Opinion
No. 21347.
March 6, 1950.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT, JACKSON COUNTY, JOHN R. JAMES, J.
Wherritt Sevier, Liberty, for appellant.
Lawson, Hale Coleberd, Liberty, for respondent.
Appellant made claim to a widow's statutory allowance and one year's support in the estate of her deceased husband Eugene A. Clark, which was allowed in the sum of $1300, from which respondent, as executor of the Last Will of said deceased and as a devisee and legatee thereunder, appealed, and while said appeal was pending he brought this action in equity for a decree holding appellant estopped by her postnuptial contract from claiming any statutory allowance or support from said estate, and holding said contract to be fair and equitable. The court found against appellant in the present case, holding her estopped, as aforesaid, from which decree she has appealed.
The petition in equity in the present case recites that respondent is the executor of the Last Will of Eugene A. Clark, deceased, and is one of six devisees, legatees and distributees under said will; that in December, 1931, the deceased, then a widower, and appellant, then a widow, intermarried; that both were then over 60 years of age; that prior to and at the time of their marriage each then owned substantial real and personal property; that at the instance and request of appellant, they moved from the farm residence of deceased to the town of Liberty, Missouri, on certain terms and conditions agreed to; that in accordance with the agreement, deceased entered into the postnuptial contract with appellant on or about April 30, 1932, whereby he bought and with his own funds paid for a dwelling in Liberty, and in reliance upon said contract, had the title to the same conveyed to him and appellant as tenants by the entirety; that it was apparent at that time and at all times thereafter that appellant would survive the deceased; that Eugene A. Clark died January 7, 1947; that the terms of said postnuptial contract were fair, just and equitable; that appellant, since the death of deceased, has made claim to a widow's statutory allowance and one year's support from said estate in direct conflict with the said contract, after receiving the benefits thereof; that respondent has no adequate remedy at law. The prayer was that the court find and decree that appellant is estopped to make such claims by reason of said postnuptial contract, and that the same be decreed to be just, fair and equitable. The postnuptial contract, signed and acknowledged, and attached to the petition as an exhibit and made a part thereof, is as follows:
"This Agreement, Made this 30th day of April, 1932, by and between Eugene A. Clark party of the first part, and Ida May Clark, his wife, party of the second part, both of Clay County, Missouri, Witnesseth
"That Whereas, said parties are husband and wife, and the said first party has several children living by a former marriage, and the parties hereto have no children; and
"Whereas, said first party owns certain farm lands and other property in Clay County, Missouri, and has bought, and on the date hereof, is accepting conveyance from Raymond L. Mosby and Faye L. Mosby, his wife, of all of Lot 59, in Prospect Heights, an addition to the City of Liberty, in Clay County, Missouri, by deed dated March 31st, 1932, payment for which said lot is made from the funds and property of first party; and
"Whereas, second party desires that the deed conveying said lot from the said Mosbys be made to the parties hereto, by survivorship, so that should second party outlive first party, she will own said Lot 59 in Prospect Heights in fee simple; and
"Whereas, first party has agreed to cause said deed from said Mosby and wife to be made to the parties hereto as husband and wife, by survivorship and for the purposes aforesaid.
"Now, Therefore, It Is Agreed That in consideration of the said Mosby deed being made to both parties to this contract, and to the survivor of them, that if second party hereto survives first party, she will fully release any and all claims which she may then have against the property of first party, including statutory allowance, year's support, dower, homestead and all other claims of every kind and character against the property of first party, whether real or personal, and that she will upon demand execute, free of expense to her, the necessary assignments, releases, conveyances and any other instrument or instruments to effectually release or transfer her interest in said property, it being the intention of the parties to this instrument to provide hereby that upon the death of first party, should second party survive him, she takes as her own absolute property, the said Lot 59, in Prospect Heights in Liberty, and that the children and heirs of first party (not including second party hereto) take all of the remainder of his property, and it is upon the agreement of second party so to do that first party is paying in full for said tract of land in Liberty, Missouri, and causing it to be conveyed to himself and wife jointly".
