Opinion
Civil Action No. 2:18-03282-RMG-MGB
04-10-2019
Robbie Collins, Plaintiff, v. Warden Stephon, et. al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This action has been filed by Plaintiff, pro se and in forma pauperis, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the Court are Plaintiff's various motions for injunctive relief. (Dkt. Nos. 29; 35; 43.) Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the Court deny Plaintiff's motions.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied him proper medical treatment and outdoor recreation while Plaintiff was incarcerated at Broad River Correctional Institution. (Dkt. No. 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he arrived at Broad River in June of 2018, "after a few weeks of being locked in the cell for 24 hours a day." (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that on his arrival, he informed Defendants Warden Stephon and A/W Washington that he was "entitled to 1 hour of outside recreated and that [he] had previous injuries that [were] beginning to bother [him] due to the denial of exercise." (Id.) According to Plaintiff, these Defendants told Plaintiff "to deal with it because outside recreation is only a privilege." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he received no response to any grievances he subsequently filed related to his requests for outdoor recreation. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that "due to the total deprivation of outdoor recreation, [he] began to suffer from bed soreness 'severe' and [his] previous shoulder injury began to deteriorate." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he had reconstructive surgery on his shoulder on October 26, 2018. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, he did not receive any pain medication when he returned to prison. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that when he told Defendants Nurse Lee, Nurse Olds and Nurse Werre that he was not receiving any pain medication, they told Plaintiff that someone had been "signing [Plaintiff] had received [his] meds." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he told these Defendants that "whoever was signing off stating [he] received [his] meds was lying and [Plaintiff] requested that [he] be able to sign for [his] meds." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges these Defendants told him "oh well and requested [he] leave medical." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges these Defendants would not allow him to sign for his medications. (Id.) Plaintiff then told these Defendants that nurses were "stealing" his pain medication. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he received no response to any grievances he subsequently filed related to his requests for pain medication. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges that he eventually "spoke with the doctor and informed her that [he] was not receiving any pain medication and that the nurses [were] stealing" his medicine and "documenting that [he] was receiving them." (Id.) According to Plaintiff, the doctor reordered the pain medication, but Plaintiff has only received it once. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he "suffered in excruciating pain for two weeks without pain medication." (Id.)
Plaintiff filed this action on December 6, 2018, asserting that Defendants have violated his constitutional rights by their deliberate indifference to his medical condition and by denying him outdoor recreation. (Id.) In his Complaint, he specifies that the denial of outdoor recreation occurred from June 2018 to November 13, 2018, and the deliberate indifference occurred from October 26, 2018 through November 10, 2018. (Id. at 8.) He asks for compensatory damages in the amount of $200,000.00 total: $100,000 for the denial of medical care and $100,000.00 for the denial of outdoor recreation. (Id. at 7.)
On March 18, 2019, Plaintiff filed a one-page "Motion for Injunction," asking the Court to order Defendants to give Plaintiff one hour of outside recreation "for the duration of this civil suit." (Dkt. No. 29.) On March 20, 2019, Plaintiff filed a "Motion for Injunctive Relief," stating that Defendants were retaliating against him for filing the instant suit by canceling visitation, denying him access to the law library, and refusing to transfer Plaintiff after he explained his life was in danger at "Dorm Wateree." (Dkt. No. 35.) Plaintiff's motion asks the Court "to stop Defendants' retaliation or transfer Plaintiff to another institution." (Id.) On March 27, 2019, Plaintiff filed a "Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order" ("TRO"). (Dkt. No. 41.) In this brief, Plaintiff again asks the Court for an injunction: (1) "to give Plaintiff at least one hour of outside recreation 5 (five) days a week"; (2) "to restrain [Defendants] from retaliation"; and (3) to give Plaintiff access to the law library to further litigate his case. (Dkt. No. 41.) On April 5, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel asking that the Court "intercede and compel Defendants" to allow Plaintiff access to the law library. (Dkt. No. 43.) The undersigned construes this as another motion for injunctive relief.
