Summary
In Victoria v. Commonwealth, 38 C. L. R. 399, 407, Higgins, J., speaking for the High Court of Australia, said: "If our decision happened to be adverse to the Commonwealth Act, the other States might have their financial arrangements seriously upset; and yet they would not be bound by that decision as they are not parties. This court might have to entertain a fresh action by some other State, seeking to induce this court to reconsider its pronounced decision.
Summary of this case from National Transportation Co., Inc. v. ToquetOpinion
No. CV 03 0070736
December 8, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE #101 MOTION TO DISMISS
On July 7, 2003, the plaintiff, Laurie Combs, filed a complaint against the Office of the Claims Commissioner of the State of Connecticut seeking declaratory relief. This action arises out of injuries and losses allegedly sustained as a result of a motor vehicle, accident that occurred on July 23, 2001. The plaintiff, an employee of the Department of Correction (DOC), alleges that while on duty, the state vehicle she was operating was struck by another DOC vehicle operated by another DOC employee.
The defendant, James R. Smith, is the Claims Commissioner for the State of Connecticut.
Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that on July 23, 2001 at approximately 11:50 a.m., the plaintiff was returning to York Correctional Institution from the New London Court with an inmate. She further alleges that she eventually pulled up next to another corrections officer, who was waiting to enter the truck gate, when her vehicle was struck by Corrections Officer Richard E. Marsan as he was backing out of a parking space.
On May 16, 2002, the plaintiff filed a notice of claim against the State of Connecticut with the defendant pursuant to General Statutes § 4-147. On August 28, 2002, the State of Connecticut, through the Office of the Attorney General, filed a motion to dismiss the claim on the ground that pursuant to § 4-142(2), this is an "excepted claim" upon which suit is "otherwise authorized." On September 19, 2002, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition arguing that she was prohibited from bringing a direct action by § 4-165, which provides a state employee with immunity from suit brought by another employee. In a Memorandum of Decision on October 4, 2002, the defendant granted the State of Connecticut's motion to dismiss on the ground that he lacked jurisdiction to determine the plaintiff's claim relying on § 4-142(2). Pursuant to § 4-176, the plaintiff on November 8, 2002, petitioned the defendant for a declaratory ruling on several issues pertaining to her dismissed claim. The defendant did not rule on the plaintiff's petition. Consequently, the plaintiff alleges that according to § 4-176(i), the defendant shall be deemed to have decided not to issue a ruling because one hundred and eighty days had passed since the plaintiff filed said petition.
General Statutes § 4-147 provides in relevant part: "Any person wishing to present a claim against the state shall file with the clerk of the Office of the Claims Commissioner a notice of claim . . ."
General Statutes § 4-142 provides: "There shall be a Claims Commissioner who shall hear and determine all claims against the state except: (1) Claims for the periodic payment of disability, pension, retirement or other employment benefits; (2) claims upon which suit otherwise is authorized by law including suits to recover similar relief arising from the same set of facts; (3) claims for which an administrative hearing procedure otherwise is established by law; (4) requests by political subdivisions of the state for the payment of grants in lieu of taxes; and (5) claims for the refund of taxes."
The State of Connecticut argued that the plaintiff could bring a direct action under § 52-556, which provides: "Any person injured in person or property through the negligence of any state official or employee when operating a motor vehicle owned and insured by the state against personal injuries or property damage shall have a right of action against the state to recover damages for such injury."
General Statutes § 4-165 provides in relevant part: "No state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employment."
General Statutes § 4-176 provides in relevant part: "(a) Any person may petition an agency, or an agency may on its own motion initiate a proceeding, for a declaratory ruling as to the validity of any regulation, or the applicability to specified circumstances of a provision of the general statutes, a regulation, or a final decision on a matter within the jurisdiction of the agency."
General Statutes § 4-176 provides in relevant part: "(i) If an agency does not issue a declaratory ruling within one hundred eighty days after the filing of a petition therefor, or within such longer period as may be agreed by the parties, the agency shall be deemed to have decided not to issue such ruling."
On July 7, 2003, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking declaratory judgment pursuant to § 4-175. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleges that several statutes interfere with or impair her legal rights or privileges pertaining to her initial claim against the State of Connecticut. On September 3, 2003, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, accompanied by a memorandum in support. On August 13, 2004, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition.
