Opinion
B321343
02-07-2024
CLAUDIA R., a Minor, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.
The Law Office of Carlos A. Lloreda, Jr. and Carlos A. Lloreda, Jr. for Plaintiff and Appellant. Vanderford &Ruiz, Rodolfo F. Ruiz, Erin E. Uyeshima, and Mark R. Irvine for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Nos. 18STCV03720, 21STCP00575, Lawrence P. Riff, Judge. Affirmed.
The Law Office of Carlos A. Lloreda, Jr. and Carlos A. Lloreda, Jr. for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Vanderford &Ruiz, Rodolfo F. Ruiz, Erin E. Uyeshima, and Mark R. Irvine for Defendant and Respondent.
CHANEY, J.
Government Code section 945.4 generally bars any suit against a public entity for money or damages unless a timely claim (i.e., a "government claim") has been submitted to and denied by the public entity or, under section 946.6, the superior court has relieved the claimant from the requirements of section 945.4.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.
In March 2018, appellant Claudia R. presented a government claim to respondent Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), alleging that LAUSD failed to prevent her from being raped in December 2017 at Los Angeles High School. After the claim was deemed denied, Claudia filed a complaint with the superior court.
Claudia alleges that, in the second grade, she was "diagnosed with mental retardation" and though she is "now 20 years old," she has "the intellectual level of a six-year-old." She filed suit through her guardian ad litem.
In an amended complaint, Claudia added an allegation that in November 2019, due to LAUSD's negligence, she was filmed performing oral sex on another student at Susan Miller Dorsey High School (the Dorsey incident). Claudia did not initially present a government claim as to the Dorsey incident; her counsel admitted that he believed a separate claim form was unnecessary. However, in July 2020, Claudia applied with LAUSD to present a late claim and, when that application was deemed denied, petitioned the superior court for relief under section 946.6. The trial court denied her petition, finding that her counsel's mistaken belief that a separate government claim was not required did not warrant relief.
On appeal, Claudia asks us to find the trial court abused its discretion in denying her petition. Because we conclude the court acted within the bounds of reason, we affirm.
Because we conclude the court did not err in finding Claudia had failed to establish a basis for relief under section 946.6, we do not consider the parties' arguments on whether LAUSD would be prejudiced if she had established such a basis.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We limit our summary to the facts and procedural history relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
A. Timeline
Because this case involves four alleged incidents of sexual misconduct-one for which no government claim was filed, one for which a timely government claim was filed, and two for which untimely government claims were filed or attempted to be filed- as well as three complaints in one superior court case and a petition for relief in a second superior court case, we set forth the following brief timeline in an effort to allay any confusion from the more thorough discussion in the subsequent sections.
May 2016: Claudia alleges she was sexually assaulted at Los Angeles High School.
October 2017: Claudia alleges she was sexually assaulted at Los Angeles High School.
December 2017: Claudia alleges she was sexually assaulted at Los Angeles High School.
March 2018: Claudia files a government claim with LAUSD, discussing the October 2017 and December 2017 incidents.
November 2018: Claudia files a complaint in the superior court against LAUSD. The complaint discusses the May 2016 incident and the December 2017 incident, but states the lawsuit is based on the December 2017 incident. There is no mention of the October 2017 incident.
November 2019: Claudia alleges she was recorded performing oral sex on a male student at Dorsey High School.
December 2019: Claudia files a First Amended Complaint (FAC). The FAC discusses the May 2016, October 2017, and December 2017 incidents and also includes the new November 2019 incident at Dorsey High. The FAC omits the previous statement contained in the initial complaint that the lawsuit is based on the December 2017 incident.
January 2020: Claudia files a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) with the same factual allegations as the FAC.
March - August 2020: LAUSD asks to strike certain allegations in the SAC, including allegations regarding the Dorsey incident. Claudia agrees to strike those allegations and the trial court grants the motion to strike.
July 2020: Claudia seeks leave to file a late government claim regarding the Dorsey incident. The request is deemed denied as of August 2020.
February 2021: Claudia files, in a separate case, a petition for relief under section 946.6 regarding the Dorsey incident. It is the denial of this petition that is the subject of this appeal.
B. Claudia Files a Government Claim
In March 2018, Claudia presented a government claim to LAUSD. The claim form alleged that "Two boys, then students of Los Angeles High School, forcibly raped Claudia R[]." When asked when the "damage occurred," Clauda responded "October 2017 and 12-11-2017." When asked why LAUSD was responsible, Claudia responded, "Los Angeles high school and its employees acted wrongfully and negligently in the supervision of its grounds and its students in failing to prevent the forcible rape of L.A. high school student Claudia R[]."
