Summary
holding that for a conditions of confinement claim arising in the Tarrant County Jail, inmate must complete available appeal step beyond initial grievance
Summary of this case from Bailey v. AndersonOpinion
Civil Action No. 4:02-CV-553-Y.
May 31, 2005
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANT JOHN PETER SMITH HOSPITAL
In this case brought by pro-se prisoner Kevin P. Coffer, his claims against Tarrant County Sheriff's Department, Officer Taylor, and Tarrant County, Texas, were all dismissed by prior orders of this Court. Now pending is the motion for summary judgment of the remaining defendant, John Peter Smith Hospital ("JPS"), accompanied by a brief in support, and an appendix. The appendix consists of the following materials: June 15, 2004, Affidavit of Captain Roy Heisey, with twenty-two pages of records; October 15, 2004, Affidavit of Alvin C. Clay, with nine pages of records attached; December 16, 2004, Affidavit of Captain Roy Heisey, with four pages of records attached; and the December 20, 2004, Affidavit of Kelly E. Felps, M.D.
The appendix also consists of other affidavits and business records that the Court did not find necessary to resolve the summary-judgment motion on the basis of lack of exhaustion under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Coffer did not file any response to JPS's motion for summary judgment, and the motion is ripe for consideration. After review and consideration of the motion for summary judgment, supporting brief, portions of the appendix as referenced above, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the motion for summary judgment of defendant JPS should be granted for the reason that inmate Coffer failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e before filing this suit, consistent with this Court's order granting Tarrant County's motion for summary judgment, filed November 15, 2004.
Coffer's form complaint and more definite statement in this case alleged claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs arising from his care and treatment post-surgery on his right knee on August 8, 2000. (Compl. § V, More Definite Statement (MDS) at ¶ 3; Felps Affidavit at page 2.) Coffer named, as relevant to the pending motion for summary judgment, both Tarrant County, Texas, and John Peter Smith Hospital. (Compl. Style; § IV(B).) Both JPS and Tarrant County, Texas, filed virtually the same answers to Coffer's pleadings, and asserted the same defense of failure to exhaust under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). (October 28, 2003, Answer of JPS Hospital; December 11, 2003, Answer of Tarrant County, Texas.) The only difference in the answers was the recitation by defendant JPS that it is a governmental entity established as the Tarrant County Hospital District consistent with section 281.001, et seq. of the Texas Health and Safety Code, doing business as JPS Health Network and commonly known as John Peter Smith Hospital. (JPS Answer at ¶ 3.) Tarrant County, Texas, however, filed its own motion to dismiss which, after notice by the Court, was construed as a motion for summary judgment, and granted on November 15, 2004.
Coffer's post-surgery allegations in the complaint refer to "July 8," but in his more definite statement, he refers to the surgery's being "eight (8) days" after the initial injury. As the records reviewed by Dr. Felps indicate the injury occurred on July 31, 2000, followed by surgery on August 8, 2000, the Court adopts the dates as listed in such records.
Both parties are represented by the Tarrant County District Attorney's office.
The motion for summary judgment of JPS is virtually identical to that already granted by the Court in favor of Tarrant County, Texas, with respect to the contention that Coffer failed to satisfy the 42 U.S.C. § 1997e exhaustion requirement before filing this suit. The June 15, 2004, affidavit of Captain Heisey, with records, and the October 15, 2004, affidavit of Officer Alvin Clay, with records, submitted by JPS in support of its motion for summary judgment, are identical to the affidavits and records upon which the Court made its prior determination. What is new and peculiar to the motion for summary judgment of JPS, however, is Captain Heisey's separate December 16, 2004, affidavit. In that document, Captain Heisey notes that the medical services within the Tarrant County jail are provided through JPS, that medical clinics are maintained within the jail by JPS, that JPS medical personnel work at established locations inside two separate facilities of the Tarrant County jail (Corrections Center and Green Bay), and JPS medical personnel are authorized to attend to inmates in the confinement areas, depending on level of security. (Heisey Dec. 16, 2004, Affidavit at ¶ 3.) The affidavit also provides that "the Jail Grievance Procedure can be used by inmates to complain of medical personnel employed by JPS Hospital and medical care provided by JPS generally." (Heisey Dec. 16, 2004, Affidavit at ¶ 4.)
