Opinion
J-S58035-17 No. 151 MDA 2017
12-28-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. PHILLIP D. COLTON Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 9, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0000454-2013 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:
Appellant, Philip D. Colton, appeals from the amended judgment of sentence, imposed in the Centre County Court of Common Pleas, following remand for resentencing on Appellant's convictions for numerous sex offenses committed against the mentally disabled granddaughter of Appellant's paramour. We affirm.
The trial court opinion fully and correctly set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them.
Appellant raises one issue on appeal:
DID THE SENTENCING COURT ERR IN IMPOSING TWO SEPARATE SENTENCES ON CENTRE COUNTY CRIMINAL INFORMATION NO. CP-14-CR-454-2013, COUNT 1, RAPE, MENTALLY DISABLED PERSON, 18 PA.C.S.A. § 3121(A)(5), AND COUNT 2, RAPE OF A CHILD, 18 PA.C.S.A. § 3121(C), FOR ONE SINGLE ACT OF RAPE?(Appellant's Brief at 9).
Appellant argues he should not be subject to two separate sentences at Centre County Criminal Information No. CP-14-CR-454-2013, Count 1, Rape, Mentally Disabled Person at 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(A)(5), and Count 2, Rape of a Child at 18 PA.C.S.A. § 3121(C), for one single act of rape. Appellant contends the Commonwealth charged only a single act of rape, which cannot support a separate sentence for violating two subsections of the same statute, despite the fact that the evidence supports both convictions. Appellant claims the court's imposition of more than one punishment for a single offense conflicts with the fundamental principles of double jeopardy prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offense. Appellant concludes this Court should vacate the judgment of sentence on Count 2 at Criminal Information No. 0454-2013, because it is merely an alternative for the same Rape offense punished in Count 1. We disagree.
Whether crimes merge for sentencing purposes implicates the legality of the sentence. Commonwealth v. Tanner , 61 A.3d 1043, 1046 (Pa.Super. 2013). Therefore, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Id. Merger of sentences is governed generally by Section 9765 of the Sentencing Code, which provides:
§ 9765. Merger of sentences
No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded offense.42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765. "[T]he language of the legislature is clear. The only way two crimes merge for sentencing is if all elements of the lesser offense are included within the greater offense." Commonwealth v. Coppedge , 984 A.2d 562, 564 (Pa.Super. 2009) (stating cases decided before effective date of Section 9765 are not instructive in merger analysis; regardless of whether facts of particular case comprise both crimes; if elements of crimes differ, i.e., if one offense can be committed without committing other offense, crimes do not merge under legislative mandate of Section 9765).
The Crimes Code defines the offenses of rape of a child and rape of a mentally disabled person, in relevant part, as follows:
§ 3121. Rape
(a) Offense defined.-A person commits a felony of the first degree when the person engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant:
* * *
(5) Who suffers from a mental disability which renders the complainant incapable of consent.
* * *
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(a)(5), (c).
(c) Rape of a child.-A person commits the offense of rape of a child, a felony of the first degree, when the person engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant who is less than 13 years of age.
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Katherine V. Oliver, we conclude Appellant's issue merits no relief. The Trial Court opinion fully discusses and properly disposes of the question presented. ( See Trial Court Opinion, filed April 10, 2017, at 3-6) (finding: merger of offenses on Counts 1 and 2 at Criminal Information No. 0454-2013 for sentencing is prohibited, unless offenses arose from single criminal act and all statutory elements of one offense are included in other; although single criminal act gave rise to Counts 1 and 2 at Criminal Information No. 0454-2013, each offense includes element other does not; Count 1, rape of mentally disabled person, includes element that victim was mentally disabled, which is not element of offense of rape of child; Count 2, rape of child, includes element that victim was child less than 13 years of age, which is not element of rape of mentally disabled person; merger of sentences for Counts 1 and 2 is therefore prohibited; imposing separate sentences for each offense did not violate double jeopardy guarantees under state or federal constitution). The criminal conduct at issue involved a single criminal act, but the charges at Counts 1 and 2 each include an element that the other does not. Thus, merger for sentencing was unwarranted; and the separate sentences imposed must stand. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 12/28/17
Image materials not available for display.