Opinion
J-S11032-16 No. 537 EDA 2015
04-19-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ANTHONY CORBIN, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order February 24, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Criminal Division, No(s): CP-51-CR-0012372-2007 BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
Anthony Corbin ("Corbin") appeals from the Order dismissing his first Petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The PCRA court set forth the relevant underlying factual and procedural history, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/10/15, at 1-3.
On appeal, Corbin raises the following questions for our review:
1. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to request an instruction under Commonwealth v. Kloiber [, 106 A.2d 820 (Pa. 1954),] where, of the two eyewitnesses who testified, both said that they were "not sure" of their identifications and one previously identified someone other than [Corbin]?
2. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to impeach (a) the jailhouse informant with substantial evidence of his bias and severe mental health problems[,] and (b) one identification witness with her many pending criminal cases?
3. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's instructions that required substantial doubt for acquittal; relieved the Commonwealth of its burden to prove all elements of consciousness of guilt[,] and then allowed the jury to convict solely on such evidence; invaded the jury's province on the ultimate issue in the case; omitted any reference to the all-important lapse in time between the crime and the witnesses' identifications; and improperly pressured the jury to reach unanimity?Brief for Appellant at 3-4.
4. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's improper bolstering of the credibility of a central Commonwealth witness?
5. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to request a cautionary instruction on evidence implicating [Corbin] in uncharged bad acts and crimes?
6. Was direct [appeal] counsel ineffective for failing to raise the claim that the trial court erred in prohibiting impeachment of the central witness with evidence that he had committed several armed robberies?
7. Is [Corbin] entitled to relief as a result of the cumulative impact of all of these errors?
We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court's ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error.Commonwealth v. Ford , 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted).
As each of Corbin's claims involve the ineffective assistance of counsel, to succeed on such a claim, he must demonstrate by the preponderance of the evidence that
(1) [the] underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests; and (3) but for counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.Commonwealth v. Ali , 10 A.3d 282, 291 (Pa. 2010). A failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will require rejection of the claim. Commonwealth v. Martin , 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa. 2010). Counsel is presumed to be effective, and the burden is on the appellant to prove otherwise. Commonwealth v. Hanible , 30 A.3d 426, 439 (Pa. 2011).
In his first claim, Corbin contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request, or object to the trial court's failure to give a Kloiber instruction. Brief for Appellant at 10. Corbin argues that the Commonwealth presented the testimony of two eyewitnesses, Odessey Spearman ("Spearman") and John Gallagher ("Gallagher"), neither of whom were positive in identifying Corbin as the perpetrator. Id. at 10-13. Corbin asserts that the PCRA court properly found that counsel did not have a reasonable basis for failing to seek a Kloiber instruction, but challenges its finding that Corbin suffered no prejudice based upon his admissions to three biased witnesses. Id. at 13-15; see also id. at 16 (arguing that the jury assessed the credibility of the three witnesses under the erroneous impression that there were no problems with the identification testimony of Spearman and Gallagher); 18 (asserting that without credible identification evidence, the jury would have been left with only the three witnesses who had heard Corbin's admission). Corbin claims that there was no physical evidence linking him to the crime, and that the identifications by Spearman and Gallagher were central to the jury's deliberations. Id. at 14. Corbin also argues that counsel failed to impeach one of the witnesses, Burnie Tindale ("Tindale"), to whom Corbin admitted his involvement in the crimes. Id. at 17-18. Corbin maintains that the jury's long deliberation evidenced a lack of overwhelming evidence, and demonstrated that the lack of a Kloiber instruction prejudiced him. Id. at 18-20.
