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holding that a claim of gender discrimination is not "reasonably related" to claims of race, national origin or color discrimination
Summary of this case from Jiggetts v. DiazOpinion
96 Civ. 4293 (GBD).
January 15, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION ORDER
Pro Se plaintiff, a former paraprofessional in District 7 of the New York City Board of Education ("BOE"), brought this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq, against the defendants. Defendants have moved for summary judgment based on (1) this Court's lack of jurisdiction to hear those claims which were not raised before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") prior to bringing this action; (2) the fact that those claims relating to conduct which occurred before September 9, 1994 are time-barred; and (3) plaintiff's failure to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion is granted.
Background
The facts recited in this decision are derived from Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts Pursuant to Local Rules for the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, Local Civil Rule 56.1 ("Local Civil Rule"). Plaintiff did not submit her own statement of the material facts as to which there is a genuine issue to be tried pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1(b). Therefore, as required by Local Civil Rule 56.1(c), this Court accepts as uncontroverted all the facts set forth by defendants, as they are deemed admitted by plaintiff.
Plaintiff, a black woman of Liberian origin, began employment at the New York City BOE in September 1985. On November 1, 1988, plaintiff was assigned to work as a paraprofessional at Public School 157 ("P.S. 157").
From September 8, 1994 through August 31, 1995 and from September 5, 1995 through August 31, 1996 plaintiff was issued an Occasional Per Diem ("OPD") certificate which entitles the holder to serve as an occasional per diem substitute teacher. An individual who holds an OPD certificate may not be assigned to fill a regular substitute or long-term per diem vacancy. A person who wishes to be assigned to a regular or long-term position is required to surrender their OPD certificate and then obtain a Certificate to Serve as a Substitute in either Certified Provisional Service or Preparatory Provisional Service. In September 1996, plaintiff became a Preparatory Provisional Teacher ("PPT"), which is someone who holds a New York State temporary license, but has not yet completed all the requirements for New York State provisional certification. Additionally, a PPT license is subject specific, that is, it is issued for a specific area such as Special Education. A PPT license entitles the holder to teach permanent per diem as a long-term substitute. Additionally, a Certified Provisional Teacher ("CPT") is someone who has not yet been appointed, but who holds a New York State provisional or permanent certificate, New York City regular license or a New York City substitute license issued on or before June 30, 1969. Holders of both CPT and PPT licenses are classes of provisional teachers and are different than teachers who hold regular teaching licenses.
Pursuant to an agreement between the BOE and the United Federation of Teachers, appointments to teaching positions are made from the eligible list of persons holding regular licenses. After all available persons holding regular licenses have been appointed, if a position still remains vacant, or a vacancy arises during the school term, holders of CPT licenses have priority for assignment. If no holders of CPT licenses are available, then PPT licensed teachers are then eligible for such assignment.
Plaintiff alleges that before the summer of 1993, when plaintiff did not hold any license or certificate to teach, she applied for a teaching position with the principal of P.S.157. Plaintiff was not hired during that year, and alleges that she was never told why she was not hired, but believes that it was because she was a black woman from Africa. During the 1993-1994 school year, however, four teachers were hired at P.S. 157. of the four teachers hired by the school, two were white and held a PPT license, one was black and held a PPT license, and the fourth was a regularly appointed bilingual Latino teacher. In 1994, when plaintiff held an OPD license, she alleges that she reapplied for a teaching position, and that there were vacant teaching positions during that year, but that the positions went to white males and Latinos. During that school year, two teachers were hired at P.S. 157. One was a white teacher who held a CPT license, the other was Latina and possessed a Bilingual Special Education PPT license. Plaintiff again applied for a teaching position in 1995, when plaintiff held an OPD license, but she was not hired in that year either. However, during the 1995-1996 school year, six teachers were hired at P.S. 157. Two of the teachers that were hired were white, one of whom held a CPT license and was hired to teach English as a Second Language, the other held a PPT license. Three of the teachers were Latino, one of whom held a PPT license and was hired to teach bilingual classes, one was a CPT licensed bilingual attendance teacher, and the third was a regularly appointed elementary school teacher. The sixth teacher who was hired was black and held a PPT license.