C. Claudia Files a Complaint
In November 2018, in case number 18STCV03720, Claudia filed a complaint against LAUSD and three LAUSD employees, alleging statutory negligence and negligent supervision causes of action. Claudia alleged she was a special needs student attending Los Angeles High School, and that, on December 11, 2017, "she was sexually assaulted and/or raped in the girls' restroom." Claudia alleged LAUSD provided inadequate supervision of her and other individuals involved in the sexual assault and/or rape. The complaint stated that, "[o]n March 23, 2018, within the required six-month time frame of the December 2017 incident, Plaintiff filed a 'Claim for Damages' with LAUSD; and by LAUSD's failure to respond to such 'Claim for Damages' within 45 days, the subject 'Claim for Damages' was deemed denied by operation of law on or about May 7, 2018.
The complaint also alleged that Claudia had been sexually assaulted on campus in May 2016, however Claudia stated that her lawsuit was based on the December 2017 incident. Despite Claudia's claim in her March 2018 government claim form that her damages occurred "October 2017 and 12-112017," the complaint made no mention of any incident occurring in October 2017.
Defendants demurred to the complaint, and Claudia opposed the demurrer. In November 2019, the court sustained the demurrer, with leave to amend on the statutory negligence cause of action, but without leave to amend on the negligent supervision cause of action.
D. Claudia Files a First Amended Complaint
Despite the court's ruling, in December 2019, Claudia filed a First Amended Complaint, alleging causes of action for negligent supervision and negligence. The FAC added eight individual defendants to the previous three, six of whom were LAUSD employees, and two of whom were minor special education students attending school at Los Angeles High School. The FAC alleged Claudia was sexually assaulted three times at Los Angeles High School: once in May 2016, once in October 2017, and once in December 2017.
The FAC also alleged that Claudia's mother removed her from Los Angeles High School after the December 2017 incident and, when she returned to school in August or September 2019, she was sent to Susan Miller Dorsey High School instead of Los Angeles High School. In November 2019, while at Dorsey High, Claudia was recorded performing oral sex on a male Dorsey student. The recording was released on social media for other special education students to access. While the FAC again alleged that Claudia had filed a government claim in March 2018 "within the required six-month time frame of the December 2017 incident," it made no mention of any other government claim. The FAC no longer claimed Claudia's lawsuit was based on the December 2017 incident.
E. Claudia Files a Second Amended Complaint
In January 2020, Claudia sought to file a Second Amended Complaint. Claudia claimed she had filed a "wrong First Amended Complaint ('FAC') in response to this Court's ruling on Defendants' Demurrer." (Emphasis in original.) Claudia's counsel acknowledged the court had sustained defendants' demurrer and permitted leave to amend only on the statutory negligence cause of action. The court granted Claudia's request and she filed her SAC that same day.
The SAC stated a single cause of action for statutory negligence. The defendants were LAUSD and five of its employees. The SAC again alleged that Claudia had been sexually assaulted in May 2016, October 2017, and December 2017. Like the "wrong" FAC, the SAC also alleged that in November 2019, Claudia was recorded performing oral sex on a male student, and that the recording was released on social media (i.e., the Dorsey incident). The SAC again alleged Claudia had filed a government claim in March 2018, within the required six-month time frame of the December 2017 incident, but made no mention of any other government claim.
However, under the sole cause of action for statutory negligence, while Claudia alleged LAUSD knew or should have known of the sexual assaults that occurred before December 2017, the only accusations of negligence were that defendants "negligently failed in their duty to supervise and protect PLAINTIFF on or about December 11, 2017" and "on or about November 4, 2019."
In March 2020, defendants moved to strike portions of the SAC, arguing Claudia had improperly added three new defendants to the lawsuit, as well as "a new and separate incident from the one alleged in her original Complaint" (i.e., the Dorsey incident). Defendants asked the court to strike the allegations regarding this "separate incident." In her July 2020 opposition to the motion to strike, Claudia stated that she had dismissed the newly added defendants in March 2020, and would agree to strike the allegations regarding the Dorsey incident. In August 2020, the court granted the motion to strike. In January 2021, defendants answered the SAC.
F. Claudia Applies to File a Late Government Claim
One week after her July 2020 opposition to defendants' motion to strike, Claudia filed an "Application for Leave to Present Late Claim" with LAUSD's governing board. The claim form alleged that Claudia was recorded performing oral sex on a male Dorsey student, and the recording was released on social media. When asked when the "damage occurred," Clauda responded: "On or about November 4, 2019."