"A Kloiber instruction informs the jury that an eyewitness identification should be viewed with caution when either the witness did not have an opportunity to view the defendant clearly, equivocated on the identification of the defendant, or has had difficulties identifying the defendant on prior occasions." Commonwealth v. Sanders , 42 A.3d 325, 332 (Pa. Super. 2012). "Where an eyewitness has had protracted and unobstructed views of the defendant and consistently identified the defendant throughout the investigation and at trial, there is no need for a Kloiber instruction." Ali , 10 A.3d at 303 (citation and quotation marks omitted). "When the witness already knows the defendant, this prior familiarity creates an independent basis for the witness's in-court identification of the defendant[,] and weakens ineffectiveness claims based on counsel['s] failure to seek a Kloiber instruction." Id. A Kloiber charge, however, is "distinct from the credibility determination a fact-finder must make." Commonwealth v. Collins , 70 A.3d 1245, 1255 (Pa. Super. 2013). "We evaluate whether a Kloiber instruction is necessary under an abuse of discretion standard." Sanders , 42 A.3d at 332-33.
With regard to Spearman, she testified that on November 3, 2003, at lunchtime, she observed two men rob and shoot the victim. N.T., 1/15/09, at 142-55, 166. A few hours after the robbery, Spearman told investigating detectives that she had previously seen one of the perpetrators in the neighborhood. See id. at 155-56, 166-67; see also id. at 159 (wherein Spearman stated that Corbin "looked familiar."). As part of her identification, Spearman stated that the shooter was about 5-foot-4 to 5-foot-5 inches tall, but that she was not good with estimating heights. Id. at 165-66. On March 17, 2007, Spearman selected a picture of Corbin from a photo array, and identified him as the shooter. See id. at 168 (wherein Spearman stated that "I picked it out because it was the guy that shot the white guy."); see also N.T., 1/20/09, at 43-44 (wherein Detective Charles Boyle ("Detective Boyle") corroborated Spearman's testimony that she picked Corbin out of a photo array without hesitation). At trial, Spearman identified Corbin as the assailant, despite the fact that unlike the day of the shooting, Corbin did not have a beard, was not wearing a "hoodie," and weighed less. Id. at 157; see also id. (wherein Spearman, in identifying Corbin at trial, stated that Corbin looked like the assailant, "just smaller," and that Corbin was "bigger" on the day of the shooting).
Spearman also identified Rasheed Jenkins ("Jenkins"), Corbin's co-conspirator, from a photo array. N.T., 1/15/09, at 157-61.
Here, the PCRA court concluded that a Kloiber instruction was required as to Spearman because her identification "was weakened by [the] qualification (he 'looked like,' 'looked familiar,' he was 'bigger') and by the obstruction of the hoodie that was up." PCRA Court Opinion, 7/10/15, at 7; see also id. at 6 (noting that while Spearman stated Corbin was 5-foot-4 to 5-foot-5 inches tall, he was, in fact, 5-foot-11 inches tall). We disagree.
The PCRA court focused upon Spearman's testimony that she "wasn't really paying attention," and "just noticed" the co-conspirators standing on the street prior to the shooting. PCRA Court Opinion, 7/10/15, at 6. However, Spearman clearly stated that she observed the co-conspirators when they were robbing and shooting the victim. N.T., 1/15/09, at 163-64.
Our review discloses that Spearman merely testified that Corbin was wearing a "hoodie," or a hooded sweatshirt, on the day of the shooting, not that that hood was actually up when she observed him. See , e.g., N.T., 1/15/09, at 157, 164-65. Our review of the record further reflects that Spearman had ample opportunity to clearly observe Corbin; she was never equivocal about her identification; and she did not misidentify Corbin in the past. See Ali , 10 A.3d at 303. Spearman's statement that Corbin looked different over five years after the shooting does not demonstrate equivocation of her identification. Further, while it is evident from Spearman's testimony that her representation of Corbin's height was incorrect, this, in itself, does not require a Kloiber instruction, but goes to her credibility. Indeed, with regard to Kloiber and eyewitness identification, there is a difference between the witness's opportunity to observe and the quality of the witness's observation. See Commonwealth v. Cleveland , 703 A.2d 1046, 1049 (Pa. Super. 1997) (stating that "once the opportunity to observe is established[,] it becomes defense counsel's cross-examination, not the court's Kloiber charge, which must highlight any problems with the quality of a witness's observation."). Any perceived problem with the quality of Spearman's observations were matters of credibility for the jury; the height issue did not undermine her ability to identify Corbin. Based upon the foregoing, a Kloiber instruction was not required as to Spearman.
