Opinion
No. 3D21-1569
12-01-2021
COCOPLUM CIVIC ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. CITY OF CORAL GABLES, etc., et al., Respondents.
Cozen O'Connor, and Jason R. Domark, Charles C. Kline, and Reid Kline, for petitioner. Holland & Knight LLP, and Frances G. de la Guardia and Anna Marie Gamez; and Miriam Soler Ramos, City Attorney, City of Coral Gables, for respondent, City of Coral Gables; Gunster, and Michael B. Green, for respondent, Cocoplum Homeowners Association, Inc.
Cozen O'Connor, and Jason R. Domark, Charles C. Kline, and Reid Kline, for petitioner.
Holland & Knight LLP, and Frances G. de la Guardia and Anna Marie Gamez; and Miriam Soler Ramos, City Attorney, City of Coral Gables, for respondent, City of Coral Gables; Gunster, and Michael B. Green, for respondent, Cocoplum Homeowners Association, Inc.
Before EMAS, LOGUE and SCALES, JJ.
EMAS, J.
Cocoplum Civic Association, Inc. has filed a petition for second-tier certiorari review of the decision of the Appellate Division of the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. A three-judge panel, in a twenty-five page opinion, denied Cocoplum Civic Association's petition for first-tier certiorari review, providing comprehensive analysis and holding ultimately that (1) Cocoplum Civic Association was afforded procedural due process; (2) the essential requirements of law were observed; and (3) the decisions of the City of Coral Gables were supported by competent substantial evidence.
The Florida Supreme Court has observed:
As a case travels up the judicial ladder, review should consistently become narrower, not broader. We have held that circuit court review of an administrative agency decision, under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c)(3), is governed by a three-part standard of review: (1) whether procedural due process is accorded; (2) whether the essential requirements of law have been observed; and (3) whether the administrative findings and judgment are supported by competent substantial evidence. The standard of review for certiorari in the district court effectively eliminates the substantial competent evidence component. The inquiry is limited to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and whether the circuit court applied the correct law. As explained above, these two components are merely expressions of ways in which the circuit court decision may have departed from the essential requirements of the law. In short, we have the same standard of review as a case which begins in the county court.
Nader v. Dep't. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 87 So. 3d 712, 723 (Fla. 2012) (additional citations omitted).
Given this very limited scope and standard of our review, it is beyond peradventure that second-tier certiorari may not be utilized to challenge simple legal error, but only in instances where the petitioner establishes a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Nader, 87 So. 3d at 723 (warning that "appellate courts must exercise caution not to expand certiorari jurisdiction to review the correctness of the circuit court's decision"); Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 1086 (Fla. 2010) (noting: "[W]hen a district court considers a petition for second-tier certiorari review, the ‘inquiry is limited to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and whether the circuit court applied the correct law,’ or, as otherwise stated, departed from the essential requirements of law. The departure from the essential requirements of the law necessary for granting a writ of certiorari is something more than a simple legal error") (additional citations omitted); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d 885, 889 (Fla. 2003) (holding that "the departure from the essential requirements of law necessary for the issuance of a writ of certiorari is something more than a simple legal error"); Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. 2000) (same).
As the Court observed in Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 528 (Fla. 1995), to allow otherwise would in essence permit a second appeal, nullifying the narrow scope and "limited standard of review available to litigants after they have had the benefit of an appeal in the circuit court." Id.
Having considered the parties' submissions and appendices, and applying the limited scope and standard of review, we deny the petition for second-tier certiorari.