The answer admitted that the respondent was executor, legatee, devise and distributee, as alleged; that deceased and appellant moved to Liberty, Missouri, May 1, 1932, after their marriage on December 1, 1931; that the deceased and appellant entered into the postnuptial contract April 30, 1932; that the copy thereof attached to the petition is correct; that the deceased purchased the residence property in Liberty and paid the price thereof, and had the deed made to him and to the appellant, but more than thirty days prior to the date of the postnuptial contract; that deceased lived fifteen years after the date of the postnuptial contract and died January 7, 1947; that after his death appellant filed her claim for statutory allowance and for support, as alleged, which was duly allowed in the Probate Court, and that the same is pending on appeal by respondent in his representative and individual capacities, and denied each and all of the other allegations of the petition. The answer further alleged that at the time of the marriage of the deceased and appellant, he owned real and personal property of the value of $30,000, and the appellant owned property in California subsequently sold for $1800; that when she entered into the postnuptial contract she was unaware of the value and extent of the property of said deceased, did not consult legal counsel, and did not understand the significance of the contract nor the purpose and intent of the conveyance of the estate by the entirety; that a marriage settlement was never discussed between them before or after their marriage; that said contract was prepared by counsel for the deceased more than thirty days after the execution of said deed, and after the consideration therefor had been paid by the deceased to the grantors therein; that there was no adequate consideration from deceased to appellant for the postnuptial contract; that the same is inequitable, unjust and unfair, and was not reciprocal, since deceased did not thereby agree to waive his rights in her estate, if he should survive appellant, and that the contract was in fact a fraud imposed upon appellant and of no force and effect. It was alleged that appellant has no adequate remedy at law. The prayer of the answer was that the postnuptial contract be decreed unjust and inequitable, and that appellant be held not bound or estopped thereby, and for general relief. The reply denies all new matter contained in the answer.
The parties stipulated that at the time of the marriage of the deceased and appellant the deceased owned two farm tracts of 40 acres and 90 acres, respectively, as described; that the deceased paid $2800 out of his own funds as purchase price for the residence property in Liberty, described in the petition; that at the time of the marriage appellant possessed real and personal property of the value of $4800; that the residence property purchased in Liberty was conveyed to the deceased and to appellant by warranty deed dated March 31, 1932, acknowledged April 1, 1932, and recorded April 30, 1932. It is further stipulated that at the time of the marriage and on April 30, 1932, appellant had no child or children, natural or adopted, and no descendants of any child, and as of the date of the death of the deceased, she had no children.
At the trial the respondent introduced in evidence the parts of the answer which admitted the allegations of the petition, as above noted. The postnuptial agreement was also introduced, and also the stipulation of facts, above described.
The only substantial conflict in the evidence was as to the value of the property of the deceased Eugene A. Clark and the appellant, respectively, prior to and at the time of their marriage. The evidence of the respondent was that at the time of the marriage Eugene A. Clark owned two farm tracts valued at from $5200 to $6000. There was some evidence on the part of the appellant that the tracts were then worth from $11,250, to $13,000. His admitted personal property was $2800.
The finding of the court, in addition to the facts stipulated, was that the postnuptial contract, entered into April 30, 1932, by and between Eugene A. Clark and the appellant was for a good and valuable consideration and thereby appellant released all claims against the property of Eugene A. Clark, including statutory allowance, year's support, dower, homestead and all other claims of every kind and character, and that the said contract was fair, just, equitable and binding on the appellant. The judgment was that appellant is estopped by the contract from claiming and demanding any statutory allowance or allowance for a year's support as the widow of the deceased, and that appellant pay all costs incurred.
The appellant's first contention is that there was no valuable consideration for the postnuptial contract; that it was unilateral, did not vest any estate in the appellant, and was not a valid jointure. She contends that since, upon April 30, 1932, Eugene A. Clark held a deed conveying to him and to the appellant the premises in Liberty in the estate by the entirety, executed and acknowledged by the grantors thirty days prior thereto, and, although not recorded until April 30, 1932, the date the postnuptial contract was also entered into, the appellant's interest in such real estate as a tenant by the entirety had thereby already attached. For that reason, it is argued, such deed could not constitute a valid consideration for the postnuptial agreement then entered into whereby she accepted the terms of such deed in exchange for her waiver of her marital rights in the estate of Eugene A. Clark at his death, should she survive. It was admitted in the trial that at his death, she became absolutely vested with the title to said property in Liberty by reason of the deed thereto, as described. Appellant asserts that she was already entitled to a dower interest in her husband's estate and since, by operation of law, her interest as a tenant by the entirety by the deed in question had already attached, there was no consideration flowing to her from the deceased for any release of her marital rights in his estate, whereas her husband, the deceased, retained his rights in her property, should he survive, and that the contract was therefore also unfair, unjust and inequitable.