With regard to Gallagher, he testified that he was working on a construction site on November 3, 2003, when he heard a commotion and saw two men, one of whom was holding a gun, run and jump into a car and drive away. N.T., 1/15/09, at 114-22. Gallagher described the male holding the gun as an African-American, "husky," and with a beard and mustache. Id. at 124-25. On December 13, 2006, Gallagher picked two photos out of an array in attempting to identify the person holding the gun. Id. at 127-29; see also id. at 132 (wherein Gallagher stated that he thought the picture that did not portray Corbin was more likely the man with the gun). At trial, Gallagher testified that he could no longer identify the person with the gun. Id. at 130.
Detective Boyle testified that on December 13, 2006, Gallagher immediately picked Corbin's photo from the photo array. N.T., 1/20/09, at 37, 55, 56. Detective Boyle stated that Gallagher picked another photo after inquiring whether he would have to go to court to testify. Id. at 38, 55, 56. Detective Boyle testified that in Gallagher's written statement, Gallagher selected two photos in attempting to identify the shooter. Id. at 38-39.
Our review discloses that the trial court instructed the jury regarding how to evaluate testimony of the witnesses who had identified Corbin as the perpetrator. See N.T., 1/22/09, at 112-13 (instructing the jury to consider, inter alia, whether the witness had a good opportunity to observe the perpetrator, whether the witness had made a prior identification of Corbin as the perpetrator, whether the witness's identification was positive, or qualified by hedging or inconsistencies, and whether the witness identified anyone else as the perpetrator).
Here, Gallagher picked out two photos from the array in 2006, and never identified Corbin at trial. Based upon the fact that Gallagher did not explicitly identify Corbin as the perpetrator, we conclude that no Kloiber instruction was required. See Commonwealth v. Sanders , 42 A.3d 325, 335 (Pa. Super. 2012) (holding that the trial court did not err in declining to provide a Kloiber instruction, where the witness did not identify the defendant at trial, and the trial court instructed the jury to consider whether the identification was qualified by hedging, and all of the circumstances surrounding the identification); see also id. (stating that "[u]nlike the typical Kloiber situation, where there is a damaging in-court identification of the accused, the same type of concerns are not present where a witness declines to identify the defendant in court.").
Even if we consider Detective Boyle's testimony that Gallagher had initially picked a photo of Corbin, but hedged on his identification due to concerns about his and his family's safety, as identification testimony, a Kloiber instruction was not necessary. See Commonwealth v. Lee , 585 A.2d 1084, 1087 (Pa. Super. 1991) (concluding that a Kloiber instruction was unnecessary where the witness's fear of identifying the defendant could not be equated to a witness's failure to make an identification).
Moreover, even if Kloiber instructions should have been given to the jury, Corbin cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by this failure. Indeed, the PCRA court noted that Corbin admitted to the robbery and murder to various witnesses. See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/10/15, at 8-11. We agree and adopt the sound reasoning of the PCRA court, as to the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness test concerning this claim. See id. Thus, Corbin's first claim is without merit.
With regard to Corbin's claim pertaining to impeaching Tindale's testimony, we note that Corbin has raised a separate claim to this effect and we will address the claim below.
In his second claim, Corbin contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach the testimony of Tindale, who testified that Corbin admitted to the crimes while they were incarcerated together in federal prison. Brief for Appellant at 20, 24. Corbin argues that there was substantial evidence of Tindale's bias in favor of the Commonwealth because he was seeking a lighter sentence for his crimes. Id. at 20-24; see also Reply Brief for Appellant at 9-16 (asserting that counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Tindale with "other crimes" evidence, despite impeaching Tindale in other ways). Corbin further argues counsel failed to impeach Tindale based on his mental health issues, including hallucinatory psychosis. Brief for Appellant at 25-26.
