Opinion
J-A02030-17 No. 1692 EDA 2015
04-28-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellant v. OSCAR ALBERTO VEGA ALVARADO
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order entered May 7, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-09-CR-0000730-2015. BEFORE: OTT, RANSOM, and FITZGERALD, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered May 7, 2015, granting Appellee's suppression motion. We affirm.
The Commonwealth has certified that the trial court's suppression order will terminate and/or substantially handicap the prosecution of Appellant's case. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
In November 2014, Appellee was arrested, and subsequently charged with driving under the influence pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(a)(1) and 3802(c). On March 31, 2015, Appellee filed a pretrial motion, which included a challenge to the admissibility of statements he made during a traffic stop. Specifically, Appellee contested the admissibility of his statements made during a second interaction between him and the arresting officers on the basis that the statements were the product of a custodial interrogation made without Miranda warnings. Appellee also contested the admissibility of blood alcohol results on the basis that, without the statements he made at the scene, the Commonwealth was unable to establish the time of driving.
Arizona v. Miranda , 384 U.S. 436 (1966). --------
The trial court held a suppression hearing on May 7, 2015. Trooper Craig Acord was the only witness. In addition, the Commonwealth played the trooper's dash cam recording of the incident. The trial court summarized its factual findings as follows:
On November 21, 2014, at approximately 11:40 p.m., State Trooper [Craig] Acord ("Trooper Acord"), while on patrol and in full uniform, in a marked patrol vehicle, observed a disabled vehicle stopped on Interstate 95. The disabled vehicle, a black Mercedes owned by [Appellee], was stopped on the right shoulder on Interstate 95 and had its hazard lights on. Upon seeing the disabled vehicle, Trooper Acord turned on his overhead lights and stopped behind the vehicle. It is Trooper Acord's practice to stop and offer assistance to disabled vehicles.
When Trooper Acord initially parked his patrol car behind [Appellee's], he saw [Appellee] in the process of changing a tire. Trooper Acord then got out of his patrol car, approached [Appellee] ("the first interaction"), and asked him questions assessing the situation and offering aid. Trooper Acord's first two questions to [Appellee] were: "[Y]ou got a flat? You ok?" Trooper Acord then asked [Appellee] where he was coming from and where he
was going. Trooper Acord was very amicable during the first interaction. Prior to going back to his patrol vehicle, Trooper Acord told [Appellee] to "go ahead and do what you gotta do there" and to "have at it my friend." Pursuant to normal practice, Trooper Acord asked for [Appellee's] information and took his driver's license while his partner got the registration from [Appellee's] vehicle.
It is undisputed and uncontested that the first interaction between [Appellee] and Trooper Acord was a mere encounter. However, during the first interaction, Trooper Acord observed that [Appellee] appeared to be unsteady, slurred his speech, and had an odor of alcohol coming from him. These observations indicated to Trooper Acord, who has made roughly 350 DUI arrests, that [Appellee] was intoxicated ("hammered"). When Trooper Acord returned to his patrol car to run [Appellee's] driver's license and registration number, he notified his partner that [Appellee] was a "drunk driver" and that he was "hammered." Trooper Acord uses the term "hammered" when describing somebody who is "more than a little drunk." Trooper Acord then said to his partner that he was not going to let [Appellee] change his tire because he might hurt himself. At that time, Trooper Acord determined that [Appellee] was detained and no longer free to leave.
Trooper Acord then exited his patrol car and re-approached [Appellee's] vehicle a second time ("the second interaction"). When Trooper Acord approached [Appellee] for their second interaction, [Appellee] was kneeling down and changing the front right tire of his vehicle. When Trooper Acord reached [Appellee's] vehicle, he stated, "[Appellee], I want you to step over here and talk to me real quick." [Appellee] complied as ordered, and walked to the back right of his vehicle. [Appellee] then stood between the two State Troopers and the concrete barrier lining the shoulder of the highway.
Trooper Acord then proceeded to ask [Appellee] various questions which he already asked him during the first interaction. These questions called into doubt the answers [Appellee] initially provided. For example, one of the first questions Trooper Acord asked [Appellee] during the second interaction was "[w]here are you coming from?'
This same question was asked during the first interaction. However, it was now asked in an inquisitive tone of voice to communicate to [Appellee] that Trooper Acord severely doubted the answer [Appellee] had previously given. The same can be said for the way in which Trooper Acord re-asked [Appellee] "[h]ow come you're heading this way if you're heading home?
Trooper Acord then ordered [Appellee] to move, for a second time, between the patrol car and [Appellee's] car. Moments after commanding [Appellee] to step away from his front right tire, and asking various questions, Trooper Acord demanded [Appellee] "[s]tand over here and talk to me a bit more." This time, Trooper Acord made [Appellee] stand directly between the patrol car and [Appellee's] car. In doing so, Trooper Acord directed [Appellee] to "stand on that line for me and face me." Trooper Acord then asked [Appellee] "you don't have any weapon do you?" As Trooper Acord asked this question, he began to look into [Appellee's] pockets, asked what he was carrying and performed a brief pat down.
Trooper Acord then asked [Appellee] when his last drink was. [Appellee] responded that his last drink was twenty minutes prior to seeing Trooper Acord. Trooper Acord then asked [Appellee] if he stopped after work and where he stopped. [Appellee] answered in the affirmative and stated that he stopped at a bar called "The Press."
Trooper Acord then proceeded to administer a field sobriety test known as the horizontal gaze nystagmus. The test was administered to confirm that [Appellee] was intoxicated. The horizontal gaze nystagmus test did in fact indicate that [Appellee] was intoxicated. Next, Trooper Acord had [Appellee] take a portable breath test. The portable breath test measured [Appellee's] blood alcohol level at .19, more than double the legal limit. Trooper Acord then handcuffed [Appellee] and placed him in the back of his patrol car.