On April 1, 2019, Defendants filed a response in opposition to Plaintiff's motions for injunctive relief. (Dkt. No. 42.) Defendants attached to their response an affidavit from Defendant Warden Stephon. (Dkt. No. 42-1.) Warden Stephon avers that Plaintiff is in the Wateree Unit because of his history of behavioral issues. (Id. at 1.) He avers that "[i]f an inmate shows over time that his conduct improves, and he can follow prison rules and regulations and interact properly with other inmates, he can be considered for transfer to a different unit/dorm. Most inmates do not want to live in Wateree Unit, because of the structure and restrictions." (Id.) Warden Stephon avers that "Plaintiff is not locked in his cell and is not forced to stay in his cell 24 hours per day." (Id.) Specifically, he avers that Plaintiff can leave his cell: (1) three times a week to shower; (2) to use the law library; (3) to go to sick call. (Id. at 1-2.) He further avers that Plaintiff can exercise in his cell. (Id. at 2.)
Warden Stephon also avers that he has not denied Plaintiff access to the law library, and that he spoke with Plaintiff as Plaintiff was walking to the law library on March 25, 2019. (Id.) Warden Stephon further avers he has no knowledge or documentation of Plaintiff being denied visitation. (Id.) Finally, he avers that he has no knowledge or documentation of Plaintiff's life being in danger because Plaintiff lives in Wateree Unit. (Id.) He avers Plaintiff never asked him for a transfer or told him about an attack. (Id.) Defendants also attached to their response brief a list of dates Plaintiff visited the law library, which were "taken from the roster that [Plaintiff] signed himself." (Dkt. No. 42-2.) The list indicates Plaintiff has visited the law library seven times since filing this action on December 6, 2018, including as recently as March 25, 2019. (Id.)
Plaintiff filed a reply brief in support of his motions for injunctive relief on April 8, 2019. (Dkt. No. 45.) Plaintiff asserts that the list provided by Defendants indicates he "has been denied access to the law library all of the month of March," which "is when Plaintiff's lawsuit was served on Defendants." (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff further states that he was attacked by gang members on April 4, 2018, and has a pending civil suit in federal court related to that attack. (Id.) He appears to assert that members of the gang that attacked him are housed in Wateree Dorm. (Id.)
STANDARD
A preliminary injunction "protect[s] the status quo . . . to prevent irreparable harm during the pendency of a lawsuit ultimately to preserve the court's ability to render a meaningful judgment on the merits." In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 333 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (abrogated on other grounds by eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)). A preliminary injunction is "an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right." Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). Such relief regarding the administration of a state prison should be granted only in compelling circumstances. See Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d 266, 269 (4th Cir. 1994). Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has long recognized the "wide ranging deference" that the judiciary must show prison administrators with regard to matters within their discretion. See Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 288 (4th Cir. 1980) (discussing the complexities of running a penal institution and the reluctance of federal courts to interfere in the problems of prison administration).
To obtain a TRO or preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show the following:
(1) That he is likely to succeed on the merits,Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.
(2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,
(3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and
(4) that an injunction is in the public interest.
DISCUSSION
As discussed above, Plaintiff essentially asks that the Court impose four separate injunctions. He requests the Court enjoin Defendants: (1) to give Plaintiff one hour of outside recreation five days a week for the duration of his lawsuit; (2) to allow Plaintiff access to the law library; (3) to allow Plaintiff visitation; and (4) to stop retaliation against Plaintiff or transfer Plaintiff to another unit or institution.
Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to make the required showing under Winter. As an initial matter, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims for injunctive relief. Relevant here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated his constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment by denying him outdoor recreation. "Although it is well-established that there is a constitutional necessity for some out-of-cell exercise, it is equally recognized that penological considerations may justify restrictions." Koon v. Ozmint, No. 806-cv-1072-RBH, 2007 WL 1585161, at *1 (D.S.C. May 21, 2007) (citing Mitchell v. Rice, 954 F.2d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 1992)). Here, Defendants have indicated Plaintiff does not have outdoor recreation privileges because of his history of behavioral issues. Thus, it appears likely there is a legitimate penological concern that justifies the loss of outdoor recreation.
