Summary
In Coleman Morris v. Pisciotta, 279 A.D. 656, 657, 107 N.Y.S.2d 715, 716 (1951), the court enunciated the general rule that inducing another's employees at will to terminate their employment "is not actionable, at least unless the purpose of the actor was solely to produce damage, or unless the means employed were dishonest or unfair."
Summary of this case from In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp.Opinion
November 5, 1951.
In an action for an injunction to restrain alleged unfair competition and inducing certain of plaintiff's employees to sever their relations with plaintiff, for damages alleged to have been sustained by reason thereof, and for damages for conversion, certain of the defendants appeal from an order denying their motion to dismiss each of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth causes of action on the ground that each does not contain facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; to strike out certain paragraphs from said causes of action on the ground that they set forth conclusions of law only; and to direct that said paragraphs be made more definite and certain. Order modified so as to provide that the motion be granted to the extent that the stated causes of action be dismissed, with leave to serve an amended complaint within ten days after the entry of the order hereon, and that the motion otherwise be denied. As so modified, the order is affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements to appellants. There are no factual allegations contained in the third and fourth causes of action to the effect that the defendants induced the employees to breach employment contracts. We may not assume that the employment relationships were other than at will and, in our opinion, mere inducement to an employee at will to discontinue such employment is not actionable, at least unless the purpose of the actor was solely to produce damage, or unless the means employed were dishonest or unfair. ( Biber Bros. News Co. v. New York Evening Post, 144 Misc. 405; cf. Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80; see, also, Restatement, Torts, §§ 766-768.) The fifth and sixth causes of action contain no factual allegations to support the various conclusions therein stated, which pertain generally to the claims of unfair competition and use of trade secrets. Carswell, Johnston, Sneed and Wenzel, JJ., concur; Nolan, P.J., concurs in the modification as to the fifth and sixth causes of action, but as to the third and fourth causes of action he dissents and votes to affirm on the ground that, as a matter of pleading, such causes of action are sufficient.