General Statutes § 4-175 provides in relevant part: "(a) If a provision of the general statutes, a regulation or a final decision, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff and if an agency (1) does not take an action required by subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of subsection (e) of section 4-176, within sixty days of the filing of a petition for a declaratory ruling, (2) decides not to issue a declaratory ruling under subdivision (4) or (5) of subsection (e) of said section 4-176, or (3) is deemed to have decided not to issue a declaratory ruling under subsection (i) of said section 4-176, the petitioner may seek in the Superior Court a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the regulation in question or the applicability of the provision of the general statutes, the regulation or the final decision in question to specified circumstances."
The plaintiff alleges that General Statutes § 4-160, 4-165, 31-293a, 4-142(2) and 52-556 interfere with or impair her legal rights or privileges.
It is well-settled that "[a] motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blumenthal v. Barnes, 261 Conn. 434, 442, 804 A.2d 152 (2002). "A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dyous v. Psychiatric Security Review Board, 264 Conn. 766, 774, 826 A.2d 138 (2003). "Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). "A possible absence of subject matter jurisdiction must be addressed and decided whenever the issue is raised. The parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, either by waiver or by consent . . . Ordinarily, a challenge to the court's jurisdiction is raised by the filing of a motion to dismiss. However, [w]henever a lack of jurisdiction to entertain a particular proceeding comes to a court's notice, the court can dismiss the proceeding upon its own motion." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jolly, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 237 Conn. 184, 192-93, 676 A.2d 831 (1996).
The defendant moves to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that this court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present action. The defendant argues that in her complaint, the plaintiff is attempting to administratively appeal a final decision of the defendant, which is not properly appealable to the Superior Court. The defendant farther argues that § 4-175 is not available to the plaintiff based on the facts alleged in this action. The plaintiff counters that this court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear declaratory judgment actions pursuant to the language of § 4-175 and 4-176.
The Connecticut General Statutes and case law indicate that the Superior Court may not review decisions of the claims commissioner because the General Assembly has been given statutory authority to review said decisions. The Supreme Court originally held that "If [a] claim had been rejected by the commissioner or the general assembly, the plaintiff would then have been free to bring her constitutional claim to the Superior Court" Sullivan v. State, 189 Conn. 550, 559, 457 A.2d 304 (1983). The Court, however, subsequently recognized that the legislature eliminated a plaintiff's right to appeal decisions of the claims commissioner when it announced that "Public Acts 1982, No. 82-167, should be read as a clarification of the Superior Courts ongoing lack of jurisdiction to hear appeals from the claims commissioner." Circle Lanes of Fairfield, Inc. v. Fay, 195 Conn. 534, 541, 489 A.2d 363 (1985).
Moreover, this court acknowledges that § 4-146(b) explicitly states: "The action of the Claims Commissioner in approving or rejecting payment of any claim or part thereof shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law and fact and shall not be subject to review except by the General Assembly." "In Circle Lanes of Fairfield, Inc., [the Supreme Court] concluded that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to hear appeals from the claims commissioner because General Statutes 4-164a expressly exempted the claims commissioner from the operation of General Statutes 4-183, the provision of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act that permits an appeal to the Superior Court." Krozser v. New Haven, 212 Conn. 415, 424 n. 10, 562 A.2d 1080 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036, 110 S.Ct. 757, 107 L.Ed.2d 774 (1990).
In the present case, the plaintiff is not seeking to appeal the decision of the claims commissioner. Rather, she filed the present action to obtain a declaratory judgment in accordance with § 4-175 because the defendant did not rule on the plaintiff's petition for a declaratory ruling pertaining to her dismissed claim. The plaintiff is permitted to petition the defendant for a declaratory ruling pursuant to § 4-176(a), which expressly provides: "Any person may petition an agency, or an agency may on its own motion initiate a proceeding, for a declaratory ruling as to the validity of any regulation, or the applicability to specified circumstances of a provision of the general statutes, a regulation, or a final decision on a matter within the jurisdiction of the agency." Section 4-176(i) further provides: "If an agency does not issue a declaratory ruling within one hundred eighty days after the filing of a petition therefore, or within such longer period as may be agreed by the parties, the agency shall be deemed to have decided not to issue such ruling." In the present case, because the defendant failed to issue a declaratory ruling within one hundred eighty days after the plaintiff filed her petition, he is deemed to have decided not to issue said ruling.