On or about July 6, 1995, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC alleging that she was not hired as a teacher based on her national origin. Additionally, on or about August 18, 1995, plaintiff filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights ("NYSDHR") alleging discrimination based on her race and color. On May 6, 1996, the EEOC sent a Dismissal and Notice of Rights letter to plaintiff. By determination and order dated October 28, 1996, the NYSDHR issued a finding of no probable cause that defendants engaged in the discriminatory practices alleged by plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed this action pro se on June 11, 1996. Subsequently, attorneys appeared on plaintiffs behalf and filed an amended complaint on October 25, 1996, alleging, among other things, that defendants discriminated against her based on her race, color, gender and national origin in violation of Title VII and that she was unjustly transferred for the purposes of intimidation and harassment from P.S. 157 to P.S. 156 in September 1996.
Discussion
Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment shall be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Moreover,
the burden of showing that no genuine factual dispute exists rests on the party seeking summary judgment, and in assessing the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass'n. Inc., 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 1995)). It is not for this Court to "determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); see also American Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 388 F.2d 272, 279 (2d Cir. 1967) (finding that "on a motion for summary judgment the court cannot try issues of fact; it can only determine whether there are issues to be tried.") Moreover, "mere allegations in the non-moving party's pleadings are insufficient to show that there is a triable issue of fact if the moving party has made an appropriate factual showing." Castro v. New York City Department of Sanitation, 2000 WL 1514630, *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Defendants first argue that this Court should grant summary judgment on their behalf because the court lacks jurisdiction to hear those claims which were not raised with the EEOC prior to bringing this action.
Defendants argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction. However, "filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling." Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). Therefore, "the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a precondition to bringing a Title VII claim in federal court, rather than a jurisdictional requirement." Francis v. City of New York, 235 F.3d 763, 768 (2d Cir. 2000).
There are two prerequisites to filing a Title VII action in federal court; plaintiff must (1) file a timely charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC and (2) receive a notice of the right-to-sue letter. Habermann v. Brown, Harris, Stevens, Inc., 1994 WL 573290 (S.D.N Y 1994) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). A district court may hear Title VII claims which are either included in the EEOC charge, or are based on conduct reasonably related to that alleged in the EEOC charge.Butts v. City of New York Department of Housing Preservation and Development, 990 F.2d 1397, 1400 (2d Cir. 1993). This exhaustion requirement is an essential element of Title VII's statutory scheme, the purpose of which is to encourage settlement of discrimination disputes through conciliation and voluntary compliance, which would be defeated if a complainant could litigate a claim not previously presented to and investigated by the EEOC. Id. at 1401.
The Second Circuit recognizes three types of situations "where claims not alleged in an EEOC charge are sufficiently related to the allegations in the charge that it would be unfair to civil rights plaintiffs to bar such claims in a civil case." Butts, 990 F.2d at 1402. The first type is for claims not raised in the EEOC charge that "fall within the `scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.'" Id. The second type of "`reasonably related' claim is one alleging retaliation by an employer against an employee for filing an EEOC charge." Id. Finally, "[t]he third type of reasonably related claim is where a plaintiff alleges further incidents of discrimination carried out in precisely the same manner alleged in the EEOC charge." Id. at 1401-02.
In her amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants discriminated against her in violation of her rights under Title VII based on her national origin, as well as her race, color and gender. See Plaintiffs Amended Complaint ¶¶ 20, 37. In her charge of discrimination presented to the EEOC, plaintiff was asked to indicate the cause of the discrimination. On the form, plaintiff checked the box indicating discrimination based on national origin, she did not check the boxes indicating discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, age, disability or retaliation. Defendants' Notice of Motion, Exhibit A. Additionally, in her charge of discrimination presented to the EEOC, plaintiff alleges that "I believe that I have been denied various Teaching positions because of my nation [sic] origin, Africa in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended." Id.
Defendants first argue that plaintiff did not raise the issue of gender discrimination before the EEOC, and therefore that issue is not properly raised in this action. This Court finds that it is clear that the EEOC did not consider the issue of whether or not plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of gender. First, plaintiff did not raise claims of gender discrimination in her EEOC charge of discrimination. Moreover, a claim of gender discrimination is not reasonably related to a claim of national origin race or color discrimination. See, e.g., Fraser v. New York City Board of Education, 1998 WL 55170, *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Williams v. Borough of Manhattan Community College, 1996 WL 457322, *8 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Clements v. St. Vincent's Hospital and Medical Center of New York, 919 F. Supp. 161, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Accordingly, this Court grants summary judgment on plaintiff s claim for gender discrimination for failure to exhaust that claim through her administrative remedies.
