Opinion
C/A No. 8:19-cv-00691-TMC-JDA
03-13-2019
Quinton Collins, Plaintiff, v. Timothy Tollison, Jason Lover, Jon Hamby, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Quinton Collins ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee incarcerated at the Pickens County Detention Center, and he files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district court. For the reasons explained below, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges the following facts in his Complaint. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff contends that the three named Defendants, who are all officers with the Easley Police Department, committed slander against him and violated his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Id. at 2-4.] According to Plaintiff, on December 17, 2018, Defendants started harassing Plaintiff, his family, and his friends. [Id. at 5.] Specifically, Defendant Hamby came to Plaintiff's home, asking questions about a crime that he was investigating. [Id. at 6.] Plaintiff willingly cooperated with the investigator and answered the questions to the best of his abilities. [Id.] A couple of days later, Defendant Hamby again came to Plaintiff's home and tried to go through Plaintiff's phone without a warrant. [Id.] On February 6, 2019, Plaintiff was arrested. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that he was arrested without a warrant in violation of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. [Id.] According to Plaintiff, he was held in a holding cell for three days, where he was interrogated and deprived of food and medication, all in an attempt to force him to confess to a crime he did not commit. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that his arrest was not supported by "sufficient evidence" and that he is being maliciously prosecuted. [Id.]
On February 9, 2019, Plaintiff was taken to bond court, but the judge denied bail. [Id.] News Channel 4 was present at that hearing and publicized information about Plaintiff, stating that he was "working for Easley PD," which Plaintiff contends "is an untrue and false statement." [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that, on February 9, 2019, the Easley Police Department posted untrue information about Plaintiff on social media, defaming his character. [Id. at 5.] Since then, according to Plaintiff, the Easley Police Department has continued to harass Plaintiff's friends and family, threatening them with arrest if they do not cooperate. [Id. at 6-7.] Plaintiff contends that he is in fear for his life and that strange people are approaching his family making threats. [Id. at 7.] For his relief, Plaintiff asks that the charges against him be dismissed, that the misinformation published about him be publicly corrected, and that he be compensated for every day he is "detained and humiliated." [Id. at 8.]
The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has been charged with the following crimes, which remain pending against him in the Pickens County Court of General Sessions: (1) murder at case number 2019A3920400083 and (2) attempted robbery with a deadly weapon at case number 2019A3920400084.
See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record"); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that 'the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'").
See Pickens County Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Pickens/PublicIndex/ (search by Plaintiff's first and last name) (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, Plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1501 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert a claim for defamation and constitutional violations related to Plaintiff's arrest and pending state court criminal proceedings.
Failure to State a Claim for Defamation
Plaintiff's claim for defamation and/or slander against Defendants should be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Plaintiff's allegations relate to Defendants' misconduct in posting false information about Plaintiff on social media; however, defamation, slander, and libel fail to state a cognizable claim under § 1983. Although state law provides a right of action for slander or defamation, an alleged act of defamation of character or injury to reputation is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697-710 & nn. 3-4 (1976); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084106, at *3 (D.S.C. May 7, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 2084383 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). Civil rights statutes, such as § 1983, do not impose liability for violations of duties of care arising under a state's tort law. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 200-03 (1989). Here, Plaintiff's defamation claim does not implicate the violation of any federal right. A § 1983 action may not be "based alone on a violation of state law or on a state tort." Clark v. Link, 855 F.2d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 1988). A state law claim "does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner." See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Thus, Plaintiff's allegations concerning a purely state law claim fail to establish a claim for a violation of a federal right as required under § 1983, and therefore his claim must be dismissed. Wilson v. Ozmint, No. 3:10-cv-2887-RMG, 2011 WL 1336391, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 2011).
Additionally, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a plausible federal constitutional claim because the First Amendment does not provide a private cause of action for defamation. See, e.g., Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991) ("Defamation, by itself, is a tort actionable under the laws of most States, but not a constitutional deprivation."); Sonnier v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Lafayette, No. 6:16-cv-1229, 2017 WL 778153, at *3 (W.D. La. Jan. 18, 2017) ("[T]here is nothing in the First Amendment to create a private cause of action for either defamation or invasion of privacy."), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 778003 (W.D. La. Feb. 24, 2017); Davis v. City of Aransas Pass, No. 2:13-cv-363, 2014 WL 2112701, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 20, 2014) ("[T]here is no federal constitutional right to be free from defamation or slander."). It is well settled that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal statute under which damage claims for constitutional violations may be raised, may not be used to assert defamation claims. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 711-12 (explaining interest in reputation alone does not implicate a "liberty" or "property" interest sufficient to invoke due process protection under § 1983); Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1994) (same); Oliver v. Collins, 904 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1990) (same); Mowbray v. Cameron County, Tex., 274 F.3d 269, 277 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining public humiliation, scorn, and ridicule from being criminally investigated does not state plausible claim for a constitutional violation). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that his constitutional rights were violated as to his claim for defamation.
