Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-3728, Section "K"
February 20, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant, La Madeline's, Motion for Summary Judgment (rec. doc. 22) filed in response to plaintiffs complaint alleging it violated provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Plaintiff's complaint argues that defendant violated the ADA when it failed to promote, advance and rehire her after she underwent a second surgery to her jaw. Defendant contends that plaintiff has not alleged a valid claim under the ADA and requests summary judgment in its favor. After reviewing the memoranda and relevant law, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion for the reasons that follow.
42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff has a long and detailed history of problems with her jaw. It began in the late eighties, when plaintiff suffered a trauma to her jaw that made eating and talking difficult for her at certain times. In 1991, plaintiff underwent her first corrective surgery to her jaw, but continued to suffer from pain in discomfort. In 1996, plaintiff had another surgery for her jaw that provided temporary relief However, plaintiff continued to have pain in that area and was unable to "eat like a normal human being." For example, plaintiff explained that she was forced to blend her foods in a mixer before eating them or would have to crush food in the roof of her mouth before swallowing because she could not chew. Even with her discomfort, plaintiff maintained employment throughout this period.
In April 1998, plaintiff was hired by La Madeline as the manager of one of its locations in New Orleans, Louisiana and in April 1999, was promoted to serve as the general manager at another New Orleans location. Later that year, plaintiffs physician recommended that she undergo a "two phase" surgery to correct problems with her jaw. On December 8, 2000, plaintiff took a leave of absence from her employment for her first surgery. Plaintiff returned from her first surgery on January 5, 2000 with restrictions to perform only "light administrative duties" and defendant accommodated her limitations by giving her primarily administrative duties. Plaintiff also testified that after the surgery she continued to have had trouble eating because she could not chew normally.
On January 27, 2000, plaintiff advised defendant that she was scheduled to undergo the second phase of her surgery and requested that she be placed on long term disability. On January 29, 2000, plaintiff took her second leave of absence. After her second surgery, plaintiff testified that while she was not able to run or stand for a long period of time, she was able to bathe herself, cook (with some difficulty), drive, dress, and take care of her daily needs. Nonetheless, plaintiff applied for and received long term disability from CNA, defendant's insurer, on February 28, 2000 claiming that she was incapable of performing her job requirements because of chronic pain and weight loss. Plaintiff was also placed on family medical leave by La Madeline.
Plaintiff was expected to return to work May 31, 2000, but that date was extended one month due to surgery delays. On May 25, 2000, plaintiff contacted Director of Operations for defendant, Lyn Harwell, to inquire about open positions for a general manager. Mr. Harwell explained that there were no general management positions available in New Orleans at that time, but that there was a management position open in the Mandeville location. On June 14, 2000, plaintiff again contacted defendant for information about any open positions as general manager. In a letter dated June 28, 2000, La Madeline explained that "once your doctor releases you to return to work, you may contact the Director of Operations, Lyn Harwell, regarding an available equivalent position and your status with the company." Plaintiff never contacted Mr. Harwell and began looking for other employment in August 2000. Plaintiff began working at Copeland's in September 2000. and is currently employed as an Assistant General Manager at Roadhouse Grill.
Plaintiff also testified that by July, 2000 she was able to chew her food normally — with minor soreness. She also noted that by August, 2000, plaintiff was able to handle a solid workload.
On July 27, 2000, plaintiff filed an EEOC charge alleging that she had been discriminated against by La Madeline in violation of the ADA. The EEOC reviewed and dismissed plaintiff's claims. On December 20, 2000, plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit alleging that defendant violated the ADA by "failing to promote and advance" plaintiff and rehire her after her second leave of absence.
Defendant contends that: (1) plaintiff can not establish that she suffers from a "disability" as defined by the ADA, in part, because her temporary jaw infliction (which was corrected by surgery) did not "substantially limit any of her major life activities," (2) even if plaintiff could prove that she had a "disability within the meaning of the ADA, she could not establish that she was a "qualified individual" who could perform the essential functions of her job during the time in question as her long term disability application and deposition testimony declare her totally disabled to perform the tasks implicit in her job, and (3) even were plaintiff to prove that she was a qualified individual with a disability, she could not establish that La Madeline failed to accommodate her because plaintiff never returned to work and instead sought employment at other restaurants.
Plaintiff, however, argues that (1) she had a "disability" as defined under the ADA because she was substantially limited in the major life activity of "eating" following her surgeries and even though disability was temporary, defendant's violations occurred when it was uncertain how long the disability would last, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action (constructive termination) when she was afflicted with the disability, (3) she should not be estopped from claiming she could perform essential functions of the job because of statements she made in her application for long term disability benefits, and (4) evidence establishes that defendant's proffered reason for plaintiff's constructive discharge was merely pretext.
ANALYSIS
Standard for Motion for Summary Judgment
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action." Daniels v. City of Arlington, Texas, 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2001).
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Stults v. Conoco, 76 F.3d 651, 656 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more that show there is some possible doubt as to the material facts. Rather, the nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986); Beck v. Texas State Board of Dental Examiners, 204 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 2000).
In reviewing the motion, the Court considers the record as a whole, disregarding evidence that the jury is "not required to believe." Thomas v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, Inc., 233 F.3d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 2000). Thus, where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita at 588. Finally, the Court notes that substantive law determines materiality of facts and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Standards Imposed by the ADA
The ADA prohibits discrimination "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, compensation, job training and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Under McDonnell Douglas Co. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must establish that she: (1) suffers from a disability, (2) was a qualified individual for the job to which she applied, (3) was subject to an adverse employment decision, and (4) was replaced by a nondisabled person or treated less favorably than nondisabled employees.
