Summary
In Embry the pathologist "opined" that the myocardial infarction was caused by the physical and emotional stress occasioned by the purse snatching struggle.
Summary of this case from Com. v. WilliamsOpinion
October 5, 1970.
January 7, 1971.
Criminal Law — Evidence — Causation — Murder — Death of victim — Myocardial infarction — Opinion of expert expressed "with a reasonable degree of medical certainty".
1. To sustain a conviction for murder the evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim's death was caused by a criminal agency. [185]
2. In this case, in which it appeared that in the course of a struggle with defendants the victim of a robbery, seventy-one years of age, fell to the ground and was subsequently pronounced dead on arrival at a hospital; and that the only evidence introduced by the prosecution to directly link the robbery with the victim's death was the testimony of a pathologist who stated that the sole cause of death was a myocardial infarction and who further expressed the opinion, "with a reasonable degree of medical certainty", that the myocardial infarction was caused by physical and emotional stress occasioned by the robbery and the struggle in which the victim was involved; it was Held that the evidence was insufficient to prove causation beyond a reasonable doubt.
Mr. Justice COHEN took no part in the decision of this case.
Argued October 5, 1970. Before BELL, C. J., JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS and POMEROY, JJ.
Appeal, No. 90, March T., 1970, from judgment of sentence of Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division, of Allegheny County, Feb. T., 1968, No. 44, in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Terry Embry et al. Judgment of sentence reversed.
Indictment charging defendants with murder and voluntary manslaughter. Before VAN DER VOORT, J.
Verdict of guilty of murder in first degree and judgment entered thereon. Defendants appealed.
John J. Dean, Assistant Public Defender, with him H. David Rothman, Assistant Public Defender, and George H. Ross, Public Defender, for appellants.
Carol Mary Los, Assistant District Attorney, with her Robert L. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, and Robert W. Duggan, District Attorney, for appellee.
This is a direct appeal from the imposition of a life sentence following a jury determination that appellants, all of whom were represented by court-appointed counsel, were guilty of murder in the first degree.
On the morning of December 20, 1967, around 10:45 a.m., Hattie Littlestone, seventy-one years of age, was set upon and robbed of her purse by three youths. In the ensuing struggle to prevent the purse-snatching, she fell to the ground and the youths fled. Miss Littlestone was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. While a variety of contentions are raised, because of our disposition of this appeal we can confine our discussion to one point: whether sufficient evidence was introduced to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hattie Littlestone's death was caused by a criminal agency.
In Com. v. Radford, 428 Pa. 279, 236 A.2d 802 (1968), we clearly indicated that proof of causation must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Attempting to meet this burden, the Chief Forensic Pathologist for the Coroner's Office of Allegheny County, Cyril H. Wecht, M.D., who performed the autopsy, testified for the prosecution that the sole cause of death was a myocardial infarction, commonly termed a "heart attack." Despite the existence of a past history of cardiac-related problems, Dr. Wecht further opined, "with a reasonable degree of medical certainty," that the myocardial infarction was caused by physical and emotional stress occasioned by the purse snatching and ensuing struggle. No other evidence was presented by the Commonwealth to directly link the purse snatching with Miss Littlestone's death.
Dr. Wecht testified that the autopsy also revealed the victim had "evidence of long-standing disease of the coronary arteries" and "evidence of old scarring in the heart from previous heart attacks, previous myocardial infarctions."
Upon cross-examination by the defense attorneys as well as questioning by the trial judge, Dr. Wecht expressly admitted that while he was positively certain that death occurred due to the infarction, he was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the struggle produced the stress which, in turn, could have caused the myocardial infarction. Instead, he was only able to reconstruct the chain of causation with a "reasonable degree of medical certainty." That the witness was not confused by this language is evidenced by his later testimony that in a proper case he could find causation beyond a reasonable doubt.
In Radford, the Commonwealth's witness was similarly unable to resolve the issue of causation beyond a reasonable doubt. To semantically distinguish Radford's "probable" from this appeal's "reasonable degree of medical certainty" would be irrelevant since causation must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Although it is hornbook law that a jury is never bound by an expert witness, when only one witness is presented by the Commonwealth to establish causation and that witness cannot do so beyond a reasonable doubt, a necessary element of the proof of that crime is missing.
Judgment of sentence reversed.
Mr. Justice COHEN took no part in the decision of this case.