Trooper Acord testified at the suppression hearing that his plan in re-approaching [Appellee] was to build his case for impairment. Trooper Acord hoped to do so by getting [Appellee] to talk more so that he could get [Appellee's] slurred speech on his audio recorder. However, Trooper
Acord did not provide [Appellee] with his Miranda warnings. Further, at no point did Trooper Acord or his partner return [Appellee's] driver's license to him.Trial Court Opinion, 10/7/15, at 1-5 (footnotes omitted).
Earlier in the evening, another State Trooper, Trooper Hand, observed [Appellee] pull over to the side of the highway. No estimate of time between [Trooper] Hand's observation and when Trooper Acord arrived on the scene was given. [Appellee] was not in the driver's seat and the engine was not running. Trooper Acord did not touch any portion of the vehicle to indicate whether or not it was warm. At approximately 12:30 a.m. blood was drawn at St. Mary's Hospital.
After hearing argument from the parties, the trial court granted Appellee motion, thereby suppressing statements made during the second interaction, and, because the Commonwealth proof of the time Appellee was driving was dependent on one of these statements, it also ruled the blood alcohol results inadmissible as it relates to the Section 3802(c) charge. This timely appeal by the Commonwealth follows. Both the Commonwealth and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
The Commonwealth raises the following issues:
A. Did [Trooper Acord] have reasonable suspicion to believe that Appellee, who exhibited slurred speech and red, glassy eyes, smelled of alcohol, was unsteady on his feet, and had trouble responding to the [trooper's] questions, had been operating his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, such that an investigative detention of Appellee was lawful for purposing [sic] of further investigation [of] the suspected criminal activity?
B. Did the suppression court err in concluding that Appellee had been subject to custodial interrogation which required Miranda warnings where the [trooper]
testified that he formed the opinion during the traffic stop that Appellee was intoxicated and therefore not free to leave but where the [trooper] never communicated that to Appellee, and where, under an objective standard, the totality of the circumstances did not reasonably suggest to Appellee that he was under arrest or the [functional] equivalent thereof at the time he made statement(s) that were the subject of suppression?Commonwealth's Brief at 4-5 (excess capitalization omitted).
C. Did the suppression court err in suppressing the laboratory results concerning Appellee's blood alcohol content based on a violation of the two-hour rule where it held that there was circumstantial evidence that Appellee had been driving within two hours of his blood being drawn based on Appellee's statements in conjunction with other circumstantial evidence, but that Appellee's statement was inadmissible and therefore the blood results were inadmissible?
D. Did the suppression court err in suppressing the laboratory results concerning Appellee's blood alcohol content based on a violation of the two-hour rule where the blood alcohol results were otherwise admissible as evidence on count one of the information, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), irrespective of whether Appellee's blood was drawn within two hours of him operating a vehicle?
This Court has summarized:
The applicable standard of review in a Commonwealth appeal from an order of suppression is well-settled. We must first determine whether the factual findings are supported by the record, and then determine whether the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings are reasonable. We may consider only the evidence from the defendant's witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. When the evidence supports the suppression court's findings of fact, this Court may reverse only when the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are erroneous.Commonwealth v. Lyles , 54 A.3d 76 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted), affirmed , 97 A.3d 298 (Pa. 2014).
After careful review of the suppression hearing transcript, as well as our viewing of the dash cam video, we conclude that the Honorable Robert J. Mellon has prepared a thorough and well-reasoned opinion that discusses the different types of police interaction with persons subject to a traffic stop and correctly applies the requisite quantum of evidence the police must possess in order to validate their conduct. Applying the applicable criteria to his factual findings, we conclude that Judge Mellon has correctly disposed of the Commonwealth's first three claims. We therefore adopt Judge Mellon's October 7, 2015 opinion as our own in disposing of the Commonwealth's first three issues enumerated above.
In reaching our conclusion, we reiterate that standards applicable to police conduct may change during the relatively short duration of a traffic stop. See Commonwealth v. Cauley , 10 A.3d 321, 326 (Pa. Super. 2010) (explaining that "[b]ecause the level of intrusion may change during the course of the police encounter, the record must be carefully scrutinized for any evidence of such changes"). Given the particular facts presented, we emphasize the following rationale provided by Judge Mellon:
The foregoing facts clearly indicate that no further investigation was necessary to convince Trooper Acord, who has made roughly 350 DUI arrests, that [Appellee] was intoxicated and an arrest was going to be made. For instance, Trooper Acord's use of the word "hammered," and his corresponding description of the term, showed that
there was no doubt in his mind that [Appellee] was intoxicated. Trooper Acord testified at the suppression hearing that his plan in re-approaching [Appellee] was to build his case for impairment. His only efforts in doing so were to ask incriminating questions and subject [Appellee] to an interrogation. These circumstances do not fit the purpose of the investigative detention because once the determination to arrest was made, [Appellee] was in custody and entitled to his Miranda warnings prior to being interrogated.Trial Court Opinion, 10/7/15, at 24 (footnote omitted). See , e.g., Commonwealth v. Turner , 772 A.2d 970, 975 (Pa. Super. 1999) (en banc) (holding that if a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subject to treatment that renders him in custody for practical purposes, he or she is entitled to full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda ).
In addressing the Commonwealth's fourth issue, we note that Judge Mellon explicitly suppressed the blood alcohol results only as to the Section 3802(c) charge. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/7/15, at 26.
In sum, because a review of the totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion that Appellee was subject to custodial interrogation during the traffic stop without the benefit of Miranda warnings, we affirm the order granting Appellee's suppression motion.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 4/28/2017
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