Summary
In Ebbole, the issue was whether section 3 of the Act, 19 P. S. § 191.3, standing alone, requires a showing of probable cause; we held that it did not. While the opinion does hold that the statute does not require a showing of probable cause, it does not follow from this that to require such a showing would violate the statute.
Summary of this case from Commonwealth ex rel. Marshall v. GedneyOpinion
November 14, 1972.
December 11, 1972.
Criminal Law — Extradition — Affidavit charging commission of crime.
1. Under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act of July 8, 1941, P.L. 288, § 3 (which provides that a demand for extradition, when based upon a warrant for arrest, be accompanied by a copy of an affidavit which must substantially charge the person demanded with having committed a crime) there is no express statutory requirement that the affidavit state the source or grounds for the belief that the crime was committed.
2. In this case, in which it appeared that not only the affiant, an assistant district attorney, but also the victim, who identified the defendant, were present at the extradition hearing, it was Held that the court below was clearly warranted in ordering extradition.
Before WRIGHT, P.J., WATKINS, JACOBS, HOFFMAN, and PACKEL, JJ. (SPAULDING and CERCONE, JJ., absent).
Appeal, No. 420, April T., 1972, from order of Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division, of Allegheny County, June T., 1972, No. 1100, in re Commonwealth ex rel. Harold Anthony Ebbole v. William B. Robinson. Order affirmed.
Habeas corpus. Before CLARKE, J.
Order entered dismissing petition for writ of habeas corpus and directing extradition. Relator appealed.
John J. Petrush, for appellant.
Robert L. Eberhardt, Assistant District Attorney, with him Carol Mary Los, Assistant District Attorney, and Robert W. Duggan, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Argued: November 14, 1972.
An extradition demand by the Governor of California was recognized by the Governor of this Commonwealth, and thereafter the court below ordered the extradition. The appellant contends that the California demand was violative of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act because the California affidavit of arrest did not demonstrate probable cause. The affidavit specifically set forth that the appellant committed rape and perversion upon a named victim on a specified date.
Act of July 8, 1941, P.L. 288, § 1 et seq., 19 P. S. § 191.1.
Section 3 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act provides that the demand for extradition, when based on a warrant for arrest, be accompanied by "a copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate there, together with a copy of any warrant which was issued thereupon . . ." and that the "affidavit made before the magistrate must substantially charge the person demanded with having committed a crime under the law of that state . . ." Thus, there is no express statutory requirement for the affidavit to state the source or the grounds for the belief that the crime was committed. Even if we were to imply such a provision, the court below was clearly warranted in ordering the extradition because there was present in the court not only the affiant, an assistant district attorney, but also the victim herself who identified the appellant.
Order affirmed.