Summary
holding attorney's conviction for bribery to avoid random judicial assignments warranted permanent disbarment
Summary of this case from In re R.M.WOpinion
No. 91-854
Submitted October 9, 1991 —
Decided December 31, 1991.
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 89-50.
By a complaint filed August 28, 1989, the relator, Cleveland Bar Association, charged respondent, Frederick K. Jurek, in two counts with violations of DR 1-102(A)(3) (engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude), 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in any other conduct that adversely reflects upon his fitness to practice law). Count I charged that in case No. 216309, in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, respondent was convicted of three counts of bribery, and in Count II, case No. 213051, in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, of two counts of bribery.
In his answer respondent admitted that he was convicted of the counts of bribery in both cases and that he engaged in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and misconduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, but denied that he engaged in any other conduct that adversely reflected upon his fitness to practice law.
At the hearing on the matter held, on November 30, 1990, before a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court, the parties stipulated to the factual allegations contained in both counts and that such facts constituted violations of the Disciplinary Rules as set forth in the complaint. The hearing proceeded on the question of mitigation, with respondent providing the bulk of the testimony as follows.
Indictments in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County were processed in the arraignment room where cases were assigned, through random selection, to one of the thirty-four judges on the common pleas bench. The bond commissioner in charge of randomly assigning judges was Ray McCool. Respondent and McCool had been acquainted for twenty-nine years. Respondent and McCool had discussed McCool's ability to "accurately depict [ sic] the future." They had talked about it, "* * * but one day he [McCool] said, `I can predict the future,' and I [respondent] said, `Let's go with it.'" Respondent paid McCool "$300 a pop" five times or more.
Respondent's interest in participating in this scheme was to avoid harsh situations where a client might get a maximum sentence from a particular judge: "* * * [I]n those days, for money you could avoid that." The money was given to McCool to avoid the random selection process. Respondent said, "I didn't want to gamble it." In a particular case respondent would make a decision whether that case merited bribing McCool.
Respondent was sentenced to five years' imprisonment on the criminal charges against him and served approximately twenty-three months of that sentence.
The panel accepted the stipulated findings of fact, limiting its decision to the appropriate sanction. It acknowledged that respondent recommended indefinite suspension, whereas relator felt the appropriate sanction would be permanent disbarment. The panel concluded that respondent's conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(3), 1-102(A)(5) and 1-102(A)(6), and recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.
The board, upon consideration of the panel's report, stated that an indefinite suspension "does not serve to protect the justice system and the integrity of our courts. The Respondent engaged in a knowing, willful course of conduct designed to corrupt the justice system and bribe officials towards that end. * * * In particular this Respondent, despite his conviction and incarceration, showed no remorse for his wrongdoing and in fact exhibited arrogance toward the hearing panel and the system of lawyer discipline in general." The board, while adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the panel, recommended that the respondent be permanently disbarred.
Kenneth A. Bravo, William H. Fulton and Mark F. Kennedy, for relator.
Phillip J. Korey, for respondent.
Based upon a review of the record we concur in the findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendation of the board. Respondent is hereby permanently disbarred from the practice of law. Costs taxed to respondent.
Judgment accordingly.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, HOLMES, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, H. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.