Corbin also asserts counsel should have impeached Tindale on his testimony that Corbin had shown the discovery in the case to Tindale when confessing, despite the fact that Corbin had not been charged with the crimes. Brief for Appellant at 25. However, Corbin did not raise this claim in his court-ordered Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) Concise Statement. Thus, it is waived on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Lane , 81 A.3d 974, 979 (Pa. Super. 2013) (noting that any issues not raised in a Rule 1925(b) concise statement are waived on appeal); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iv).
With regard to Tindale's alleged mental health issues, the PCRA court addressed Corbin's claim and determined that it is without merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/10/15, at 11-12; see also Commonwealth v. Hutchinson , 556 A.2d 370, 372 (Pa. 1989) (stating that the petitioner has the burden to prove his ineffectiveness allegations by submission of relevant evidence in support of the claim). We adopt the sound reasoning the PCRA court for the purpose of this appeal. See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/10/15, at 11-12.
With regard to Tindale's bias toward the Commonwealth, we note that "[c]ross-examination may be employed to test a witness'[s] story, to impeach credibility, and to establish the witness'[s] motive for testifying. Further, a witness may be cross-examined as to any matter tending to show the interest or bias of that witness." Commonwealth v. Hyland , 875 A.2d 1175, 1186 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations omitted). "Whenever a prosecution witness may be biased in favor of the prosecution because of outstanding criminal charges or because of any non-final criminal disposition against him within the same jurisdiction, that possible bias, in fairness, must be made known to the jury." Id. (citation omitted). Further, defense counsel must be permitted to cross-examine a Commonwealth witness on possible favorable treatment, in exchange for testimony for the Commonwealth, so that the jury may consider the witness's possible ulterior motives, to accurately to assess credibility. Id. "The scope of cross-examination is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion." Commonwealth v. Ballard , 80 A.3d 380, 394 (Pa. 2013).
Here, the PCRA court addressed Corbin's claim and determined that it is without merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/10/15, at 27-28. Moreover, in addition to testimony elicited at trial, Corbin's counsel argued to the jury that Tindale had a motive to lie because he was seeking a break on his own sentence. See N.T., 1/22/09, at 40-44; N.T., 1/15/09, at 36, 39-43. Thus, the PCRA court properly rejected Corbin's claim, and we adopt its sound reasoning for the purpose of this appeal. See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/10/15, at 27-28.
We note that Corbin cites to various crimes Tindale allegedly committed that counsel should have used to impeach Tindale. Brief for Appellant at 22-23. However, Tindale was not charged or convicted with crimes in these instances. See , e.g., Commonwealth v. Patterson , 91 A.3d 55, 68-69 (Pa. 2014) (noting that a witness's veracity "may not be impeached by prior arrests which have not lead to convictions. Pa.R.E. 608(b) precludes the admission of specific instances of misconduct to attack a witness'[s] character for truthfulness while Pa.R.E. 609(a) requires an actual conviction of a crime involving dishonesty or false statement in order for a witness's credibility to be attacked with evidence of the crime."). Thus, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to impeach Tindale with inadmissible evidence. See Commonwealth v. Harris , 703 A.2d 441, 450 (Pa. 1997) (stating that where "evidence was either irrelevant or inadmissible, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to present it.").
Additionally, we note that Corbin has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by counsel's actions where he admitted his involvement in the robbery and murder to two other people. See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/10/15, at 8-10; see also Commonwealth v. Rainey , 928 A.2d 215, 233 (Pa. 2007) (stating that "[i]f it is clear that [a]ppellant has not demonstrated that counsel's act or omission adversely affected the outcome of the proceedings, the claim may be dismissed on that basis alone[.]").