Claudia's application for leave to present a late claim for the Dorsey incident alleged her counsel "inadvertently failed to timely file a claim form with the LAUSD as a result of a series of unexpected and unpredictable events." Claudia argued that: (1) the claim had been included in the SAC, filed in January 2020; (2) because the initial government claim form had to do with sexual assault and "the new claim continued with an additional allegation of sexual assault, it was believed that no new claim form was required"; (3) because there were service problems with the SAC, Claudia had dismissed "defendants employed at Dorsey" without prejudice; and (4) because of the "press of work and the numerous deadlines faced on many cases, compounded with the logistical and personnel problems resulting from the covid-19 pandemic," Claudia's counsel "had fewer people putting fewer hours in to deal with more work." Claudia's application was denied by operation of law in August 2020.
G. The Court Refuses to Excuse Claudia from the Requirements of Section 945.4
1. Section 946.6 Petition
In February 2021, in case number 21STCP00575, Claudia petitioned the court under section 946.6 for relief from the provisions of section 945.4 or to otherwise accept her government claim regarding the Dorsey incident as timely. Claudia claimed her failure to present a timely government claim was "through mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect." Specifically, her counsel argued that he mistakenly believed that presenting a claim for the Dorsey incident was unnecessary because allegations regarding the incident had been included in the SAC and because a government claim form had previously been filed. Counsel also blamed the COVID-19 pandemic for "delay[ing] my realizing and acting on the need to file an application for leave to file a late claim." Counsel additionally argued that he had been diligent in investigating the Dorsey incident and contended defendants would suffer no prejudice from permitting a late-filed claim. At defendants' request, the court ordered this new case related to the previous one. In July 2021, the two cases were consolidated.
2. Opposition
LAUSD opposed Claudia's petition, arguing that she had not shown that her failure to file a timely government claim stemmed from mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. Specifically, LAUSD argued that "ignorance of the claim filing statutes has never been excusable neglect that permits relief from the strict statutory requirements," that Claudia's counsel's belief that he did not need to file a separate claim was unreasonable, that counsel failed to exercise diligence in determining whether a new claim form was needed, and that neither being short-staffed nor the COVID-19 pandemic would have prevented counsel from timely presenting a government claim. LAUSD also contended that granting Claudia's petition would prejudice it because it had already used up most of its deposition time with Claudia's guardian ad litem.
3. Reply
In Claudia's reply, she preliminarily argued that LAUSD's opposition was untimely served. She also claimed her counsel "knew of the law [regarding the requirement to file a government claim form]. But it simply did not occur to Petitioner's attorney that ANOTHER claim against LAUSD needed to be filed until after the 6-month deadline had passed." (Emphasis in original.) She argued her attorney "was so drawn into the episodic nature of inappropriate sexual activity involving his client occurring on an LAUSD campus that he was lulled into mistakenly and inadvertently failing to timely file a claim." She offered to alleviate any prejudice by agreeing to permit LAUSD to take a further deposition of Claudia's guardian ad litem.
Although the details are irrelevant to this appeal, Claudia claimed that, because LAUSD served its opposition via e-service, it was six calendar days late.
4. Initial Court Hearing
In December 2021, the court heard Claudia's petition. In regard to Claudia's contention that the opposition was untimely served, the trial court asked Claudia's counsel what else he would have added to his reply had the opposition been served earlier.
Claudia's counsel responded that he would have "look[ed] at the communications that I had with opposing counsel relative to his acquiescence that the Dorsey High incident was going to become a reality." After counsel continued on with his argument that the government claim form was not filed due to "an extremely reasonable mistake," the court asked Claudia's counsel what the mistake was. Counsel responded, "I did not file a notice of claim within the period I was supposed to, believing that giving them notice on [sic] the Second Amended Complaint was sufficient. That was the mistake."
The court opined that while a mistake of law could be grounds for relief when the law was "complex and debatable," the issue of whether a separate government claim needed to be presented was neither. However, because the parties disagreed about whether the opposition was timely served, and Claudia's counsel claimed he would have filed a more robust reply had he been given more time, the court continued the hearing to permit supplemental briefing. The court stated its understanding that Claudia was going to argue she had "placed the district on notice of everything it needed to know, and that that was compliance or substantial compliance or excusable compliance with the Government Claims Act," and that LAUSD was going to disagree with that position, and the court wanted to give both parties "an opportunity to expand the record in that direction."
5. Second Court Hearing
Both parties filed supplemental briefing. After hearing argument at the continued hearing, the court issued a nine-page ruling denying the petition. Preliminarily, the court stated it was not considering a new inadvertence argument raised in the supplemental briefing, because the court had permitted supplemental briefing only to address an argument that LAUSD had "acquiesced" to adding the Dorsey incident to the in-progress lawsuit, or that LAUSD had "made any reliance/estoppel statements that would imply" Claudia did not need to file a new government claim form. However, the court determined that, "at most," Claudia's new evidence demonstrated that LAUSD had notice that Claudia intended to bring a new claim regarding the Dorsey incident.
