Opinion
10-P-1893
10-14-2011
COMMONWEALTH v. STEVEN BYSON.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
On October 6, 2009, the defendant admitted to sufficient facts on one count of malicious destruction of property over $250, G. L. c. 266 § 127; and one count of attempt to commit a crime, G. L. c. 274, § 6. Both counts were continued without a finding for eighteen months, and the defendant was placed under supervised probation.
The charges stemmed from an incident that occurred the night of October 5, 2009, when the defendant went to the residence of his former employer and began banging on the door. The doorframe cracked, causing the offending damage.
Seven months after tendering his plea, the defendant moved for a new trial under Mass.R.Crim.P. 30(b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), arguing that his admissions to sufficient facts should be vacated because (1) he was incompetent at the time of his tender and (2) the court did not hold a competency hearing prior to his tender. The trial judge denied the motion, and we affirm.
Discussion. An admission to sufficient facts is 'the functional equivalent of a guilty plea.' Commonwealth v. Villalobos, 437 Mass. 797, 800 (2002) (holding that G. L. c. 278, § 29D, applies to both types of pleas). See Commonwealth v. Haskell, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 284, 289-290 (2010). '[A] judge may only allow [the withdrawal of a guilty plea] 'if it appears that justice may not have been done." Commonwealth v. Berrios, 447 Mass. 701, 708 (2006), quoting from Commonwealth v. DeMarco, 387 Mass. 481, 482 (1982), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 907 (2007).
The statute governing the validity of a guilty plea requires that the judge 'conduct a hearing to determine the voluntariness of the plea.' Mass.R.Crim.P. 12(c)(5), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1513 (2004). A judge accepting a guilty plea must determine that the plea 'is both intelligently and voluntarily made.' Commonwealth v. DeCologero, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 93, 94 (2000), quoting from Commonwealth v. Correa, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 714, 717 (1997).
In determining competency, a judge must decide 'whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' Commonwealth v. Russin, 420 Mass. 309, 317 (1995), quoting from Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). In this case, the trial judge engaged in a detailed colloquy with the defendant. He asked the defendant whether he understood the proceedings, he carefully explained the charges against the defendant, he informed the defendant of the rights he would be waiving as a result of the plea, and he informed him of the further legal consequences of his plea. After initially refusing to accept the facts as alleged by the Commonwealth, the defendant ultimately did so. The defendant indicated that he had initially been confused and that he had 'heard something different, that [he] was kicking the door,' but that the judge's explanation had clarified the facts as alleged. Upon receiving this clarification the defendant tendered his plea.
We see nothing in the record indicating that the defendant was suffering from a mental illness at the time his plea was tendered. The time for determining the defendant's competency is the time of his plea. See Commonwealth v. Sherman, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 797, 803 (2007). See also Commonwealth v. Companonio, 445 Mass. 39, 50 (2005) (time for determining defendant's competency is time of trial). The postconviction evidence provided by the defendant of incidents during the defendant's pretrial incarceration and a prior diagnosis of mental illness here does not constitute a sufficient basis to trigger the hearing requirement. See Commonwealth v. Hall, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 2-3 (1983), and cases cited.
In reviewing the judge's determination of competency, we 'must give weight to the judge's opportunity to observe the defendant's demeanor during the trial and the plea hearing.' Russin, 420 Mass. at 317. The judge was within his discretion, based on his own observations at the plea colloquy, to accept the plea as competently tendered. His subsequent denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial was therefore proper.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order denying the defendant's motion for a new trial.
So ordered.
By the Court (Trainor, Brown & Carhart, JJ.),