Proof of a "disability" is a threshold requirement of an ADA claim, and as defined by the ADA, a "disability" includes: (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of the individual, (2) a record of such impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. The EEOC interpretive guidelines to the ADA provide that an individual is substantially limited if she is totally or significantly restricted in her ability to perform major life activities in comparison with the average person in the general population.
The guidelines further note that the following factors are instructive to determine whether an individuals' ailment "substantially limits a major life activity" including: (1) the nature and severity of the impairment, (2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment, and (3) the permanent or long term impact or expected impact resulting from the impairment. And, as the Supreme Court noted in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, KY, Inc. v. Williams, 122 S.Ct. 681, 691 (2002), "to be substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual for doing activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives. The impairment's impact must also be permanent or long term."
Several courts have held that temporary disorders are not "disabilities" protected by the ADA. In McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 62 F.3d 92 (3rd Cir. 1995), for example, the court determined that inability to work for two months following abdominal surgery did not constitute a disability and noted that plaintiff's impairment "was not permanent, nor for such an extended time as to be of the type contemplated" by the ADA. Similarly, in Pryor v. Trane Co., 138 F.3d 1024, 1026 (5th Cir. 1998) the Fifth Circuit, citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630, noted that temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term impact, are usually not disabilities. See also Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 1997) (concluding in part that alcoholism did not make plaintiff a "qualified individual with a disability" and noting that it has previously rejected attempts to transform temporary afflictions into qualifying disabilities), Rogers v. International Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755 (5th Cir. 1996) (concluding that plaintiffs intermittent ankle inflictions were temporary and did not constitute a permanent disability), Shaw v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, 1999 WL 1068581 (N.D. Miss. 1999) (concluding that plaintiffs intermittent problems following her root canal surgery did not constitute a "disability" under the ADA, in part, because there was no proof of any permanent or long-term impact), and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, KY, Inc. v. Williams, 122 S.Ct. 681, 691 (2002) (noting in part that to be "substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an impairment's impacts must be permanent or long-term).
It is with those standards that the Court turns to the merits of the case at bar. The central question for this Court is whether plaintiff has presented a genuine issue of material fact as to the first prong of her prima facie case, that is, whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude that she suffers from a disability as defined by the ADA. If, so, the Court must then determine whether plaintiff should be estopped from claiming that she was a "qualified individual" to perform her job requirements based on her representations in her application for long term disability indicating that she was totally incapable of employment.
Prima Fade Case
Plaintiff claims that her jaw infliction and limitations following her surgery created a disability that precluded her from the major life activity of "eating." While the Court notes that eating may be a "major life activity" within the meaning of the ADA, plaintiff has not established that her infliction is protected by the ADA. First, plaintiff was not permanently limited in the major life activity of eating. Before her surgeries and during her tenure at La Madeline, as long as she prepared her foods in a certain manner and restricted her diet to foods that would accommodate her condition, plaintiff was able to eat as long. And, by August 2001, plaintiff had resumed a more normal eating pattern and even noted that she could chew a piece of steak. Thus, plaintiff does not meet the requirement of the ADA that an infliction or its effects be permanent or long-lasting.
Furthermore, plaintiff's infliction did not did not have a long term effect on any other "major life activities" outside of "eating." For example, after her first and second surgeries in 2001, plaintiff was able to care for herself and perform daily activities like washing, bathing, cooking and driving. Plaintiff also returned to work for defendant after her first surgery and was permitted to perform administrative duties that did not require an exertion of energy. After her second surgery, plaintiff eventually regained her full strength and by August 2001 was able to carry a full workload. Thus, plaintiff can not establish that her infliction substantially limited any other major life activity for the long-term.
The Court further notes that its decision is consistent with the recent Supreme Court ruling in Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky. Inc. v. Williams, 122 S.Ct. 681 (2002). In that case, plaintiff developed carpal tunnel syndrome while employed as an assembly line worker and was fired from her job when her doctor's restrictions prohibited her from completing her job requirements. Plaintiff then sued her employer for failing to provide her reasonable accommodation and argued that she was disabled under the ADA because her physical impairments substantially limited her in several major life activities including: (1) manual tasks, (2) housework, (3) gardening, (4) playing with her children, (5) lifting, and (6) working.
The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and held that plaintiff's disability was not protected by the ADA because it had not limited her in any major life activity. However, the Sixth Circuit reversed found, in part, that plaintiff's impairments had substantially limited her in the "performance of manual tasks" associated with her job. On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit's reasoning because it "analyzed only a limited class of manual tasks and failed to ask whether respondent's impairments prevented or restricted her from performing tasks that are of central importance to most people's daily lives." Williams at 693. The Court noted that, "household chores, bathing, and brushing one's teeth" are among the type of manual tasks of central importance to people's daily lived and should have been a part of the court's assessment.
In the case at bar, the Court has rejected plaintiffs contention that she is limited in the major life activity of eating because any effects she may have felt were only temporary. The Court further notes that plaintiff can not establish that her infliction limited any other major life activities as she has remained able to tend to her personal hygiene, complete household chores, and drive.
Finally, the Court notes that while defendant advised plaintiff to contact Mr. Harwell once her physician released her to return to work to discuss available job position, she chose not to contact him and sought employment elsewhere. Plaintiff never afforded defendant the opportunity to accommodate any needs she might of had during future employment with La Madeline. Therefore, the Court can not hold that defendant failed to accommodate defendant under provisions of the ADA.
Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and plaintiff's complaint is dismissed.