The court stated that relief in this instance could be granted only if Claudia demonstrated that the failure to present a separate government claim was due to "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." After finding that Claudia was not relying on "surprise" or "excusable neglect," the court concluded "inadvertence" did not apply because an act would only be inadvertent "if it is accidental, or the result of inattention or unplanned," which was not the case here. Finally, the court concluded that while there was a mistake, the mistake of law made by Claudia's counsel was not one for which relief was warranted. Quoting Hernandez v. Garcetti (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 675, 683-684, the court stated that" '[t]he issue of which mistakes of law constitute excusable neglect presents a fact question; the determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law. [Citation.] Although an honest mistake of law is a valid ground for relief where a problem is complex and debatable, ignorance of the law coupled with negligence in ascertaining it will certainly sustain a finding denying relief.'" Finding the question of whether a separate government claim form was required for the Dorsey incident neither complex nor debatable, the court denied Claudia's petition. Claudia timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law
"As a general rule, a plaintiff must present a public entity with a timely written claim for damages before filing suit against it." (J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 648, 652.) "If a complaint does not allege facts showing that a claim was timely made, or that compliance with the claims statutes is excused, it is subject to demurrer." (Ibid.; see also § 945.4 [barring suit for money or damages against public entity on cause of action for which government claim is required unless government claim is presented and rejected].) A claim is presented "when the public entity 'receives a document which contains the information required by section 910 and is signed by the claimant....'" (Simms v. Bear Valley Community Healthcare District (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 391, 400.) Section 910 requires presentation of "(a) The name and post office address of the claimant. [¶] (b) The post office address to which the person presenting the claim desires notices to be sent. [¶] (c) The date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted. [¶] (d) A general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim. [¶] (e) The name or names of the public employee or employees causing the injury, damage, or loss, if known. [¶] (f) The amount claimed if it totals less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) as of the date of presentation of the claim, including the estimated amount of any prospective injury, damage, or loss, insofar as it may be known at the time of the presentation of the claim, together with the basis of computation of the amount claimed. If the amount claimed exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000), no dollar amount shall be included in the claim. However, it shall indicate whether the claim would be a limited civil case." (§ 910.) A claim must also state that if it is not resolved, litigation will ensue. (A.S. v. Palmdale School Dist. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1091, 1100.)
"The purpose of the claims statutes is not to prevent surprise, but 'to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation. [Citations.] It is well-settled that claims statutes must be satisfied even in face of the public entity's actual knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the claim.'" (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 738.) "The claims statutes also 'enable the public entity to engage in fiscal planning for potential liabilities and to avoid similar liabilities in the future.'" (Ibid.)
"A claim relating to a cause of action . . . for injury to person . . . shall be presented as provided . . . not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action." (§ 911.2, subd. (a).) "When a claim . . . is not presented within [the required] time, a written application may be made to the public entity for leave to present that claim." (§ 911.4, subd. (a).) "If an application for leave to present a claim is denied or deemed to be denied . . . a petition may be made to the court for an order relieving the petitioner from Section 945.4." (§ 946.6, subd. (a).) Relief shall be granted if one of several showings is made; the only relevant basis for relief in this case is if "[t]he failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect unless the public entity establishes that it would be prejudiced in the defense of the claim if the court relieves the petitioner from the requirements of Section 945.4." (§ 946.6, subd. (c)(1).)
The decision to grant or deny a petition seeking relief under section 946.6 is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal except for abuse of discretion. (Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 270, 275 (Bettencourt).)
B. Analysis
"The mere recital of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is not sufficient to warrant relief. Relief on grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is available only on a showing that the claimant's failure to timely present a claim was reasonable when tested by the objective 'reasonably prudent person' standard." (Dep't of Water &Power v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1293.) "[N]ot every mistake of law is excusable." (Viles v. State (1967) 66 Cal.2d 24, 29.) While "an honest mistake is excusable, the determining factor [is] the reasonableness of the misconception." (Ibid.; see also Hernandez v. Garcetti, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 683-684 ["' "Although an honest mistake of law is a valid ground for relief where a problem is complex and debatable, ignorance of the law coupled with negligence in ascertaining it will certainly sustain a finding denying relief"' "]; Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1783 ["When examining the mistake or neglect, the court inquires whether a reasonably prudent person might have made the same error under the same or similar circumstances"].)
Claudia admits that the failure to file a timely claim was due to a mistake made by her counsel. When directly asked by the trial court what his mistake was, Claudia's counsel responded: "I did not file a notice of claim within the period I was supposed to, believing that giving them notice on the Second Amended Complaint was sufficient." The trial court found this mistake unreasonable. The court concluded that a mistake of law could be grounds for relief only when the issue was complex or debatable, and the issue of whether a separate claim form needed to be filed for the Dorsey incident was neither.
