Opinion
J-S45035-17 No. 405 EDA 2016
08-22-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. BRUCE X. COOPER, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order January 20, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0438741-1984 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, and STRASSBURGER, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Bruce X. Cooper (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order dismissing his praecipe for writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum as an untimely-filed petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
A prior panel of this Court set forth the relevant background to this matter as follows.
On July 13, 1985, a jury convicted Appellant of second-degree murder, robbery, and possessing instruments of crime. The court sentenced Appellant on April 14, 1987, to a total term of life imprisonment. Post-verdict motions were denied, and Appellant's direct appeal was dismissed on September 3, 1987 for failure to file a brief. The Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on December 16, 1987.
Appellant filed a petition for post conviction relief on May 18, 1987. The PCRA court dismissed this petition because Appellant's direct appeal was still pending. On August 19, 1988, Appellant filed his next petition for post conviction relief. The PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant, and the court ultimately denied relief on June 1, 1994. We affirmed the denial of relief and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Cooper , 669 A.2d 408 (Pa. Super. 1994) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 679 A.2d 227 (Pa. 1995).Commonwealth v. Cooper , 876 A.2d 460 (Pa. Super. 2005) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 889 A.2d 87 (Pa. 2005).
Appellant filed another PCRA petition on February 5, 1999. The PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely filed, on July 21, 1999. Once again, this Court affirmed the denial of relief and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Cooper , 782 A.2d 1051 (Pa. Super. 2001) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 792 A.2d 1251 (Pa. 2001).
Appellant filed another PCRA petition on October 22, 2003, which was dismissed by the PCRA court as untimely filed. Again, denial of relief was affirmed by this Court and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Id. The pattern repeated itself in 2008. Commonwealth v. Cooper , 964 A.2d 432 (Pa. Super. 2008) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 967 A.2d 958 (Pa. 2008).
Appellant filed the petition at issue herein on July 7, 2014. Although styled as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the trial court treated the July 7, 2014 filing as a PCRA petition. "[T]he PCRA is intended to be the sole means of achieving post-conviction relief." Commonwealth v. Taylor , 65 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa. Super. 2013). "Unless the PCRA could not provide for a potential remedy, the PCRA statute subsumes the writ of habeas corpus." Id. at 465-66. Although presented inartfully, it appears Appellant is raising claims of newly-discovered evidence. Because such claims are cognizable under the PCRA, habeas corpus is not a viable vehicle for pursuing them. See Commonwealth v. Beck , 848 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super. 2004). Accordingly, we agree with the PCRA court that the PCRA was the proper vehicle to examine these filings.
Generally, a PCRA petition must be filed within one year from the date a judgment becomes final. There are three exceptions to this time requirement: (1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional right. When a petitioner alleges and proves that one of these exceptions is met, the petition will be considered timely. A PCRA petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed within 60 days of the date the claims could have been presented. The timeliness requirements of the PCRA are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court cannot hear untimely petitions.Commonwealth v. Brandon , 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Thus, the PCRA court had no jurisdiction to entertain Appellant's petition unless he pled and offered proof of one or more of the three statutory exceptions to the time bar. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant failed to do so. The instant petition for collateral relief attempts to raise the same claim raised in Appellant's 2008 PCRA petition: that trial counsel provided ineffective representation due to his drug and alcohol use during Appellant's trial. As this Court held in ruling on his previous PCRA petition, Appellant has been attempting to litigate this claim since 1999. Cooper , 964 A.2d 432 (unpublished memorandum at 6-7). Then, as now, Appellant has failed to meet the threshold burden of proving that "the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to petitioner and could not have been ascertained by due diligence," or that he raised this claim within 60 days of discovering such evidence. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Moreover, Appellant concedes that the case upon which he attempts to rely for relief, Martinez v. Ryan , 566 U.S. 1 (2012), "did not recognize a new constitutional right" that would permit relief under the PCRA. Appellant's Brief at 13. Accordingly, the PCRA court properly dismissed his petition.
As the PCRA court explained,
[i]n Martinez , the Supreme Court held that, where counsel is ineffective in a prior, initial state collateral review proceeding, and where the ineffectiveness caused the petitioner to procedurally default on a substantive claim, counsel's ineffectiveness "may provide cause [to excuse a] procedural default in a federal habeas proceeding. Yet, as the Martinez Court explicitly declared, it was not handing down a "constitutional ruling" and it was not recognizing a new constitutional right. Rather, the Martinez Court based its holding upon an "equitable" exception to a court-created doctrine that is applicable only in the federal courts. See also Commonwealth v. Saunders , 60 A.3d 162, 165 (Pa. Super. [] 2013) (holding that "[w]hile Martinez represents a significant development in federal habeas corpus law, it is of no moment with respect to the way Pennsylvania courts apply the plain language of the time bar set forth in section 9545(b)(1) of the PCRA.")
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 8/22/2017
PCRA Court Opinion, 1/20/2016, at 3 (some citations omitted).