Similarly, the plaintiff has the authority to file for declaratory relief in the Superior Court as provided for in § 4-175(a) subdivision (3), which states: "If a provision of the general statutes, a regulation or a final decision, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff and if an agency . . . is deemed to have decided not to issue a declaratory ruling under subsection (i) of said section 4-176, the petitioner may seek in the Superior Court a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the regulation in question or the applicability of the provision of the general statutes, the regulation or the final decision in question to specified circumstances." The Appellate Court also recognized these statutory rights when it highlighted that "[a] party may also file a declaratory judgment action with the agency `as to the validity of any regulation, or the applicability to specified circumstances of a provision of the general statutes, a regulation, or a final decision on a matter within the jurisdiction of the agency.' . . . After a ruling by the agency, or a decision by the agency not to issue a ruling, the party may then file a declaratory judgment action with the trial court" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rudy's Limousine Service, Inc. v. Commissioner, Department of Transportation, 78 Conn.App. 80, 85-86, 826 A.2d 1161 (2003). Here, the plaintiff can rely on § 4-175 to provide her with the authority to file a declaratory judgment action in the Superior Court because provisions of the General Statutes interfere with or impair her legal rights or privileges and the defendant did not rule on her November 8, 2002 petition. As such, this court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case as promulgated by § 4-175.
The defendant's argument that § 4-186(c) exempts the Office of the Claims Commissioner from any judicial review is without merit. Section 4-186(c) expressly provides: "The Employment Security Division and the Board of Mediation and Arbitration of the state Labor Department, the Claims Commissioner, and the Workers' Compensation Commissioner are exempt from the provisions of section 4-176e and sections 4-177 to 4-183, inclusive." The Supreme Court has acknowledged that several sections of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA) continue to apply to those agencies enumerated in § 4-186(c), namely § 4-175 and 4-176. In addressing which sections of UAPA govern the board of mediation and arbitration, another agency exempted under § 4-186(c), the court held that "§ 4-186(c) does not exempt the board of mediation and arbitration from all the provisions of the UAPA; it exempts the board only from the provisions of General Statutes § 4-176e and General Statutes §§ 4-177 through 4-183." Stratford v. State Board of Mediation and Arbitration, 239 Conn. 32, 41, 681 A.2d 281 (1996). The court farther concluded that "General Statutes §§ 4-168 through 4-176 govern an agency's regulation-making process, including declaratory rulings regarding regulations. The board of mediation and arbitration is subject to those provisions of the UAPA." Id., 42. Thus, the Claims Commissioner, like the board of mediation and arbitration, must adhere to § 4-175 and 4-176 and all other statutory provisions not exempted by § 4-186.
Alternatively, the plaintiff could have also brought an action to the Superior Court for a declaratory judgment pursuant to Practice Book § 17-54 and General Statutes § 52-29. "Our Supreme Court has frequently pointed out that the statutes and rules pertaining to declaratory judgments create an independent remedy and should be accorded a liberal construction." Colonial House v. Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations, 23 Conn.Sup. 30, 34, 176 A.2d 381 (1961). "The rules adopted to carry out the statute authorize the Superior Court to render such judgments `as to the existence or nonexistence (a) of any right, power, privilege or immunity; or (b) of any fact upon which the existence or nonexistence of such right, power, privilege or immunity does or may depend, whether such right, power, privilege or immunity now exists or will arise in the future.' While the rules go on to limit that power in certain respects, neither in them nor in the statute is there any restriction upon the power of the court to render judgments determining rights which are contingent upon the happening of some future event." Sigal v. Wise, 114 Conn. 297, 301, 158 A. 891 (1932). More importantly to the present case, the court has also concluded that "an action for a declaratory judgment is a proper method for determining rights in connection with a regulation of an administrative agency." Colonial House v. Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations, supra, CT Page 18553 23 Conn.Sup. 35-36. The plaintiff, therefore, in the present action could have sought a declaratory judgment in the Superior Court based on the language of both Practice Book § 17-54 and General Statutes § 52-29 despite the more narrow method provided for in § 4-175.
Practice Book § 17-54 provides: "The judicial authority will, in cases not herein excepted, render declaratory judgments as to the existence or nonexistence (1) of any right, power, privilege or immunity; or (2) of any fact upon which the existence or nonexistence of such right, power, privilege or immunity does or may depend, whether such right, power, privilege or immunity now exists or will arise in the future.
General Statutes § 52-29 provides:
(a) The Superior Court in any action or proceeding may declare rights and other legal relations on request for such a declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.
The declaration shall have the force of a final judgment.
(b) The judges of the Superior Court may make such orders and rules as they may deem necessary or advisable to carry into effect the provisions of this section.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.
Riley, J.