On appeal, Claudia argues her counsel's mistake "was reasonable for many reasons." Specifically, she contends her counsel reasonably believed he did not need to file a government claim form for the Dorsey incident because the parties were already engaged in litigation and because he believed it was sufficient to include the allegations of the Dorsey incident in the SAC. Claudia also argues that: (1) the Dorsey incident occurred just as Claudia's counsel "was engaging in advertising that dramatically increased counsel's case-load volume of his law office"; (2) "the COVID-19 onslaught began a couple months after the Dorsey incident, adding additional burdens to Plaintiff counsel's overwhelmed office staff," leading to a situation in which counsel and his staff "inadvertently failed to timely file Plaintiff's second claim form with LAUSD"; (3) the claim form was filed "just 70 days late"; and (4) LAUSD had notice of the Dorsey incident through the SAC, filed in January 2020.
Both parties agree that the standard of review is abuse of discretion. Thus, our task is to determine not whether we agree with the trial court's characterization of counsel's mistake, but whether the court acted within the bounds of reason. (Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1339 ["' "The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason"' "].) We find that it did act within the bounds of reason.
1. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding Counsel's Belief Unreasonable
Section 911.2 is clear: "A claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person or to personal property or growing crops shall be presented as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 915) not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action." (§ 911.2, subd. (a).)
Claudia's counsel was generally aware of this statute and the need to file a government claim form to preserve the right to sue a public entity over an incident-he filed a timely government claim regarding the December 2017 incident alleged in the initial complaint. Nevertheless, he argued to the trial court that he reasonably believed he did not need to file a separate claim form for the Dorsey incident.
Our Supreme Court has made clear that "section 945.4 requires each cause of action to be presented by a claim complying with section 910," and that if "the claim is rejected and the plaintiff ultimately files a complaint against the public entity, the facts underlying each cause of action in the complaint must have been fairly reflected in a timely claim." (Stockett v. Association of Cal. Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Authority (2004) 34 Cal.4th 441, 447.) The facts underlying any cause of action arising from the Dorsey incident were not reflected in a timely claim. The Dorsey incident occurred almost two years after the December 2017 incident described in the initial claim form, and took place in a different high school. Nor did the initial claim form disclose the "date, place and other circumstances of the" Dorsey incident or provide a "general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred" (§ 910, subds. (c) &(d))-it could not have, as the initial claim form was filed 20 months before the Dorsey incident occurred.
Claudia cited (and cites) no authority standing for the proposition that, because the parties were already in litigation, the plaintiff could ignore the requirements of the government claims statute. Nor do we find the law debatable or complex. Thus, we cannot say the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason by finding that the mistake of law made by Claudia's counsel was unreasonable and not grounds for relief. (See Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 476 [" 'Ignorance of the law, at least where coupled with negligence in failing to look it up, will not justify a trial court in granting relief [citations] and such facts will certainly sustain a finding denying relief' "].)
2. Claudia's Other Excuses Fail
We quickly address and dispense with the other excuses proffered by Claudia:
That the Dorsey incident occurred just as Claudia's counsel's advertising campaign bore fruit does not excuse her counsel's mistake of law. This is not a situation in which the press of business caused a deadline to be mis-calendared or resulted in a filled-out form being inadvertently lost. Claudia's counsel admitted he did not believe another government claim form needed to be filed.
Nor can counsel blame the "onslaught" caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. For one thing, as Claudia admits, the pandemic did not begin until at least "a couple months after the Dorsey incident," meaning it was not the pandemic that prevented counsel from filing the government claim form or from conducting the research to determine whether it was necessary to present the claim. Moreover, counsel fails to explain how the difficulties caused by the pandemic resulted in his mistaken understanding of the law.
That the claim was filed "just 70 days late" may affect the determination of whether LAUSD was prejudiced by the untimely claim but has no bearing on whether counsel's mistake of law was reasonable.
And finally, it is irrelevant that LAUSD had notice of the Dorsey incident through the SAC." 'It is well-settled that claims statutes must be satisfied even in face of the public entity's actual knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the claim.'" (City of Stockton v. Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 738.)
We note also that Claudia stipulated to strike the allegations of the Dorsey incident from the SAC.
