Opinion
J-E01011-16 No. 3114 EDA 2014
07-12-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. SEAN JOSEPH CICCONE Appellant
Appeal from the PCRA Order October 7, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0003231-2011 BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., OLSON, J., OTT, J., and STABILE, J. CONCURRING OPINION BY MUNDY, J.:
I concur in the result of the learned Majority in this case, but I cannot join its opinion. Although I agree that we may correct Appellant's illegal sentence in this case based on Commonwealth v. Newman , 99 A.3d 86 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 121 A.3d 496 (Pa. 2015), and its progeny, I disagree with the Majority's analysis.
Subsequent to Newman , our Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Hopkins , 117 A.3d 247 (Pa. 2015), which adopted Newman 's conclusion. I utilize Newman to refer to this entire line of cases for simplicity.
Succinctly stated, I cannot accept the Majority and the Dissent's premise that Newman and its progeny are conclusions of federal constitutional law. In Newman , the defendant was sentenced to a mandatory minimum under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712.1, after the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant possessed a firearm "in close proximity" to drugs. Newman , supra at 98. This Court concluded that, consistent with Alleyne , Appellant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated, as the "in close proximity" element was not submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt, and the error was not harmless. Id. But then the Newman Court went further and opined that under 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1925, the subsections of Section 9712.1 could not be severed from each other, rendering the statute "unconstitutional in its entirety." Id. at 101-102, 102 n.10.
The Majority and Dissent's premise is apparent in their treatment of Commonwealth v. Riggle , 119 A.3d 1058 (Pa. Super. 2015), in which this Court concluded that Alleyne v. United States , 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) did not apply retroactively to cases where the judgment of sentence became final before Alleyne was decided. Riggle , supra at 1067. The Riggle Court applied the framework set by the United States Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane , 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality), which determines whether a new rule of federal constitutional law shall be applied retroactively to cases where the judgment of sentence had become final. See id. Although the Majority initially states that Riggle and Teague are legally irrelevant to the question presented in this case, the Majority overrules Riggle at the end of its opinion. Majority Opinion at 16, 23. Therefore, it is understandable that the Dissent spends almost all of its time explaining, as a federal constitutional matter, why Alleyne is not retroactive under Teague. See generally Dissenting Opinion at 20. As I explain infra, this Court need not engage in this mode of analysis to resolve the instant appeal. See Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 14 (stating that Appellant can receive relief from his illegal sentence "regardless of the decisions concerning the retroactive application of Alleyne to cases on collateral review[]") (emphasis added).
I filed a concurring opinion in Newman , explaining that Section 9712.1 was severable. See Newman , supra at 104-106 (Mundy, J., concurring). I have also expressed my disagreement with Newman 's severability analysis in subsequent opinions. See generally Commonwealth v. Wolfe , 106 A.3d 800, 803 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal granted, 121 A.3d 433 (Pa. 2015); Commonwealth v. Fennell , 105 A.3d 13, 18 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 121 A.3d 494 (Pa. 2015); Commonwealth v. Cardwell , 105 A.3d 748, 752 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 121 A.3d 494 (Pa. 2015). However, I have also stated that since Newman is the law of this Commonwealth, it "must be applied in a principled manner[.]" Wolfe , supra ; Fennell , supra ; Cardwell , supra. Therefore, accepting Newman 's severability analysis, I cannot deny its legal consequences. --------
In the instant case, Section 7508(a)(1)(ii)'s three-year mandatory minimum was applied after Appellant admitted as part of his guilty plea that "[t]he weight of the [marijuana] plants was approximately, 13 pounds." N.T., 9/9/11, at 5; see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508(a)(1)(ii) (requiring a mandatory minimum sentence of three years' imprisonment "when the amount of marijuana involved is at least ten pounds, but less than 50 pounds[]"). Since Appellant admitted to the triggering element, Appellant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was not violated. See generally Alleyne , supra at 2163; Cunningham v. California , 549 U.S. 270, 274-275 (2007) (stating that the Sixth Amendment requires extra elements either be "found by a jury or admitted by the defendant[]") (citation omitted; emphasis added).
However, under Newman , the fact that Appellant's constitutional rights were not violated is legally irrelevant. We have held Newman requires voiding a mandatory minimum sentence even if the jury finds the extra element beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant stipulates to the same, or the extra element was already an element of the primary offense. See Commonwealth v. Vargas , 108 A.3d 858, 864, 876-877 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (holding Section 7508 sentence illegal even though defendant stipulated to the drug weight), appeal denied, 121 A.3d 496 (Pa. 2015); Fennell , supra at 20 (same); Cardwell , supra at 754-755 (same); Wolfe , supra at 805-806 (holding Section 9718 sentence illegal even though extra element of victim's age was already an element of the underlying primary offense); Commonwealth v. Valentine , 101 A.3d 801, 812 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding Sections 9712 and 9713 sentences illegal even though the extra elements were submitted to the jury on a special verdict form and found beyond a reasonable doubt), appeal denied, 124 A.3d 309 (Pa. 2015).
Newman 's severability analysis is not based on Alleyne , the Sixth Amendment, or anything the United States Supreme Court has promulgated, but rather it was a conclusion of this Court under 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1925. Therefore, Newman 's severability holding is purely a state law conclusion, and it is not one of federal constitutional law. The United States Supreme Court has consistently acknowledged that the severability of state statutes because of a constitutional defect is a state law issue. See Hooper v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor , 472 U.S. 612, 625 (1985) (stating, after holding a portion of a New Mexico statute unconstitutional that "[i]t is for the New Mexico courts to decide, as a matter of state law, whether the state legislature would have enacted the statute without the invalid portion); Morey v. Doud , 354 U.S. 457, 470 n.16 (1957) (stating, after holding a portion of an Illinois statute unconstitutional that "the question of severability is a question of state law, [and] the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is binding here[]"), overruled on other grounds, City of New Orleans v . Dukes , 427 U.S. 297 (1976). Newman and its progeny do not stand for the proposition that the jury must find the extra element for a mandatory minimum beyond a reasonable doubt, which is what Alleyne holds. Instead, Newman 's severability conclusion stands for the legal rule that the jury is prohibited from finding said element beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, I cannot accept the Majority or the Dissent's characterization that we must decide whether Alleyne is retroactive under Teague.
Newman voids all of the mandatory minimum statutes, except those based on a prior conviction, which explicitly require judicial fact-finding by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, due to Newman 's state law conclusion on severability, Appellant's mandatory minimum sentence now lacks statutory authorization, which is a legality of sentence issue. See Commonwealth v. Rivera , 95 A.3d 913, 915 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating, "[i]f no statutory authorization exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction[]") (citation omitted). A legality of sentence issue is cognizable under the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(vii); accord Commonwealth v. Beck , 848 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super. 2004). Such claims "may be entertained as long as the reviewing court has jurisdiction." Commonwealth v. Borovichka , 18 A.3d 1242, 1254 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). As Appellant's PCRA petition was timely, we have jurisdiction and authority to correct Appellant's illegal sentence.
Based on the foregoing, I agree with the Majority that Appellant's mandatory minimum sentence is illegal and subject to correction because his PCRA petition was timely. However, I would leave Riggle undisturbed and not offer any explicit or implicit opinion as to whether Alleyne is retroactive as a matter of federal law under Teague. Accordingly, I respectfully concur in the result only.
Judge Lazarus joins this concurring opinion.