Another affidavit newly prepared in support of the JPS motion is that of Kelly E. Felps, M.D., the medical director at the Tarrant County jail for the relevant time period. In that affidavit, Dr. Felps recounts that after surgery was performed on Coffer's knee at JPS Hospital on August 8, 2000, Coffer was transferred back to the Tarrant County jail infirmary. (Felps Affidavit at page 2.) It appears that all of the subsequent medical care provided to Coffer as recounted in Dr. Felps's review of the medical records, and Felps's own treatment of Coffer, was provided within the Tarrant County jail, and/or one of the jail infirmaries or clinics. (Felps affidavit at pages 2-4.)
Because the complained-of inadequacies in treatment of Coffer allegedly were suffered while Coffer was housed within the Tarrant County jail, and because the grievance procedure available to Coffer for complaints regarding care provided to him by persons employed by JPS within the jail is the same as that available for complaints about other jail conditions, the Court concludes that Coffer's claims against JPS are barred by his failure to exhaust administrative remedies, for the reasons set out in pages 2-5 of the Order granting the motion for summary judgment of Tarrant County. As noted there, because Coffer did not exercise the available appeal step on any of his grievances about medical care before filing suit, he did not exhaust such remedies as were available to him under § 1997e(a).
Thus, the question of whether 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) applies to claims arising out of medical care provided to a prisoner in a medical or hospital facility other than within a "jail, prison, or other correctional facility" is not reached in this case.
The Fifth Circuit has expressly rejected an inmate's arguments that he could avoid the application of 1997e(a) based upon substantial compliance:
But [inmate Wright] did not pursue the grievance remedy to conclusion. Nothing in the Prison Litigation Reform Act, however, prescribes appropriate grievance procedures or enables judges, by creative interpretation of the exhaustion doctrine, to prescribe or oversee prison grievance systems. TDCJ has promulgated a detailed, complex and carefully thought-out program to facilitate the filing of grievances and assure their prompt, dispassionate investigation. The PLRA required Wright to exhaust "available" "remedies", whatever they may be. His failure to do so prevents him from pursuing a federal lawsuit at this time.Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2001).
By choosing to pursue a lawsuit before meeting the section 1997e exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies requirement, Coffer sought relief to which he was not entitled. Because Coffer's claims presently lack an arguable basis in law, the motion for summary judgment of JPS must be granted.
See Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. den'd, 526 U.S. 1133 (1999).
It is therefore ORDERED that the December 16, 2004, motion for summary judgment of John Peter Smith Hospital on the basis that plaintiff Coffer failed to exhaust administrative remedies [docket no. 45], be, and is hereby, GRANTED.
The Court thus has not reached the alternative argument for summary judgment of John Peter Smith Hospital.
It is further ORDERED that plaintiff Coffer take nothing on his claims against defendant John Peter Smith Hospital, and such claims be, and they are hereby, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE to refiling in forma pauperis.
See Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that where inmate sought court relief prior to completion of exhaustion under § 1997e, it was appropriate for district court to dismiss with prejudice for purposes of proceeding in forma pauperis; see also Smith v. Strain, No. Civ.A. 03-612, 2004 WL 1837380, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 17, 2004) ("If an inmate files in federal court an in forma pauperis complaint containing claims that have not been exhausted through available administrative remedies, those claims should be dismissed without prejudice, but with prejudice for the purpose of proceeding in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915"). Such a dismissal, however, is without prejudice to refiling a fee-paid complaint making the same allegation if Coffer has exhausted available administrative remedies. See Wright, 260 F.3d at 358 (holding that dismissal for the failure to exhaust administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) should be without prejudice and that the applicable statute of limitations should be equitably tolled during the pendency of dismissed suit and any additional administrative proceedings).