3. Claudia's Cited Authority Does Not Hold to the Contrary
We are aware that our Supreme Court has held that "[t]he policy favoring trial on the merits is the primary policy underlying section 946.6" and that "to implement this policy, any doubts should be resolved in favor of granting relief." (Bettencourt, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 276.) However, Claudia cites no authority eliminating the requirement that the petitioner must demonstrate the failure to timely present a government claim was due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (See Bettencourt, 42 Cal.3d at p. 275 ["The trial court shall grant relief under section 946.6 when: . . . (2) failure to timely present the claim was caused by mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect"]; Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 431 [to grant relief, court "must also conclude that the failure to timely present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect"]; Nilsson v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 976, 979 (Nilsson) [relief requires showing of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect"]; Flores v. Board of Supervisors (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 480, 483 (Flores) [same].)
Claudia cites a litany of cases (Bettencourt, Nilsson, Flores, Stub v. Harrison (1939) 35 Cal.App.2d 685 (Stub), Bergloff v. Reynolds (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 349 (Bergloff), Alderman v. Jacobs (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 273 (Alderman)) that she claims support her argument that the trial court abused its discretion in finding her counsel's mistake unreasonable and inexcusable. We find none persuasive. As discussed in more detail below, in Bettencourt, the attorney made a reasonable mistake of fact, not law. In the other cases, the attorneys committed excusable neglect, such as mis-calendaring a deadline or losing a pleading. In none of the cases did the attorney misinterpret a statute that was neither complex nor debatable.
In Bettencourt, four days after being retained, plaintiffs' counsel filed a government claim "with the State Board of Control under the mistaken belief that the employees of Sacramento City College were employees of the State of California." (Bettencourt, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 273-274.) He discovered the mistake five and a half weeks later and immediately sought to remedy the error with a petition to present a late claim and then a petition to the superior court for relief under section 946.6, both denied. (Id. at pp. 274-275.) Our Supreme Court found that "it would not have been unreasonable for counsel to assume that Sacramento City College was part of the statewide higher education system" and reversed the superior court's denial of relief. (Id. at pp. 277, 281.) Here, by contrast, Claudia's counsel did not present a claim based on the Dorsey incident to the wrong public entity. Instead, he mistakenly believed that he did not need to file a separate government claim with any entity. Nothing in Bettencourt mandates a finding or even suggests that the trial court was not within its discretion to find Claudia's counsel's mistake of law unreasonable.
The other cases cited by Claudia involved counsel's excusable neglect. In Nilsson, plaintiff's counsel mis-calendared the deadline to present a government claim. (Nilsson, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d at p. 978.) Similarly, in Flores, a claim was not timely presented because of the attorneys' "failure to open a file which in turn would have reminded them of the 100-day limitation upon the presentation of appellants' claim." (Flores, supra, 13 Cal.App.3d at p. 483.) Likewise in Stub, defendant's attorney received a complaint for which an answer was due but, prior to the deadline to file that answer, learned that his son had been seriously injured and hospitalized. Thereafter, the attorney spent 10 days in the hospital by his son's bedside and, upon returning to the office, forgot about the answer until a few days after it was due. (Stub, supra, 35 Cal.App.2d at pp. 686-687; see also Bergloff, supra, 181 Cal.App.2d at pp. 352-353, 358-359 [trial court did not abuse discretion in granting relief under Code Civ. Proc., § 473 when mistake was result of associate attorney mishearing instructions given by lead attorney]; Alderman, supra, 128 Cal.App.2d at pp. 275-276 [trial court did not abuse discretion in granting relief under Code Civ. Proc., § 473 when attorney's secretary inadvertently threw out copies of answer before it was filed].) All of these cases involved either an attorney's forgetfulness or a breakdown of some procedure followed by the attorney's office that normally would have ensured a timely filing. Here, while Claudia's attorney does point to an increase in workload caused by a successful advertising campaign, counsel has admitted that he did not forget to file the separate government claim or mis-calendar the deadline to do so, and neither he nor his office misplaced it-rather, he believed he did not need to file it. Thus, none of the cases cited are applicable.
4. Substantial Compliance
Claudia also argues on appeal that she substantially complied with the government claims statute by providing "prompt notice" of the Dorsey incident to LAUSD's counsel, by including the allegations regarding the incident in the SAC, and by submitting a separate claim form 70 days late. We disagree. If notifying a public entity through the filing of a complaint constituted substantial compliance with the government claims statute, there would be no need for the government claims statute.
As our Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he purpose of the claims statutes is not to prevent surprise, but 'to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation. [Citations.] It is well-settled that claims statutes must be satisfied even in face of the public entity's actual knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the claim.'" (City of Stockton v. Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 738.) Notifying LAUSD's counsel that an incident occurred and then including the allegations in a second amended complaint can hardly be deemed substantial compliance with a statute designed to give a public entity sufficient information to investigate and potentially settle a claim "without the expense of litigation." This is especially true when, after the SAC was filed, Claudia agreed to strike all allegations regarding the Dorsey incident from the SAC.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent is awarded its costs on appeal.
