Opinion
39126.
DECIDED OCTOBER 11, 1961. REHEARING DENIED OCTOBER 31, 1961.
Disbarment. Jackson Superior Court. Before Judge Kennedy from Augusta Circuit.
Robert J. Reed, for plaintiff in error.
John Ackbar Darsey, Davis Davidson, Jack S. Davidson, H. W. Davis, contra.
1. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Gordon v. Clinkscales, 215 Ga. 843, 849 ( 114 S.E.2d 15), established as the law of the case that grounds of disbarment were stated where it was "alleged that the respondent proposed to a named person to furnish him protection in the operation of a business upon the payment of $10,000 in cash and $500 per month."
2. The testimony in support of the charge referred to in the first division of the opinion, if not subject to being considered impeached by the jury, demanded a verdict that the respondent was guilty as charged.
3. "It is not improper for the trial court to direct a verdict in favor of disbarment where such a verdict is demanded by the evidence. Wernimont v. State, 101 Ark. 210 ( 142 S.W. 194, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1156)." Wood v. State, 45 Ga. App. 783, 790 ( 165 S.E. 908). James v. State, 73 Ga. App. 834 (6) ( 38 S.E.2d 125).
4. "Proof that a witness has been convicted of the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor affords no ground for impeachment of the witness." Wheeler v. State, 4 Ga. App. 325 (2) ( 61 S.E. 409). Therefore, evidence that might arouse a suspicion that the witness was so engaged would not tend to impeach his testimony.
5. Assuming but not deciding that a plea of guilty in a tax evasion case would authorize a jury to impeach a witness, evidence that a plea of nolo contendere had been entered by such witness in such a case would not authorize his impeachment. See Wright v. State, 75 Ga. App. 764 ( 44 S.E.2d 569), as to the import of a plea of nolo contendere.
6. The evidence given in support of the charge referred to in division 1 of this opinion was not, as contended by the respondent, so improbable as to be unworthy of belief.
7. The evidence demanded the verdict against the respondent on the grounds referred to in the first division of the opinion and the direction of the verdict on such grounds was not error.
8. Inasmuch as the disbarment of the respondent was demanded on the ground referred to, the other assignments of error made in the writ of error are nugatory and will not be considered.
Judgment affirmed. Carlisle, P.J., and Eberhardt, J., concur.
DECIDED OCTOBER 11, 1961 — REHEARING DENIED OCTOBER 31, 1961.
This is the second appearance of this case in this court. On the first appearance this court was equally divided on the question of whether a disbarment proceeding could be brought against the respondent while he was serving as judge of the superior court and the writ of error was therefore transferred to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held ( Gordon v. Clinkscales, 215 Ga. 843, 849, 114 S.E.2d 15), that such action would lie and that, without passing on all the grounds presented, two of the alleged grounds of disbarment were sufficient to authorize the disbarment of the respondent and were not subject to demurrer. After the judgment of the Supreme Court was made the judgment of the trial court various grounds of demurrer were filed and ruled on, and, thereafter, the case was tried. On the trial of the case, at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence and after both sides had closed, the trial court directed a verdict of guilty on specified grounds and of not guilty as to others, and entered a judgment disbarring the respondent. Thereafter, the respondent's motion for a judgment non obstante veredicto and for a new trial were overruled and he now assigns error on the judgments adverse to him.