that if the verdict is not guilty by reason of insanity, it will be his duty to send the defendant to a state institution for the insane. [453]
6. Where, in his confession and in his testimony, the defendant stated that he wore gloves at the time of the murder to avoid leaving his finger prints, the testimony of a witness, who said that he met the defendant in the county jail before the murder and sold him a pair of gloves which he identified as one of the Commonwealth's exhibits, was admissible to establish the truth of defendant's confession, though the introduction of this evidence might have been unfavorable to the defendant. [453-4]
7. Where, at the beginning of the charge, in discussing in detail the law of murder, and before commenting in any way upon the facts of the case, the trial judge stated that the first verdict possible in the case would be murder in the first degree with the death penalty, the second would be murder in the first degree with the punishment fixed at life imprisonment, but that the jury had the power to return a verdict of manslaughter or a verdict of not guilty, or a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, because the defense offered was that of insanity, such instruction was not in any way prejudicial to defendant. [454]
8. Where the trial judge charged, referring to the evidence produced by the Commonwealth, that it contained every element necessary to make out the crime of murder of the first degree, and that if the jury believed the testimony of the officers who testified for the Commonwealth, it would be its duty to return a verdict of murder in the first degree, imposing the penalty of death, such portion of the charge was not an improper expression of the opinion of the court as to the punishment the defendant deserved, where in other portions of the charge the trial judge carefully pointed out that the kind of verdict was in the jury's discretion. [454-6]
9. It was not reversible error for the trial court to state to the jury that there was no question of reasonable doubt in the case, where, taking the charge as a whole, it was evident that the court in so stating referred to the killing and the manner in which it was accomplished, both of which elements of the crime were admitted by the defendant in his confession and in his testimony, and where the trial court instructed the jury that the Commonwealth must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and accurately defined the meaning of the phrase. [455-6]
Before KEPHART, C. J., SCHAFFER, MAXEY, LINN, STERN and BARNES, JJ.
Appeal, No. 167, March T., 1936, by defendant, from sentence of O. T. Cambria Co., Sept. T., 1935, No. 6, in case of Commonwealth v. Jacob Gable. Record remitted to court below.
Indictment for murder and for manslaughter. Before McCANN, P. J.
The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.
Verdict of guilty in the first degree, penalty fixed at death, and judgment and sentence thereon. Defendant appealed.
Errors assigned, among others, were various rulings on evidence.
J. H. Connell, Jr., for appellant.
Stephens Mayer, District Attorney, for appellee.
Argued May 11, 1936.
This is a case of first degree murder. The jury fixed the penalty at death. The condemned, appealing to us from the sentence, submits three questions: (1) May the Commonwealth introduce in evidence his written confession when it contains references to the commission by him of other crimes not connected with the homicide? (2) The defense being insanity, was it error for the trial judge to review in detail the evidence of the Commonwealth and to instruct the jury that if they believed it, their duty was to find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree with the death penalty, without at that specific time referring expressly to the affirmative defense of insanity? (3) The defense being insanity, was it improper for the judge to refuse to instruct the jury that in the event of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, it would be his duty to commit the defendant to a state institution for the insane?
The murder was a most cruel one. Its revolting details need not be recited. It is sufficient to say that the victim was a woman almost eighty years' old who was a neighbor of defendant, living across the street from his home. He was twenty years of age and had been out of school for about four years. He had not worked for many months before the killing and was apparently loafing around, living by his wits. The deceased was in her home alone. This the defendant knew. He thought there was considerable money in the house and entered it shortly after midday for the purpose of stealing the money. He encountered the deceased, struck her with his fist, beat her with objects in the room, including a tea kettle and an electric iron, and stabbed her to death. He then ransacked the house, stealing such money and other articles as he could find. Shortly after its commission the crime was discovered. The defendant was arrested the following day. He made a confession in writing, in which the details of the killing were recited. He repeated them on the witness stand when called as a witness in his own behalf. As before stated, the defense was insanity. The attempted proof of it did not impress the jury, nor does it us.
In answering the first question submitted, it may be stated that it has been presented to us more than once and our conclusion has been that if a voluntary confession is made to police officers, the whole is admissible in evidence, even though it may contain admissions of other offenses unrelated to the one for the commission of which the defendant is on trial: Com. v. Weston, 297 Pa. 382, 147 A. 79; Com. v. Dague, 302 Pa. 13, 152 A. 839. But in this case there is a further reason why the confession in its entirety was not objectionable. In it the defendant admitted all the details of the crime. These admissions unerringly established that the murder was of the first degree. They, as fully as in any case that can be imagined, warranted the death penalty. Therefore the mentioning of other offenses could not have prejudiced the defendant, he had himself shown the enormity of his crime, its degree and the warrant for the penalty. The other crimes recited were not makeweights for his conviction, under his own story no makeweights were required. When he took the witness stand, he repeated what he had stated in the confession in full detail. His defense was not that he had not committed the crime, but that at the time he was irresponsible, urged to do what he did by an overmastering impulse. The confession in its entirety was properly placed in evidence: Com. v. Mellor, 294 Pa. 339, 144 A. 534.