I concur: WEINGART, J.
BENDIX, Acting P. J., Dissenting.
Plaintiff C.R., a special needs student, through her guardian ad litem, E. A., sued the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) and its employees for sexual assault and/or rape at Los Angeles High School when she was a student there in 2017. She later amended the complaint (without leave of court) to add allegations of a sexual assault and/or rape occurring two years later at Dorsey High School (Dorsey Incident). It is undisputed that the only government claim (Gov. Code, § 945.4)C.R. successfully filed with LAUSD did not encompass the Dorsey Incident. C.R. then filed an application to file a late claim regarding the Dorsey Incident; LAUSD did not respond to C.R.'s application.
Undesignated statutory citations are to the Government Code.
I rely on the majority's factual and procedural background and have included additional factual background as needed in the Discussion.
Section 945.4 requires presentation of a government claim prior to suing a public entity. Section 946.6 provides for petitioning the trial court for relief from the requirements of section 945.4. (§ 946.6, subd. (a).) The court "shall relieve the petitioner" if the petition was made within a reasonable time and "[t]he failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect unless the public entity establishes that it would be prejudiced in the defense of the claim if the court relieves the petitioner from the requirements of Section 945.4." (§ 946.6, subd. (c)(1), italics added.)
Section 945.4 provides with exceptions not relevant here: "[N]o suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented . . . until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board ...."
Section 946.6 provides other bases to relieve a petitioner from the requirements of section 945.4. Those bases are not relevant to the current appeal because C.R. did not rely on them in her petition.
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff C.R.'s petition for relief from her failure to file a government claim before adding to an existing complaint, a second incident of assault and/or rape. The majority, as did the trial court, largely relies on an appellate court case, Hernandez v. Garcetti (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 675 (Hernandez), to conclude because counsel's mistake in not filing a government claim involved a noncomplex and noncomplicated legal issue, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that mistake inexcusable. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15.)
I respectfully disagree with that conclusion. As set forth below, that conclusion (1) does not give full measure to our Supreme Court's guidance as to exercising discretion to grant relief from failing to file a timely government claim; (2) fails to take into account that LAUSD itself told the trial court while C.R.'s petition for relief was pending that the Dorsey Incident involved the same parties and the same or similar claims; and (3) fails to recognize that denying relief would not serve any purpose underlying the government claim requirement where, as here, it is undisputed that there was no evidence of pending or contemplated settlement discussions even as to the claim for which defendant did timely file a government claim and no lack of diligence once C.R.'s counsel discovered his mistake.
I recognize that abuse of discretion is an appellate hill of Sisyphean proportion, as it should be lest every appeal turn into a do-over. I conclude, however, that C.R. has climbed that hill and thus would reverse.
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion In Denying Relief From C.R.'s Failure To File a Timely Government Claim
I agree with the majority on many points. I agree that the purpose served by filing a government claim is "not to prevent surprise, but 'to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation. [Citations.] ....' [Citation.]" (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 738.) "The claims statutes also 'enable the public entity to engage in fiscal planning for potential liabilities and to avoid similar liabilities in the future.' [Citations.]" (Ibid.)
The majority is also correct that the decision to grant relief under section 946.6 is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal except for abuse of that discretion. (Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 270, 275 (Bettencourt).) I would add, however, that "orders denying relief under section 946.6 are scrutinized more carefully than orders granting relief." (Hernandez, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 682-683 [citing Bettencourt for this principle].)
I agree with the majority that in reviewing for abuse of discretion here, "our task is to determine not whether we agree with the trial court's characterization of counsel's mistake, but whether the court acted within the bounds of reason." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 16.)
The majority cabins our high court's opinion in Bettencourt, as well as what they describe as a "litany" of other cases C.R. cites, as standing for the principle that relief from failing to file a government claim should be granted for mistakes of fact basically akin to calendaring errors. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 19-22.) Bettencourt does not support such a narrow synthesis of the court's discretion to grant relief.
Instead, our high court has counseled, "The policy favoring trial on the merits is the primary policy underlying section 946.6. [Citation.] In order to implement this policy, any doubts should be resolved in favor of granting relief." (Bettencourt, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 276.) In addition, the trial court's discretion should be" '" exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice."' [Citation]." (Id. at p. 275.) Further, in deciding whether a person's conduct is excusable, courts look to (1) the nature of the mistake or neglect, and (2) whether the person was otherwise diligent in investigating and pursuing the claim. (Id. at p. 276.)