With respect to Plaintiff's allegations regarding the denial of his access to the law library, Plaintiff "must demonstrate with some specificity that this right was interfered with, and must also show that this interference with his rights resulted in some sort of actual injury." Joe v. Ozmint, No. 2:08-cv-0585-PMD-RSC, 2008 WL 5076858, at *9 (D.S.C. Nov. 21, 2008) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996)). Here, the record indicates Plaintiff has used the law library numerous times since filing the instant action, including in March of 2019. Further, Plaintiff has failed to show how this alleged denial of access has caused him actual injury—the record shows that Plaintiff has submitted numerous filings in this action with citations to precedent and legal arguments. See, e.g., Wise v. Ozmint, No. 6:09-cv-153, 2009 WL 3232672, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 6, 2009) (noting that plaintiff's "numerous, lengthy, and timely filings indicate that he has been given a significant amount of access to both the prison law library and mailroom" and holding that where plaintiff "fails to show some actual injury resulting from denial of access to the courts, his assertion that he has been denied access" is without merit.).
Next, Plaintiff's conclusory allegations of denial of visitation on one occasion does not establish a constitutional violation. Neither prisoners nor would-be visitors have a constitutional right to prison visitation. Adkins v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 4:05-cv-00108-HFF-TER, 2007 WL 904797, at *7 (D.S.C. Feb. 20, 2007), adopted by, 2007 WL 904795 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2007) (citing White v. Keller, 438 F. Supp. 110, 115 (D. Md. 1977) (but leaving open possibility that permanent band on all visitation could implicate Eighth Amendment); Kentucky Dep't of Correctional v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461 (1989) (no right guaranteed directly by Due Process Clause)). Finally, as for Plaintiff's request for a transfer, there is no constitutional right for a state or federal prisoner to be housed in a particular institution, at a particular custody level, or in a particular portion or unit of a correctional institution. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 246-50 (1983); Ange v. Paderick, 521 F.2d 1066, 1068 (4th Cir. 1975). The placement and assignment of inmates into particular institutions or units by state or federal corrections departments are discretionary functions, and are not subject to review unless state or federal law places limitations on official discretion. Hayes v. Thompson, 726 F.2d 1015, 1016-1017 & n.1 (4th Cir. 1984). For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a clear likelihood of success on the merits of his motions.
Next, Plaintiff has failed to make a clear showing that he will suffer irreparable harm absent the injunctive relief. As discussed above, the evidence indicates Plaintiff has been granted routine access to the law library. There is no indication that his prison visitation rights will be denied in the future because of this lawsuit. With respect to his claims regarding the denial of outdoor recreation and the threat of gang violence, Plaintiff has provided no evidence to support his claims and bases his motions solely on the allegations in his complaint. Plaintiff's reference to his other civil action in federal court does not establish that the alleged gang attack occurred or that Plaintiff is currently being housed with members of the gang that allegedly attacked him. See Collins v. Williams et al, Case No. 2:18-cv-01491-RMG-MGB.
Finally, Plaintiff has failed to establish that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and he has failed to show that an injunction is in the public interest. As the Fourth Circuit explained in Wetzel v. Edwards:
The realities of running a penal institution are complex and unique to the prison environment. Federal courts have traditionally been reluctant to interfere in the problems of prison administration. Indeed, the decisions made by prison administrators in their informed discretion have been accorded "wide-ranging deference" by the federal courts. . . . Furthermore, federal courts have an additional reason to show deference to the decisions of prison authorities, where a state penal institution is involved. Procunier v. Martinez, supra. The possible injury to the defendant-appellants if the preliminary injunction stands is potentially grave. The informed discretion of these penological experts could be radically limited with respect to inmate transfers specifically and, more importantly, with respect to prison discipline in general.635 F.2d at 288 (emphasis added).
Granting an injunction to alleviate Plaintiff's concerns regarding the lack of outdoor recreation and the threat of violence would require reversing prison administrators' decisions regarding Plaintiff's prison assignment. The undersigned cannot conclude that the public interest would be best served by mandating such extraordinary relief where the record contains only the Plaintiff's allegations and no evidence.
As Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits or more than a possibility of irreparable harm, and because the balance of the equities and the public interest involved do not warrant the extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief, Plaintiff's motions for preliminary injunction and TRO should be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court recommends that Plaintiff's motions for injunctive relief and TRO (Dkt. Nos. 29; 35; 43) be DENIED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
/s/_________
MARY GORDON BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE April 10, 2019 Charleston, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).