Opinion
6:20-cv-00636-AR
06-03-2022
DERRICK DEAN COFFELT, Plaintiff, v. KATHARINE R. SEMPLE, Defendant.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
JEFFREY ARMISTEAD United States Magistrate Judge.
Introduction
Plaintiff Derrick Dean Coffelt (“Coffelt”), an unrepresented litigant currently in the custody of the Oregon Department of Corrections, brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action alleging claims against defendant Katharine R. Semple (“Semple”), who is a Marion County Assistant District Attorney. Currently before the court is Semple's Partial Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike (ECF No. 18). For the reasons that follow, Semple's motion should be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Background
Coffelt's Amended Complaint alleges two claims for relief. In his first claim, Coffelt alleges that he was placed under arrest in Marion County for violating a restraining order, that the arrest was made without sufficient evidence, and that the charges were eventually dismissed on speedy trial grounds. Coffelt alleges that Semple was involved in the case in which the charges were dropped, and alleges that Semple relied upon the faulty charges to move to revoke his bail in another pending criminal case, all in violation of Coffelt's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Chief District Judge Marco A. Hernandez dismissed Coffelt's original Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) and granted Coffelt leave to file an Amended Complaint, which is the operative pleading before the court.
In his second claim, Coffelt alleges that he placed a telephone call to his attorney while in custody on the charges for which his bail was revoked. Coffelt alleges that Semple listened to the phone call in violation of Coffelt's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that she “used this phone call to press charges of tampering with a witness on my lawyer.” It is not apparent whether Coffelt is alleging that this action injured his attorney or whether it injured Coffelt himself.
By way of remedy, Coffelt seeks money damages and “[a] temporary restraining order until a preliminary injunction is in place; followed by a permanent injunction to protect my rights from Ms. Semple now and in the future.”
Semple moves to dismiss Coffelt's first claim for relief on the basis of prosecutorial immunity. Semple moves to strike the sentence in Coffelt's second claim quoted above on the basis that the statement is irrelevant because Coffelt lacks standing to allege a claim based on his attorney's injury. Finally, Semple moves to strike Coffelt's request for injunctive relief. In response to Semple's motion, Coffelt filed a “Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction” (ECF No. 21) in which Coffelt does not seek any specific preliminary injunctive relief but instead appears to address Semple's motion to dismiss his first claim and motion to strike his request for injunctive relief; Coffelt does not address Semple's motion to strike the sentence contained in his second claim for relief.
Semple construes Coffelt's filing as a response to the Partial Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike. Because Coffelt does not seek any specific relief in his motion, and because it appears directly responsive to the arguments set forth in Semple's filing, this court likewise A prosecutor's functions protected by absolute immunity include initiating a criminal prosecution and presenting the state's case, appearing at a probable cause hearing to present evidence in support of a search warrant application, professional evaluation of evidence construes it as a responsive filing rather than a separate motion. In any event, for the reasons set forth below, Coffelt has not stated facts establishing he is entitled to injunctive relief.
Discussion
I. Partial Motion to Dismiss Based on Prosecutorial Immunity
Semple moves to dismiss Coffelt's entire first claim for relief based upon prosecutorial immunity. A district court must dismiss an action initiated by a prisoner seeking redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee if the court determines that the action seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(iii) & 1915A(b)(3). When a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court construes the pleadings liberally and affords the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). A pro se litigant is permitted to amend their complaint unless the deficiencies of the complaint clearly cannot be cured by amendment. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000).
Prosecutors are absolutely immune from § 1983 actions seeking damages that challenge activities related to the initiation and presentation of criminal prosecutions and that are related to conduct “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Van De Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 343 (2009); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Determining whether a prosecutor's actions are immunized requires a functional analysis; the classification of the challenged acts, not the motivation underlying them, determines whether absolute immunity applies. Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986 (en banc)). assembled by the police and appropriate preparation for its presentation at a trial or before a grand jury, and preparing and filing an arrest warrant. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993); Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 343; Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 2009). Moreover, even charges of malicious prosecution, falsification of evidence, coercion of perjured testimony, and concealment of exculpatory evidence will be dismissed on grounds of prosecutorial immunity so long as the conduct is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2001).
Here, Coffelt's first claim alleges facts about Semple's prosecutorial decisions intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Coffelt alleges that Semple initiated without evidence a prosecution that was ultimately dismissed for speedy trial reasons, and he alleges that Semple relied upon that prosecution to argue Coffelt's bail should be revoked in another pending criminal prosecution. The conduct alleged is prosecutorial in function and Semple is entitled to prosecutorial immunity. Accordingly, Semple's motion to dismiss Coffelt's first claim should be granted. Because Coffelt was previously advised of the deficiencies of this claim and granted leave to amend, and because his Amended Complaint did not cure the deficiencies of his first claim for relief, Coffelt should not be granted leave to further amend this claim, as it appears that further leave to amend would be futile. See, e.g., Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile); see also Griggs v. Pace A. Group, Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 879 (9th Cir. 1999) (discretion to deny leave to amend is “particularly broad” when court previously granted leave to amend).
II. Motion to Strike Sentence Contained in Claim Two
Semple moves to strike the sentence in Coffelt's second claim pertaining to witness tampering charges against his trial counsel on the basis that Coffelt lacks standing to assert an injury incurred by his attorney, rendering the statement irrelevant to Coffelt's claim. As noted, Coffelt did not address this motion.
