Summary
holding specific priority of liens under Certificate of Motor Vehicle Title Law as valid against general provisions in Uniform Commercial Code relating to artisan's liens
Summary of this case from Matter of FieldsOpinion
No. 38823
Decided May 19, 1965.
Liens — Priority — Lien noted on certificate of title of motor vehicle — Section 4505.13, Revised Code — Prevails over liens arising by operation of law — Section 1309.29, Revised Code.
The specific priority granted in Section 4505.13, Revised Code, to liens noted upon the certificate of title of a motor vehicle makes such liens valid against other liens and prevails over the general provision of Section 1309.29, Revised Code, relating to artisan's liens. (Sections 1309.29, 1333.41 and 4505.13, Revised Code, construed.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County.
The plaintiff brought its action to replevin a motor vehicle upon which it had an admittedly valid chattel mortgage. The lien of this valid chattel mortgage was recorded upon the face of the certificate of title. Defendant Downtown Lincoln-Mercury Company in this action was in possession of the vehicle and claimed to be entitled to retain possession by virtue of its garageman's lien resulting from its furnishing of labor and materials for the repair of such automobile.
It is stipulated that the sole issue involved is the priority of the liens of the respective parties It is admitted that plaintiff's lien is superior unless the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code has altered the established law of Ohio as to the priority of liens upon motor vehicles.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held for the plaintiff, and the cause is before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Mr. Marvin J. Barsman, for appellee.
Mr. Lee B. Kasson, Jr., for appellant.
The pertinent section of the Uniform Commercial Code is Section 1309.29, Revised Code, effective July 1, 1962, which provides:
"When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes services or materials with respect to goods subject to a security interest, a lien upon goods in possession of such person given by statute or rule of law for such materials or services takes priority over a perfected security interest unless the lien is statutory and the statute expressly provides otherwise."
The lien referred to in Section 1309.29, Revised Code, is the artisan's lien. The artisan's lien prior to the enactment of Section 1333.41, Revised Code, was a common-law lien. That section makes the artisan's lien a statutory lien but expressly excludes motor vehicles from its operation. It follows that the artisan's lien to the extent that it affects motor vehicles is still a common-law lien and, hence, does not fall within the exception in Section 1309.29, Revised Code.
The language of Section 4505.13, Revised Code, specifically makes a security agreement conveying a security interest in an automobile, if a notation of such instrument has been made by the Clerk of the Court of Common Pleas on the face of the certificate of title, valid against other lienholders.
There is an apparent conflict as to the priority of the liens under the subject statutes. However, the General Assembly by expressly eliminating motor vehicles from the provisions of Section 1333.41, Revised Code, by expressly excepting motor vehicles from the required filing to protect a security interest in Section 1309.21 (C) 2, Revised Code, and by the amendments of Section 4505.13, Revised Code, the specific statute which deals with motor-vehicle liens and which states that a lien noted upon the certificate shall be valid against other liens, has made it clear that the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code was not intended to alter the well established law of Ohio as to the priority of liens upon motor vehicles.
A special statutory provision which relates to a specific subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision which might otherwise be applicable. Andrianos v. Community Traction Co., 155 Ohio St. 47.
We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that the specific priority provided in Section 4505.13, Revised Code, prevails over the general provision of Section 1309.29, Revised Code.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed
TAFT, C.J., ZIMMERMAN, MATTHIAS, O'NEILL, HERBERT and SCHNEIDER, JJ., concur.