Applying these principles, the Bettencourt court held filing a claim with the wrong governmental entity was excusable even though the attorney had letterhead identifying the proper governmental defendant. (Bettencourt, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 277, 281.) In other words, the identity of the proper defendant was under counsel's nose. That failure to identify the proper defendant thus was not merely the product of a reasonable assumption, as the majority intimates, or an error akin to a calendaring snafu. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 20-21.) Bettencourt also cited with approval appellate court rulings reversing denials of relief for abuse of discretion that do not all fit within the narrow rule the majority proposes. As one example, Bettencourt found instructive Kaslavage v. West Kern County Water Dist. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 529), which held as excusable counsel's failure properly to determine what entities owned the facilities that were on the situs of his client's accident. (See Bettencourt, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 277-279.) That failure cannot be characterized as a mere mistake of fact, let alone a mistake akin to a calendaring error.
Our high court's guidance in Bettencourt demonstrates that the trial court abused its discretion in denying C.R.'s petition for relief.
First, there is no evidence that counsel's mistake was tactical.
Second, LAUSD's inconsistent representations to the court about the similarity of the Dorsey Incident to the claim for which C.R. filed a timely government claim supports that C.R.'s counsel's mistake in not timely filing a second government claim was excusable. More specifically, when C.R.'s petition for relief was pending under a separate case number, LAUSD successfully sought to relate the matter to the current case on the express representation that the petition "involves the same parties and is based on the same or similar claims." (Italics added.) Paradoxically, in then opposing that petition, LAUSD asserted, "The two incidents occurred almost two years . . . apart and involved a different campus, different students, and different LAUSD employees." Given LAUSD's own ambivalence as to whether C.R.'s claims were the "same" or "different," Bettencourt counsels that C.R. deserved the benefit of the doubt as to whether her counsel's error was excusable.
Third, the purpose of requiring filing a government claim is to facilitate early settlement before the governmental entity incurs litigation costs. LAUSD apparently expressed no interest in exploring settlement even of the claim for which there was a timely government claim. In responding to LAUSD's invocation on appeal of the settlement purpose of the government claim requirement, C.R. represented, "LAUSD never responded to [her] settlement demand letters; never sent [her] any settlement offers; and never proposed any settlement vehicle, for example, mediation." There thus would have been no dishonor to the government claim requirement had the trial court granted relief from C.R.'s failure to file such a claim.
Fourth, it was undisputed that C.R.'s counsel acted diligently once he discovered his error. This is in marked contrast to the attorney in Hernandez, whose lack of diligence was Division Six's alternate holding for affirming the trial court's denial of section 946.6 relief. (Hernandez, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 684.)
For all these reasons, to paraphrase Bettencourt, the trial court erred in not giving plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, not exercising its discretion in the spirit of the government claim requirement, and not allowing her Dorsey Incident claim to proceed on its merits.
B. LAUSD Fails To Show Prejudice From C.R.'s Delay In Filing the Second Government Claim
LAUSD argues a public entity does not have the burden to show prejudice from the late filing of a government claim unless the plaintiff establishes ground for relief. (Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 478; see also Hasty v. County of Los Angeles (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 623, 627.)
This principle is correct in so far as it goes. Where, however, petitioner has shown a basis for relief, as I contend C.R. has, the burden shifts to the public entity to show prejudice. On appeal, LAUSD makes no argument with respect to prejudice.
The record, however, demonstrates the absence of prejudice as a matter of law. Further, LAUSD would not be "entitled to marshal further evidence of prejudice on remand [citation]." (DeVore v. Department of California Highway Patrol (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 454, 459.) I therefore address LAUSD's claims of prejudice in the trial court.
LAUSD does not dispute it received notice of the Dorsey Incident on July 13, 2020, when C.R. filed an application to file a late claim. In the trial court, LAUSD claimed prejudice from having already conducted purported extensive litigation regarding C.R.'s first claim. LAUSD explained it had already taken the deposition of C.R.'s guardian ad litem and that C.R.'s counsel limited that deposition to seven hours and only one hour remained. C.R.'s counsel agreed to mitigate that potential prejudice by permitting a second deposition. LAUSD thus did not identify any prejudice remaining from C.R.'s relatively brief delay in notifying LAUSD of the Dorsey Incident.
LAUSD did not argue it was unable to investigate the Dorsey Incident because of late notice. As explained above, LAUSD did not argue that C.R.'s late filing of the government claim inhibited settlement of any claim, whether the one included in the initial government claim or in the second government claim C.R. attempted to present to LAUSD. The absence of any prejudice not already remedied by additional deposition time indicates that the trial court would have had no discretion to deny the petition on the grounds of prejudice, and a remand for the trial court to exercise that discretion would be a futile act. (Cf. In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 526, 533 ["a remand for factual finding is not appropriate when there are no factual issues to resolve due to a failure of proof by the party who has the burden of proof"].)
In sum, I respectfully dissent and would reverse.