Defendants also argue that this Court should grant summary judgment in defendants' favor on plaintiffs claims of discrimination based on race and color because plaintiff did not raise these claims before the EEOC. However, it is not clear if plaintiff intended to allege discrimination based on national origin as well as race and color, or if she intended to base her complaint solely on discrimination based on national origin. It is also unclear whether the EEOC investigated and considered the issue of defendants' alleged discrimination against plaintiff based on national origin alone, or investigated claims of race and color discrimination as well.
Additionally, plaintiff did raise claims of race and color discrimination in her complaint before the NYSDHR. Those claims were dismissed upon a finding that there was no probable cause to believe that defendants had engaged, or were engaging in an unlawful discriminatory practice. Plaintiffs choice to raise these claims before the NYSDHR amounts to an election of remedies under N.Y. Executive Law § 297(9). See also Moodie v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 58 F.3d 879, 883 n. 2 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that "it is clear that New York law bars successive, as well as concurrent, court proceedings once recourse is had to the administrative forum.") Moreover, the proper procedure for review of this determination is either to appeal that decision to the New York State Supreme Court pursuant to N.Y. Executive Law § 298 or to request EEOC review of the action. Furthermore, plaintiff did not receive a right to sue letter from the NYSDHR giving plaintiff the right to raise those claims in this federal action. Therefore, this Court is not basing its determination of whether or not plaintiff intended to raise claims of race or color discrimination on the fact that she raised these claims before that agency.
While plaintiff did state that she believed that she was denied various positions because of her African national origin in her EEOC complaint, she also stated that she believed "other Teachers of Hispanic national origin and White [sic], USA national origin have been given the Teaching positions." Defendants' Notice of Motion, Exhibit A. Additionally, while plaintiff only checked the box indicating discrimination based on national origin in her EEOC charge of discrimination, she should not be precluded from raising race or color discrimination in her complaint because this Court declines to hold "that the failure to place a check mark in the correct box is a fatal error. In the context of Title VII, no one — not even the unschooled — should be boxed out." Alonzo v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 25 F. Supp.2d 455, 458-59 (S.D.N Y 1998) (citing Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 463 (5th Cir. 1970). Therefore, this Court will not decline to consider those claims on that basis.
A plaintiff "is not required to articulate in their EEOC charges the precise legal theories which they will later assert in a Title VII lawsuit. Rather, a complainant filing an EEOC charge is only required `to describe generally the action or practices complained of.'" Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 822 F. Supp. 1020, 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Moreover, the Second Circuit has held that "because EEOC charges are generally filed by pro se parties `not versed in the vagaries of Title VII and its jurisdictional and pleading requirements, [the Court] has taken a `flexible stance in interpreting Title VII's procedural provisions,' so as not to frustrate Title VII's remedial goals.'" Amin v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 73, 81 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Johnson v. Palma, 931 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1991)). Therefore, the proper focus of this Court's inquiry lies in assessing the factual allegations raised in plaintiff's EEOC charge, rather than the legal theories stated therein in determining whether one cause of action is related to another. Id. Given that it is unclear whether plaintiff intended to allege that white and Latino individuals were given teaching positions based on their race, or their national origin, this Court finds that her allegations of race and color discrimination are properly raised before this Court. Additionally, plaintiffs claim of race or color discrimination is reasonably related to a claim of discrimination based on national origin. See, e.g., Fraser v. New York City Board of Education, 1998 WL 55170, *4 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Alonzo v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 25 F. Supp.2d 455, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Williams v. Borough of Manhattan Community College, 1996 WL 457322, *8 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Therefore, summary judgment for failure of plaintiff to raise her claims of race and color discrimination before the EEOC is denied.
Plaintiff further alleges in her amended complaint that she was improperly transferred from P.S. 157 to P.S. 156 in September 1996. See Plaintiffs Amended Complaint ¶¶ 40-44. However, it is clear from plaintiffs charge of discrimination before the EEOC, plaintiff made no mention of her transfer, therefore she did not raise this issue before that agency and that agency did not consider that issue in its investigation. Moreover, plaintiff does not allege in her amended complaint that she was transferred from P.S. 157 to P.S. 156 in retaliation for having filed a charge with the EEOC, a basis on which this Court could have found that this cause of action was reasonably related to her claims of failure to hire. See Butts v. City of New York Department of Housing Preservation and Development, 990 F.2d 1397, 1402 (2d Cir. 1993). Additionally, plaintiff was represented by an attorney at the time of the filing of the amended complaint, therefore, this Court need not give the amended complaint the liberal reading normally given to a pro se litigant. See, e.g., Copeland v. Rosen, 38 F. Supp.2d 298, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Since plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative remedies on her claims of improper transfer, defendants' motion for summary judgment on that claim is granted.