Corbin also contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Spearman's testimony, based upon the fact that she had criminal cases pending against her when she made statements to the police. Brief for Appellant at 26-28; see also id. at 26-27 (noting that, inter alia, Spearman had a prostitution case pending when she gave her first statement to the police in 2003; she was on probation in a prostitution case and a drug case when she gave a statement in 2007; and she had other drug arrests in 2006 and 2007). Corbin asserts that Spearman was attempting to curry favor with the Commonwealth in providing statements to the police. Id. at 26, 28.
Here, the PCRA court addressed Corbin's claims and determined that they are without merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/10/15, at 28. We adopt the sound reasoning of the PCRA court for the purpose of this appeal. See id.
Even if counsel had improperly failed to examine Spearman on her prior criminal history, Corbin has not demonstrated that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different, in light of his admission to the crime. See Commonwealth v. Cox , 728 A.2d 923, 933 (Pa. 1999) (noting that "trial counsel's failure to cross-examine these witnesses concerning bias stemming from an outstanding warrant, criminal charges, probations, or paroles, this would not so prejudice the [a]ppellant that the result of this trial would have been different if counsel had pursued this line of questioning.").
In his third claim, Corbin contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's various jury instructions. See Brief for Appellant at 28-50. First, Corbin argues that the trial court's instruction on reasonable doubt improperly added a requirement that the jury must find a substantial doubt to acquit Corbin. Id. at 29, 31-32, 34. Corbin asserts that the instruction relieved the Commonwealth of its burden of proof. Id. at 30, 31; see also id. (wherein Corbin points to the part of the instruction regarding a scenario about a loved one in need of surgery as relieving the Commonwealth of its burden). Corbin claims that the instruction was so egregious that harmless error could not be found. Id. at 32; see also id. at 32-33 (noting that the instruction did not include language requiring a vote for acquittal if a juror "pauses" or "hesitates").
Here, the PCRA court set forth the relevant standard of review with regard to jury instructions, addressed Corbin's claim concerning the reasonable doubt instruction, and concluded that it is without merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/10/15, at 12-15. We agree and adopt the PCRA court's reasoning for the purpose of this appeal. See id.
Corbin next contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the incomplete jury instruction on consciousness of guilt. Brief for Appellant at 34. Corbin argues that the Commonwealth sought the instruction based on the change in his appearance in order to conceal himself, but that the court failed to instruct the jury that it could find a consciousness of guilt if it found that he had intentionally changed his appearance to avoid detection. Id. at 35, 38. Corbin asserts that the trial court deviated from the standard jury instruction, and never instructed the jury that it was not permitted to base its decision solely on evidence of concealment. Id. at 36-37, 38-39.
The PCRA court addressed Corbin's claim and concluded that it is without merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/10/15, at 15-16. We adopt the sound reasoning of the PCRA court for the purpose of this appeal. See id.
Corbin also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury instruction regarding identification testimony. Brief for Appellant at 39-40. Corbin asserts that the trial court's instruction that several people identified him as the perpetrator is belied by the record. Id. at 39-41, 42; see also id. at 40 (wherein Corbin argues that Spearman and Gallagher did not present clear identification testimony). Corbin claims that the trial court improperly instructed the jury to focus on specific evidence to convict him. Id. at 42-43. Corbin additionally contends that counsel should have raised a claim regarding the trial court's failure to instruct the jury about the length of time between the crime and identifications. Id. at 43-46.
The PCRA court addressed this claim and determined that it is without merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/10/15, at 20-21. We adopt the sound reasoning of the PCRA court for the purpose of this appeal. See id.
As noted above, a Kloiber instruction was not required with regard to the testimony of Spearman and Gallagher.
Corbin next claims that the trial court improperly pressured the jury to reach unanimity when issuing a verdict. Brief for Appellant at 46-47, 48-49. Corbin contends that a juror hearing the instruction would feel obligated to agree with the majority in rendering a verdict. Id. at 47-48.