It is the theory of the respondent that the contract was mutual, that it recites and was executed for a valuable consideration and is a bar to appellant's claim for statutory allowance and support. There is in this case no convincing evidence of any fraud perpetrated by Eugene A. Clark upon his wife, the appellant. He was a widower, past 60 years of age at the time of the marriage and at the time of the contract in question, had two farm tracts and $2800 in cash, and there were six legatees and devisees named under his will, presumably his children or descendants, to whom, apparently, as evidenced by the will, he desired to leave, at his death, the two farm tracts. The valuations of those tracts vary under the conflicting evidence, from $5200 to $13,000, but the testimony in that respect is such that we defer to the trial court the probative value thereof. The appellant, a widow, without children or descendants, was possessed of $4800 in personal property. We cannot say, as a matter of law, that upon such evidence, it would be inequitable or unfair, or fraudulent on the part of Eugene A. Clark, to arrange by postnuptial contract with his wife, the appellant, to purchase with his own funds, a home in Liberty for $2800, by deed conveying it in such manner as, upon his death, to leave the same vested absolutely in the appellant, free of his debts and free of the administration of his estate, and unincumbered, in consideration for her waiver of marital rights in the two farm tracts to be left to his children, subject to debts and administration. In the absence of fraud, a postnuptial contract is valid. It was said in Banner v. Banner, 184 Mo.App. 396, 399, 171 S.W. 2: "Agreements in the nature of postnuptial settlements having no element of fraud in them are upheld by the courts".
It is apparent from the evidence that the execution and delivery of the deed to the Liberty real estate to Eugene A. Clark and the appellant, and the recording thereof on April 30, 1932, was not an isolated transaction and independent of the postnuptial agreement made on that date, nor that the postnuptial contract so made was an isolated transaction and independent of the real estate conveyance evidenced by the deed. It seems clear that the acquisition, execution, acknowledgment, delivery and acceptance of the deed, payment of the consideration therefor, and the execution of the postnuptial contract were, as between Eugene A. Clark and the appellant, all one transaction. Fearnley v. Fearnley, 44 Colo. 417, 98 P. 819, 822, 823. It is apparent that as between them the consideration for acceptance of the deed by Eugene A. Clark, conveying the property into an estate by the entirety, was the postnuptial contract which was accordingly entered into, and that the consideration of the postnuptial contract was the making of the deed in such terms. Under such circumstances, the mere fact that on the date the postnuptial contract was signed, the deed, which was consideration therefor and given pursuant to a previous understanding, was already in possession, would not destroy the deed as consideration for the contract. 13 C.J. 362, 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 119; Fearnley v. Fearnley, supra. All the attendant facts and circumstances of the two transactions must be considered. The deed was made as agreed by the parties, and the appellant obtained the benefits thereof and became vested of the entire title to the property therein described at the death of Eugene A. Clark.
It is not necessary to resort to inferences to justify the above conclusions since the postnuptial contract in writing seems clearly to establish the same. Such solemn provisions and recitals as there contained cannot lightly be brushed aside in the absence of fraud. Courts cannot grant relief against contracts merely because one of the parties later deems it injudicious, where no fraud is shown. Pavey v. London Provincial Marine General Insurance Co., 221 Mo.App. 930, 935, 288 S.W. 788. We believe the contract leaves nothing for speculation as to the purposes and intent of the parties, and leaves no doubt that the deed and the postnuptial contract, respectively, constituted valid considerations one for the other and were so intended and accepted. The consideration was mutual. Laclede Constr. Co. v. Tudor Iron Works, 169 Mo. 137, 151, 69 S.W. 384. Appellant must be held to be estopped by her contract from making claim to widow's allowance and support out of her husband's estate. McBreen v. McBreen, 154 Mo. 323, 329, 55 S.W. 463, 77 Am.St. Rep. 758.
It follows that appellant's remaining contentions that appellant's conduct did not constitute estoppel because of invalidity of the contract, and that the postnuptial contract was void because it was unfair and inequitable, must be overruled.
The result is that the court did not err in its findings and judgment and the same should be affirmed. It is so ordered.
All concur.