Defendants also move for summary judgment on plaintiffs claims pre-dating September 9, 1994, arguing that those claims are time-barred. Plaintiff alleges that she applied for teaching positions from the 1993-1994 school year through the 1995-1996 school year, but was not hired during any of those years. However, plaintiff did not file her charge of discrimination with the EEOC until July 6, 1995 and her charge with the NYSDHR until August 18, 1995. A Title VII plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of an alleged violation. If the plaintiff filed a charge with a state or local equal employment agency, plaintiff must file within 300 days of an alleged violation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). This requirement serves as a statute of limitations, in that discriminatory incidents that are not timely filed with the EEOC will be time-barred from plaintiffs suit in the district court. Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1998). Additionally, this limitations period both guarantees the protections of the civil rights laws to those who promptly assert their rights, as well as protects employers from the burden of defending claims arising from employment decisions that are long past. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256 (1980). Since the 300 day limitations period commenced on September 9, 1994 (300 days prior to her filing of a complaint with the EEOC), any discriminatory conduct in which defendants allegedly engaged prior to that date is time-barred from this lawsuit.
Plaintiff's failure to file within the appropriate time period is excusable if either the doctrines of equitable tolling, equitable estoppel or continuing violation apply. However, application of any these doctrines is unwarranted given the facts of this case.
Plaintiff claims that she failed to file a timely complaint with the EEOC because she waited until her union completed its investigation into her allegations of discriminatory failure to hire. Once that investigation was complete, plaintiff then filed her complaint with the EEOC and the NYSDHR. Regardless, plaintiff's failure to timely file her complaint does not merit equitable relief. The doctrine of equitable tolling is based on the principle that a "statute of limitations does not run against a plaintiff who is unaware of a cause of action." Dillman v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 784 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1986) (quotingCerbone v. International Ladies Garment Workers' Union, 768 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1985)). However, it is clear that plaintiff was aware of her cause of action. She has not provided any evidence to this Court to the contrary. Therefore, the doctrine of equitable tolling is inapplicable.
Additionally, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is not warranted in this case. While the doctrine of equitable tolling may be invoked in cases where the plaintiff is ignorant of her cause of action because of the defendant's fraudulent concealment, "equitable estoppel is invoked in cases where the plaintiff knew of the existence of his cause of action but the defendant's conduct caused him to delay bringing his lawsuit."Dillman, 784 F.2d at 60-61. This doctrine may be invoked when the employer has misrepresented the length of the limitations period or in some other way has "lulled the plaintiff into believing that it was not necessary for him to commence litigation." Id. at 61. There is no evidence that the defendants made any such representations to plaintiff or in any way attempted to persuade her not file her action. Therefore, equitable estoppel does not apply.
Furthermore, plaintiff cannot avail herself of the argument that the continuing violation doctrine should delay the statute of limitations period for filing her complaint. For plaintiffs claims to fall under the continuing violation exception, she would have to convince this Court to extend the limitations period because she had proof of "specific ongoing discriminatory policies or practices, or where specific and related instances of discrimination are permitted by the employer to continue unremedied for so long as to amount to a discriminatory policy or practice." Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 704. (2d Cir. 1994). The Second Circuit has held that "multiple incidents of discrimination, even similar ones, that are not the result of a discriminatory policy or mechanism do not amount to a continuing violation." Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff has presented no evidence to this Court that defendants have any ongoing discriminatory policy or practice in their hiring decisions. Moreover, "[t]he continuing violation doctrine does not generally apply in discriminatory hiring cases." Mareno v. Madison Square Garden. L.P., 1999 WL 777952, *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing EEOC v. Cushman Wakefield, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 209, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Plaintiff has simply recited several discrete incidents in which defendants failed to hire her without any further evidence that these hiring decisions amounted to any type of discriminatory policy or practice. Therefore, defendants' application for summary judgment on plaintiffs claims of alleged discrimination that occurred three hundred days prior her filing of her EEOC complaint on July 6, 1995 is granted.
