Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RF6254843
Jones, P.J.
Appellant Raymond G. Cepeda appeals a restraining order that compels him to stay away from respondent Rachel Cohen-Cepeda. We affirm the order.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant and respondent married in 1990. Appellant had a temper and he was physically and verbally abusive toward respondent. The first incident of physical abuse occurred in September 2000. Appellant and respondent were at a baseball game when they began to argue about whether they should have another child. During the argument, appellant hit respondent repeatedly with his open hand.
The argument continued a couple of days later. Appellant pushed respondent to the bed, punched her in the back, grabbed her face and said, “I’ll make sure you never have another baby again.”
In February 2006, respondent filed a petition to dissolve her marriage with appellant. Appellant called respondent’s mother, Joyce Sandell-Curry, and threatened respondent, saying if she got a divorce, she would pay for it the rest of her life.
About a week later, appellant repeated the threat telling Sandell-Curry that her daughter would “suffer all of her life.” Appellant added that he would burn respondent’s house down.
In June 2006, respondent obtained a restraining order against appellant.
Even though their relationship was troubled, appellant still lived in respondent’s home. In September 2006, another incident occurred. Appellant and respondent disagreed about the room in their home in which cable service should be installed. Appellant became enraged and he threatened to “kick [respondent’s] ass.” When respondent ran into the bathroom to protect herself, appellant “body slammed himself against the door[.]”
Another incident occurred in January 2008. Respondent went to a yoga class and turned her phone off so she would not be disturbed. Respondent forgot to turn her phone on after the class and she went shopping. When respondent came home, appellant demanded to know where she had been. When respondent tried to leave, appellant shoved her with both hands.
Another incident occurred in a restaurant in April 2008. Appellant started screaming at respondent calling her a “stupid bitch” and a “stupid idiot”. Appellant then walked around the restaurant telling people that respondent “bleed[s] too much.”
Another incident occurred in May 2008. Appellant and respondent were arguing about money when appellant became enraged. He threatened to burn the house down.
In the face of appellant’s repeated outbursts, respondent applied for another restraining order in May 2008.
A trial to determine whether the restraining order should issue was conducted on September 18, 2008. In addition to the evidence we have set forth above, respondent presented evidence of yet another violent incident. On September 3, 2008, respondent was at home when she heard appellant and her son screaming at each other outside. When respondent went outside to investigate, a neighbor ran up and told her that appellant had been chasing her son. The neighbor described appellant as “crazy” and “dangerous” and suggested that respondent call 911.
At the hearing, respondent explained that she needed the restraining order because she was “afraid of [respondent]. He has an explosive temper, he has threatened me, been violent with me. When there’s stress I don’t know how he’s going to react. And with the divorce proceedings ongoing, it’s extreme stress and I fear for my safety.”
Appellant also testified at the hearing. He denied ever hitting respondent or making threats against her. He blamed respondent for their various altercations stating for example that the argument at the restaurant occurred because respondent “created an argument out of nothing....”
The trial court found respondent’s testimony more persuasive and granted her a restraining order. Under the terms of the order, appellant is obligated to stay away from respondent for three years. The order also included collateral rulings that we will describe in more detail below.
II. DISCUSSION
We begin by setting forth some fundamental principles of appellate practice.
(1) “A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) Because error is never presumed, every appellant has a duty to establish error in the record the appellant produces before the reviewing court. (E.g., Hughes v. Wheeler (1888) 76 Cal. 230, 234; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 628, pp. 704-706.)
(2) An appellant’s failure to register a proper and timely objection to a ruling or occurrence in the trial court will result in loss of the appellant’s right to attack that ruling or occurrence on appeal. (E.g., Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184-185, fn. 1.)
(3) “It is incumbent upon the parties to an appeal to cite the particular portion of the record supporting each assertion made. It should be apparent that a reviewing court has no duty to search through the record to find evidence in support of a party’s position.” (Williams v. Williams (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 560, 565.)
(4) An appellant must support each argument he makes by citation to appropriate authority. If he fails to do so, the issue is forfeited for purposes of appeal. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785.)
(5) “[A] party must abide by the consequences of his own acts and cannot seek a reversal on appeal for errors which he has committed or invited. In other words, one whose conduct induces or invites the commission of error by the trial court is estopped afterward from taking advantage of such error.” (Abbott v. Cavalli (1931) 114 Cal.App. 379, 383.)
