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Clarke v. City of Atlanta

Supreme Court of Georgia
Sep 6, 1973
231 Ga. 84 (Ga. 1973)

Summary

dismissing appeal of declaratory judgment action that became moot during pendency of the appeal

Summary of this case from Labmd, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co.

Opinion

28025.

ARGUED JULY 10, 1973.

DECIDED SEPTEMBER 6, 1973. REHEARING DENIED SEPTEMBER 19, 1973.

Injunction. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Wofford.

Haas, Holland, Levison Gibert, Richard C. Freeman, III, for appellant.

Smith, Cohen, Ringel, Kohler, Martin Lowe, Robert W. Beynart, Thomas H. Ries, Ralph H. Witt, Henry L. Bowden, for appellees.


This appeal results from a complaint by a property owner alleging in essence that certain adjacent property owned by two of the defendants had been illegally rezoned. The complaint prayed that the rezoning be declared illegal and that the two defendants, the city and its building inspector, be enjoined from issuing or obtaining building permits for developing the property.

The trial court found in favor of the defendants, concluding that the plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim for either declaratory judgment or for injunctive relief.

The appeal is from that judgment.

The developer defendants have moved to dismiss the appeal for the reason that the issues recited in the enumerations of error are now moot.

Subsequent to the judgment referred to and during the appeal the application of the two developer defendants for a building permit was accepted by the city and it issued to them a permit. From an affidavit attached to the motion to dismiss it is recited that pursuant to the permit these two defendants have incurred expense on the property which as of June 12, 1973, totaled approximately two million and seventy thousand dollars.

This court has held that pursuant to the Civil Practice Act (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 664; 1967, pp. 226, 239; Code Ann. § 81A-162 (a) and (c)), the mere appeal from an order denying an injunction without further application for an interim order of supersedeas does not impose any judicial restraint upon the appellees' activities nor prohibit execution of the matter sought to be enjoined; and that "The burden rests upon the appellant to obtain such order as will protect his rights and preserve the status quo during the pendency of the appeal." Howard v. Smith, 226 Ga. 850, 852 ( 178 S.E.2d 159); Dennis v. City of Palmetto, 226 Ga. 853 ( 178 S.E.2d 161).

In this situation, the injunctive feature is now moot. Berrie v. Baucknecht, 224 Ga. 432 ( 162 S.E.2d 317); U.S. I. F. Atlanta Corp. v. Timberlake, 230 Ga. 225 ( 196 S.E.2d 440).

It follows that all issues relating to denial of declaratory judgment are likewise moot. The issuance of the building permit is now an accomplished fact, not a mere threat, uncertainty or insecurity needing guidance before acting. All of the rights of the parties have fully accrued and thus no actual controversy remains in the appeal.

Appeal dismissed. All the Justices concur.


ARGUED JULY 10, 1973 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 6, 1973 — REHEARING DENIED SEPTEMBER 19, 1973.


Summaries of

Clarke v. City of Atlanta

Supreme Court of Georgia
Sep 6, 1973
231 Ga. 84 (Ga. 1973)

dismissing appeal of declaratory judgment action that became moot during pendency of the appeal

Summary of this case from Labmd, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co.
Case details for

Clarke v. City of Atlanta

Case Details

Full title:CLARKE v. CITY OF ATLANTA et al

Court:Supreme Court of Georgia

Date published: Sep 6, 1973

Citations

231 Ga. 84 (Ga. 1973)
200 S.E.2d 264

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