Defendants finally move for summary judgment on plaintiffs remaining claims of national origin, race and color discrimination that allegedly occurred after September 9, 1994. Defendants argue that plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed in its entirety because plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of any discrimination.
The complainant in a Title VII case must carry the initial burden under the statute to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to hire, plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that she belongs to a protected group; (2) she applied for a position for which she was qualified; (3) she was subject to an adverse employment decision; and (4) the adverse employment decision occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Board of Education, 243 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2001). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If such a reason is proffered by defendant, the burden shifts back to plaintiff to prove that discrimination was the real reason for the adverse employment action.Graham v. Long Island Railroad, 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (citingMcDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804).
Defendants concede that plaintiff is member of a protected class. Defendants also concede that plaintiff was not hired for a permanent teaching position at P.S. 157, which satisfies the requirement that plaintiff demonstrate that she was subject to an adverse employment decision. However, defendants argue that, although plaintiff performed her job as a paraprofessional satisfactorily, she was not qualified for the positions for which she applied. Finally, defendants assert that plaintiff has not put forth any evidence to indicate that plaintiffs national origin, race or color factored into defendants' decision not to hire her as a teacher.
In plaintiffs amended complaint, she alleges that she applied for teaching positions in the 1993-1994 school year through the 1995-1996 school year. Plaintiff stated that she was not hired, even though she was qualified for the position, and that the defendants hired white and Latino men who were less qualified. Plaintiff provides no support for this allegation, nor is there any such evidence in the record. Plaintiff has proffered no evidence that her race, color or national origin played any role in the defendants' decisions not to hire her during the relevant time period. Plaintiff only offers her own unsubstantiated speculation as proof of defendants' discriminatory treatment. However, plaintiffs subjective belief that she was discriminated against without further evidence to that effect is not sufficient to create a triable issue of fact to withstand summary judgment. See Warren v. Quality Care Service Corp., 603 F. Supp. 1174, 1181 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding that "[t]he granting of summary judgment is not precluded by plaintiffs conclusory opinion, however sincere, that he was the victim of racial discrimination.") (citing Gatling v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 577 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1978)).
In fact, the evidence in the record demonstrates that plaintiffs allegations of fact are simply inaccurate. In each year that plaintiff applied for a teaching position and was not hired, defendants hired individuals with licenses that had priority over that of plaintiffs, and in no year did defendants hire anyone with even equal or similar credentials to plaintiff. Additionally, the record reflects that in every year that plaintiff applied for a teaching position, defendants hired both men and women of various races, all of whom were teachers who held regular licenses, CPT licenses or PPT licenses. There is no evidence any individual with an OPD license was hired during that time period. Pursuant to the agreement between the BOE and United Federation of Teachers, appointments to teaching positions are made from an eligible list of persons holding regular teaching licenses, if no such teachers are available, teachers with CPT licenses have the next priority, then holders of PPT licenses. All of the teachers hired during the relevant time period held licenses which were superior to that of plaintiff's, and defendants were therefore required to fill available positions with those individuals before defendants could even consider plaintiff's application.
Since summary judgment is no less appropriate in Title VII cases than any other kind of case, "plaintiff must still offer `concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in [her] favor.'"Distasio v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 157 F.3d 55, 62 (2d Cir. 1998). Plaintiff has only offered this Court her unsupported allegations that defendants failed to hire her for discriminatory reasons. However, her conclusory allegations will not suffice to create a genuine issue of fact, instead she is required to present "`significantly probative supporting evidence' that there is a factual dispute." Little v. State of New York, et al., 1998 WL 306545, *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 8, 1998) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). Given all of the evidence in the record that defendants' hiring decisions were made for legitimate non-discriminatory reasons and the lack of any evidence that defendants made any hiring decision based on plaintiffs national origin, race or color, plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of discrimination. Therefore, plaintiff has not born her burden to demonstrate to this Court that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial which would make summary judgment inappropriate.
Although this Court dismisses plaintiffs gender discrimination claim and other unexhausted and time-barred claims on other grounds, there is similarly a lack of evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination even further considering these claims on the merits.
Summary judgment is granted in defendants' favor, and plaintiffs complaint is accordingly dismissed in its entirety against all named defendants.