Opinion
Opinion filed March 11, 1960.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT.
Suit would not lie for declaratory judgment challenging the right of the Board of Accountancy to grant to defendant a license to practice as a public accountant as against claim that complainant should have pursued the remedy by certiorari where there was no showing that the Board acted beyond its jurisdiction illegally, oppressively, or arbitrarily. T.C.A. secs. 27-901, 27-902, 62-125, 62-136.
FROM DAVIDSONSTOCKELL, RUTHERFORD CROCKETT, Nashville, for complainants.
WILLIAM C. WILSON, SAM L. FELTS, JR., Nashville, JAMES M. SWIGGART, Special Assistant Attorney General, for defendants.
Suit for declaratory judgment challenging the right of the Board of Accountancy to grant defendant a license to practice as a public accountant. Judgments for defendants in Chancery Court, Davidson County, Ned Lentz, Chancellor, and complainants appealed. The Supreme Court, Prewitt, Chief Justice, held that the bill for declaratory judgment would not lie as against claim that certiorari was a proper remedy.
Decree affirmed.
This is a suit for a declaratory judgment filed by Francis Coleman et al. against Paul K. Blackburn et al., the effect of which was to challenge the right of the defendants to grant the defendant, Blackburn, a license to practice as a public accountant.
It appears that defendant, Blackburn, filed the application for a license as a Public Accountant under Section 62-136, T.C.A.
The Administrative Committee rejected the application. Thereupon Blackburn filed an appeal to the Board of Accountancy under the provisions of Section 62-125, T.C.A., which reads:
"Any applicant for license to practice as a public accountant * * * who is aggrieved by any action taken by an administrative committee with respect to his qualifications or other matter which was before the committee, may appeal to the board in accordance with rules and regulations to be prescribed by the board."
Later it seems the Board granted Blackburn a license to practice.
The question presented is whether this action can be maintained as a bill for declaratory judgment or rather that the complainants should have pursued the remedy prescribed by Section 27-901, T.C.A. which provides:
"Any one who may be aggrieved by any final order or judgment of any board or commission functioning under the laws of this state may have said order or judgment reviewed by the courts * * * in the manner provided by this chapter."
Section 27-902, T.C.A. begins:
"Such party shall, within sixty (60) days from the entry of the order or judgment, file a petition for certiorari * * *."
The original bill is clearly not a petition for certiorari and there is no showing that the Board acted beyond its jurisdiction illegally, oppressively or arbitrarily.
It results that we find no error in the decree of the Chancellor and it is affirmed.
BURNETT and FELTS, JUSTICES, not participating.