As to the second question stated, that the trial judge did not expressly refer to the defense of insanity in connection with his review of the Commonwealth's evidence, and his instruction that if the jury believed it, their duty was to find a first degree verdict with the death penalty, it is sufficient to say that a reading of the charge shows full instructions on the insanity defense. A court cannot be convicted of error in the order in which it gives a jury instructions, provided the instructions are adequate when announced.
The third question involves the proposition that, in a homicide case, where the defense is insanity, the trial judge must state, when requested to do so, that if the verdict is not guilty by reason of insanity, it will be his duty to send the defendant to a state institution for the insane. With this the jury has nothing to do and it was not error to refuse to so tell them.
Other matters are brought to our attention, not set forth in the statement of the questions involved. Under our rules we would not ordinarily consider alleged errors not covered in the statement of questions. As this, however, is a death case we have extended our review.
Under the second assignment of error, it is argued that the court improperly received in evidence the testimony of a witness, who said that he met the defendant in the county jail and sold him a pair of gloves which he identified as one of the Commonwealth's exhibits. It is contended that the statements of this witness prejudiced the defendant in that they showed that he had been an inmate of the county jail prior to the murder of which he was charged. In his confession and in his testimony the defendant stated that he wore kid gloves at the time of the murder and that he did so "to stop the finger prints:" In order to establish the truth of the defendant's confession the Commonwealth had the right to show that the defendant actually had the gloves in his possession and how and where he acquired them. The fact that the introduction of this evidence might prove unfavorable to the defendant is not sufficient to render it inadmissible: Com. v. Cicere, 282 Pa. 492, 128 A. 446; Com. v. Vasbinder, 292 Pa. 506, 141 A. 476; Com. v. Parker, 294 Pa. 144, 143 A. 904; Com. v. Melissari, 298 Pa. 63, 148 A. 45.
The third assignment sets forth that the court erred in charging the jury that "The first verdict possible in this case would be murder in the first degree with the death penalty; the second would be murder in the first degree with the punishment fixed at life imprisonment." The balance of this paragraph is as follows: "However, the jury have the power to return a verdict of manslaughter or a verdict of not guilty, or a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, because in this particular case the defense offered is that of insanity." These statements were made at the beginning of the charge when the court was discussing in detail the law of murder in this state. Up until the time the learned judge in the court below gave this instruction he had not commented in any way upon the facts of the case. We fail to see how this instruction was in any way prejudicial to the defendant.
The fifth assignment complains that the court erred in charging the jury: "That is the principal part of the story of the crime as related from the witness stand, and that contains every element necessary to make out the crime of murder of the first degree, and justifies the highest penalty that the law can impose. It is one of the most sordid and brutal crimes in the history of this county, and if that is true and you believe that testimony, the testimony of these officers who testified for the Commonwealth as to what they found, and you believe that confession to be true, and believe that his mind conceived and directed the acts that resulted in the death of this old lady, you would be freely warranted and it would be your duty to return a verdict of murder in the first degree, and it would unquestionably be a case where the jury in the exercise of its discretion could impose the highest penalty known to the law, namely, the penalty of death." It is contended that this portion of the charge was erroneous because the court expressed its opinion in an improper manner, distinguished between a class of witnesses, and because it directed the jury to consider the evidence of the Commonwealth apart from the defense. We find no merit in these objections. As to the expression of opinion by the court as to what punishment the defendant deserved, the learned trial judge in other portions of the charge carefully pointed out that the kind of verdict was in the jury's discretion. "An expression of opinion, so qualified, is not improper": Com. v. Stabinsky, 313 Pa. 231, 234, 169 A. 439; Com. v. Nafus, 303 Pa. 418, 154 A. 485; Com. v. Edwards, 318 Pa. 1, 178 A. 20. There is nothing in this portion of the charge which distinguishes between a class of witnesses nor do we find that the court instructed the jury to consider the Commonwealth's case separate and apart from the defense. The learned trial judge fully discusses the defense in his charge. It was presented in a fair and impartial manner. The case of Com. v. Palome, 263 Pa. 466, 106 A. 783, is not similar to the one in hand. In that case the defense was self-defense and the judge charged the jury that they were first to determine whether the defendant was guilty before they considered the affirmative defense.
The sixth assignment avers that the court erred in stating to the jury that "There is no question of reasonable doubt in this case." Taking the charge as a whole it is evident that the court in so stating referred to the killing and the manner in which it was accomplished. Both of these elements of the crime were admitted by the defendant in his confession and in his testimony. As to these there could be no reasonable doubt. The court did instruct the jury that the Commonwealth must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and defined accurately the meaning of the phrase.
The seventh assignment alleges that the charge was prejudicial to the defendant and amounts to binding instructions for the Commonwealth. Our reading of it in its entirety satisfies us that the case was fairly and impartially presented.
As it is our duty under the Act of February 15, 1870, P. L. 15, section 2, 19 P. S. Sec. 1187, we have carefully read the entire record to ascertain whether it convincingly demonstrates that there are present in the proofs the ingredients necessary to a conviction of murder of the first degree; we find that they are present and therefore the judgment is affirmed.
The record is remitted to the court below for the purpose of execution.