The PCRA court addressed this claim and determined that it is without merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/10/15, at 24-25. We adopt the sound reasoning of the PCRA court for the purpose of this appeal. See id.
Corbin finally argues that the cumulative errors with regard to the jury instructions deprived him of due process. Brief for Appellant at 49-50. As we have concluded that the ineffectiveness claims are without merit, Corbin's argument fails. See Commonwealth v. Reid , 99 A.3d 470, 520 (Pa. 2014) (stating that "no number of failed ineffectiveness claims may collectively warrant relief if they fail to do so individually.").
In his fourth claim, Corbin contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial judge's prejudicial comments regarding Detective Boyle. Brief for Appellant at 50-54. Corbin directs our attention to the trial court's statement that Detective Boyle was an old friend with whom she had previously worked. Id. at 50, 51. Corbin asserts that these comments bolstered Detective Boyle's testimony regarding the identification testimony by Spearman and Gallagher. Id. at 51-52. Corbin claims that the judge's statements denied him a fair trial, and counsel had no strategic basis for failing to object to the statements. Id. at 53-54.
The PCRA court addressed Corbin's claim and determined that it is without merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/10/15, at 26-27; see also N.T., 1/22/09, at 105 (wherein the trial court instructed the jury that a determination on the credibility of a witness is within the sole province of the jury); Commonwealth v. Tedford , 960 A.3d 1, 37 (Pa. 2008) (stating that a jury is presumed to follow a trial court's instructions). We adopt the PCRA court's reasoning for the purpose of this appeal. See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/10/15, at 26-27.
Even if counsel improperly failed to object to the judge's comments, Corbin has not demonstrated that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different, in light of his admission to the crimes.
In his fifth claim, Corbin contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an instruction on "other crimes" evidence. Brief for Appellant at 54. Corbin argues that an instruction was necessary for (1) the testimony of Jaunita Topping that she saw Corbin and Jenkins pass guns back and forth; (2) the testimony of Heather DiTaranto that she saw Corbin with guns and that Corbin had threatened to kill her family and made other violent threats against her; and (3) the testimony of Detective Boyle regarding Gallagher's reluctance to testify based on fear of retaliation. Id. at 54-56. Corbin relies upon Commonwealth v. Billa , 555 A.2d 835 (Pa. 1989), to support his contention. Brief for Appellant at 57.
The PCRA court addressed Corbin's claims and determined that they are without merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/10/15, at 31-35; see also Commonwealth v. Blystone , 725 A.2d 1197, 1204-05 (Pa. 1999) (stating that counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek corrective measures in response to a witness's references to appellant's prior criminal activity where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt). We adopt the sound reasoning of the PCRA court for the purpose of this appeal. See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/10/15, at 31-35.
In his sixth claim, Corbin contends that direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim that the trial court erred in prohibiting the introduction of evidence that Tindale had committed armed robberies, for which he had not been charged. Brief for Appellant at 58. Corbin argues that this evidence would have demonstrated that Tindale's testimony was a result of Tindale receiving favorable treatment from the Commonwealth. Id. at 58-59. Corbin asserts that this claim had a greater chance to succeed than the "utterly silly claims" direct appeal counsel raised. Id. at 59-60.
The PCRA court addressed Corbin's claim and determined that it is without merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/10/15, at 35; see also id. at 27-28. We adopt the sound reasoning of the PCRA court for the purpose of this appeal. See id.
In his final claim, Corbin contends that the cumulative impact of the errors deprived him of a fair trial. See Brief for Appellant at 60-61. As noted above, "no number of failed ineffectiveness claims may collectively warrant relief if they fail to do so individually." Reid , 99 A.3d at 520; see also PCRA Court Opinion, 7/10/15, at 36. Thus, Corbin is not entitled to relief on his final claim.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 4/19/2016
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