Moreover, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear a state law defamation claim to the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring his defamation claim under state law. Defamation is a tort under state law that may be considered by this Court only under its diversity or supplemental jurisdiction. Blackstock v. Miller, No. 4:17-cv-01926-RBH-KDW, 2017 WL 3530525, at *1-2 (D.S.C. July 28, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 3500219 (D.S.C. Aug. 16, 2017). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring state law claims against the Defendants, Plaintiff may do so under the diversity statute, if the statutory requirements are satisfied. See Cent. W. Va. Energy Co. v. Mountain State Carbon, LLC, 636 F.3d 101, 103 (4th Cir. 2011). The diversity statute requires complete diversity of parties and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000.00. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Complete diversity of parties in a case means that the citizenship of every plaintiff must be different from the citizenship of every defendant. Cent. W. Va. Energy Co., 636 F.3d at 103. Here, both Plaintiff and Defendants appear to be South Carolina residents; thus, there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction over this action. See, e.g., Newman-Greene, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 829 (1989) (complete diversity required); C.L. Ritter Lumber Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 283 F. 3d 226, 229 (4th Cir. 2002) (same); Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 464 (4th Cir. 1999) (same). Also, in absence of any plausible federal question claim, there is no basis for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Abstention under Younger and Heck
Further, Plaintiff's claims related to his pending state criminal charges are also subject to dismissal. Plaintiff's claims are not properly before this Court based on the Younger abstention doctrine. Plaintiff asks this Court to dismiss the charges against him because he was arrested without a warrant, he is being maliciously prosecuted, and the police lack sufficient evidence against him, among other things. [Doc. 1 at 6-8.] Granting Plaintiff's requested relief, however, would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin a pending state court criminal prosecution against Plaintiff. As noted, Plaintiff has been charged with murder and attempted armed robbery, and the charges remain pending against him in the Pickens County Court of General Sessions. As discussed below, because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings "except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances." Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: "[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings." Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Here, Plaintiff is involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings, and Plaintiff asks this Court to award relief for alleged constitutional violations; thus, the first element is satisfied. The second element is satisfied for reasons the Supreme Court has explained: "[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The third element is also satisfied, as the Supreme Court has noted "that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights." Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 903 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)).
Plaintiff's Complaint essentially challenges the validity of his pending criminal charges, and he asks this Court to dismiss the charges against him. A ruling in Plaintiff's favor in this case would call into question the validity of the criminal charges pending against him and would significantly interfere with Plaintiff's ongoing state criminal proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, 'whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'") (citation omitted); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). This Court finds that Plaintiff can raise his federal constitutional rights in the state court proceedings. Thus, this Court should abstain from hearing this action.
Moreover, abstention in this case is also consistent with the principle announced in Heck v. Humphrey that,
[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Plaintiff alleges that he is being maliciously prosecuted and was arrested without a warrant, among other things. [Doc. 1 at 6-8.] However, Plaintiff cannot bring his claims in this Court because the Heck holding applies to this case. A favorable determination on the merits of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims—i.e., a finding that Plaintiff was arrested without a warrant or probable cause or a finding that the State lacks sufficient evidence against Plaintiff—would imply that the pending charges against Plaintiff are invalid. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks release from custody, his claim should be brought, if at all, as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 481 ("[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983."). Because Plaintiff seeks dismissal of the charges against him or release him from custody, such claims should be dismissed with prejudice. See Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 247 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining that "when a district court abstains from a case based on Younger, it should typically dismiss the case with prejudice; not on the merits").
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
The undersigned notes that any attempt to cure the deficiencies in the Complaint would be futile for the reasons stated herein. See Goode v. Central Virginia Legal Aid Society, Inc., 807 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2015).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge March 13, 2019
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).