(6) An appellant’s reply brief is not properly used to raise new issues or correct deficiencies of the opening brief. (E.g., Laupheimer v. State of California (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 440, 459; 9 Witkin, supra, Appeal, § 723, pp. 790-791.)
With these principles in mind, we turn to the specific arguments advanced.
Appellant contends the trial court “err[ed]” and “abuse[d] its discretion” because it allowed respondent’s “key witness” “to take the stand and offer hearsay testimony....” Appellant does not identify the “key witness” at issue nor has he identified the “hearsay testimony” to which he objects. We decline to address the issue. (Williams v. Williams, supra, 14 Cal.App.3d at p. 565.) To the extent appellant has tried to remedy these omissions is his reply brief, the arguments are not properly before us. (Laupheimer v. State of California, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 459.)
Appellant argues the court violated his “double jeopardy” rights because it relied on the same allegations to support both the June 2006 and September 2008 restraining orders. We have no way to evaluate this argument because appellant has not provided us with transcripts of the June 2006 proceedings. Appellant has forfeited the right to raise the issue on appeal. (Hughes v. Wheeler, supra, 76 Cal. at p. 234.)
Appellant contends the court “err[ed] by allowing exhibits that were not entered in the official transcript to be used in the [t]rial.” Appellant does not explain this argument clearly. As best as we can tell, he is complaining about the fact that the court conditionally admitted into evidence a document respondent’s mother prepared that described the threats appellant had made. We fail to see how appellant was prejudiced by the court’s action. The court ultimately excluded that document ruling it was more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352. Appellant also suggests the court erred by “not allowing [him] any kind of defense or exhibits to be entered into the [t]rial.” Appellant has not cited any portion of the record where the court precluded him from presenting evidence or documents. The point is forfeited. (Hughes v. Wheeler, supra, 76 Cal. at p. 234.)
Appellant maintains the trial court erred by “allowing the attorneys to consult with one another outside the Courtroom shortly before the [t]rial began.” Appellant contends that act violated various rules of professional conduct that are intended to protect client confidentiality, assure that counsel act competently, and assure that counsel’s clients avoid conflicts of interest. Appellant has not cited any portion of the record that indicates counsel acted unethically or incompetently, or that counsel had a conflict of interest. The point is forfeited. (Hughes v. Wheeler, supra, 76 Cal. at p. 234.)
Appellant argues the trial court erred when it ordered him to pay child support to respondent. Appellant never raised this objection in the court below. He has forfeited the right to raise it in this court. (Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist., supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 184-185, fn. 1.) Indeed, appellant’s counsel agreed to the court’s award of child support. Appellant is estopped from raising the issue on appeal. (Abbott v. Cavalli, supra, 114 Cal.App. at p. 383.)
Appellant contends the trial court erred when it ordered him to pay respondent’s attorney fees under Family Code section 271. Appellant never raised this objection in the court below. He has forfeited the right to raise it on appeal. (Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist., supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 184-185, fn. 1.)
Family Code section 271, subdivision (a) states, in part, “the court may base an award of attorney’s fees and costs on the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote the settlement of litigation and, were possible, to reduce the costs of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and the attorneys.”
Appellant argues the trial court “err[ed] by allowing evidence to be used that was forbidden....” The premise for this argument is unclear but we need not try to sort it out. Appellant has not cited any authority to support his claim. It is forfeited for purposes of appeal. (Badie v. Bank of America, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785.)
Appellant contends the trial court erred because it considered hearsay evidence that the court said it would not consider. Appellant has not cited the precise evidence upon which this argument is based. Instead he cites to 22 pages of the reporter’s transcript. We have no duty to comb through the record to find evidence that would support appellant’s position, and we decline to do so. (City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239; Williams v. Williams, supra, 14 Cal.App.3d at p. 565.)
Finally, appellant contends the trial judge should have recused himself due to a conflict of interest. Appellant has not cited any portion of the record that demonstrates the trial court had a conflict of interest. The issue is forfeited. (Williams v. Williams, supra, 14 Cal.App.3d at p. 565.) Indeed, because appellant has not cited any authority to support his argument, the issue is doubly forfeited. (Badie v. Bank of America, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785.)
III. DISPOSITION
The restraining order is affirmed.
We concur: Simons, J., Bruiniers, J.