A motion to strike a pleading or parts of a pleading under Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is permitted where the pleading alleges “an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” The purpose of a Rule 12(f) motion to strike is “to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing of those issues prior to trial.” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). “‘Immaterial' matter is that which has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted), rev'd on other grounds, Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534-35 (1994).
The district court has discretion when deciding whether to strike a part of a pleading. See Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Gemini Mgmt., 921 F.2d 241, 244 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts disfavor striking pleadings, and grant motions to strike infrequently. Blincoe v. Western States Chiropractic College, No. CV 06-998-PK, 2007 WL 2071916, at *1 (D. Or. July 14, 2007). However, a court will grant a motion to strike when it has the “effect of making the trial of the action less complicated” or results in “streamlining the ultimate resolution of the action.” State of Cal. Ex rel. State Lands Comm'n v. United States, 512 F.Supp. 36, 38 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
As noted, Semple argues that Coffelt lacks standing to assert a claim that Semple used information obtained in her investigation of Coffelt to press charges of witness tampering against Coffelt's attorney and, therefore, the sentence should be stricken as irrelevant to Coffelt's claims. If, indeed, Coffelt attempted to state a claim based upon the injury suffered by his attorney, he would lack standing to assert such a claim. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) (the case-or-controversy requirement requires, among other things, that the party invoking federal jurisdiction must have suffered some actual or threatened injury); see also Valley Forge Christ. College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-45 (1982) (prudential limitations on federal court jurisdiction require a party to assert his own legal rights and interests, not those of others). However, to the extent Coffelt asserts that Semple's actions toward his attorney somehow contributed to the violation of Coffelt's rights, the court does not conclude, at least at the pleading stage, that the statement Semple seeks to strike “has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded.” Accordingly, Semple's motion to strike the sentence from the second claim in Coffelt's Amended Complaint should be denied. II. Coffelt's Request for Injunctive Relief
Standing is jurisdictional, cannot be waived, and is properly addressed under Rule 12(b)(1), not Rule 12(f) . Brown v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc., 913 F.Supp.2d 881, 888-89 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citations omitted). Even in the absence of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), however, this court must dismiss a claim based on an injury suffered by someone other than the plaintiff. See Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011) (“lack of Article III standing requires dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)”); Columbia Basin Apartments Ass'n v. City of Pasco, 268 F.3d 791, 796 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that courts are “obliged” to consider standing sua sponte as a matter of Article III's case-or-controversy requirement).
Finally, Semple moves to strike Coffelt's request for injunctive relief. Semple argues that Coffelt lacks standing to assert a claim for injunctive relief because he does not allege facts supporting a claim of current continuing harm or a threat of future harm. Rule 12(f), however, does not authorize district courts to strike claims for relief on the ground that such claims are precluded as a matter of law. See Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that “Rule 12(f) does not authorize district courts to strike claims for damages on the ground that such claims are precluded as a matter of law”); Guerrero v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 231 F.Supp.3d 797, 809 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (declining to strike request for injunctive relief); Varsam v. Laboratory Corp. of America, 120 F.Supp.3d 1173, 1183 (9th Cir. 2015) (same). Accordingly, Semple's motion to strike Coffelt's prayer for injunctive relief under Rule 12(f) should be denied.
The denial of Semple's motion to strike does not, however, end the inquiry into the propriety of this prayer for relief. Semple is correct that Coffelt does not allege facts establishing standing to obtain injunctive relief. Coffelt's second claim for relief alleges harm allegedly caused by Semple's past conduct in connection with a discrete criminal prosecution. For injunctive relief, which is a prospective remedy, the threat of injury must be “actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009). Past exposure to illegal conduct, though insufficient by itself to grant standing to obtain injunctive relief, may be “evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). Where standing is premised entirely on the threat of repeated injury, though, a plaintiff must show “a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way.” Id. at 111.
Here, Coffelt's allegations fail to allege either current continuing harm or a threat of future harm sufficient to support his request for injunctive relief. The sole remaining claim of the Amended Complaint will be Coffelt's claim that Semple violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by listening to a recorded telephone conversation between Coffelt and his attorney (to the extent that Coffelt was injured by Semple's alleged conduct); Coffelt alleges no facts establishing a sufficient likelihood he will again be wronged in a similar way. Accordingly, this request for relief is subject to sua sponte dismissal. See e.g., T.K. v. Adobe Systems Incorporated, No. 17-CV-04595-LHK, 2018 WL 1812200, at *14 (N.D. Cal. April 17, 2018) (sua sponte dismissing claim for injunctive relief where plaintiff failed to allege facts establishing a real and immediate threat of repeated injury and, thereby, lacked standing to obtain such relief). Because it is not clear that this deficiency cannot be cured, Coffelt should be permitted to amend his second claim for relief to allege facts that show a sufficient likelihood that he will be again similarly wronged.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court recommends that Semple's Partial Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike (ECF No. 18) be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion to dismiss Coffelt's first claim for relief should be GRANTED, without leave to amend, and this action should proceed solely on Coffelt's second claim for relief. The motion to strike the sentence “She used this phone call to press charges of tampering with a witness on my lawyer” should be DENIED. The motion to strike Coffelt's prayer for injunctive relief should be DENIED, but the prayer for relief should nonetheless be DISMISSED sua sponte based on lack of standing. Coffelt should be granted leave to amend his second claim for relief to allege facts sufficient to establishing standing for the requested injunctive relief.
Scheduling Order
The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due within fourteen days. If no objections are filed, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. If objections are filed, a response is due within fourteen days. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement.