Opinion
Case Number 99-10358-BC.
October 28, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The petitioner, Michael Mathews Clark, presently a state inmate at the Saginaw Correctional Facility in Freeland, Michigan, brings this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petitioner alleges that his sentence was tainted by false information and grossly disproportionate to his offense. The Court disagrees, and will deny the petition.
I.
On October 14, 1997, the petitioner pleaded no contest in Livingston County (Michigan) Circuit Court to one count of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520(b)(1)(a) (victim under 13 years). The conviction arose from charges that the petitioner sexually penetrated his minor niece over a substantial period of time. The petitioner recorded the criminal sexual conduct on a videotape.
In return for the petitioner's plea, the prosecutor dismissed two other counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of child sexually abusive activity, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.145(c)(2). On November 6, 1997, the trial court sentenced the petitioner to imprisonment for 60 to 100 years. The petitioner was forty-eight years of age at the time.
On appeal, the petitioner argued that his sentence was not proportionate to the offense or the offender and that it was based on inaccurate information. The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal for "lack of merit in the grounds presented." People v. Clark, No. 211074 (Mich.Ct.App. July 30, 1998). The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration in which he argued that his sentence was cruel and unusual punishment. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner's motion, opining that the sentence imposed was lenient in light of the petitioner's conduct.
In an appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, the petitioner alleged that there were errors in scoring the presentence information report, that the trial court relied on misinformation, and that the sentence was disproportionate and cruel and unusual punishment. The Court denied the petitioner's application for leave to appeal because it was "not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed." People v. Clark, No. 113496 (Mich. July 8, 1999). Two justices voted to remand for re-sentencing because, in their opinion, the sentence imposed was disproportionate.
On September 7, 1999, the petitioner filed the pending habeas corpus petition through counsel. The petition alleges one claim for relief:
WHETHER PETITIONER, MICHAEL MATTHEWS CLARK, WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND Const 1963, art I sec 17; SUFFERED IMPOSITION OF A CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CONTRARY TO THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND/OR SUFFERED A CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CONTRARY TO Const 1963, art I sec 16; AND WAS DENIED EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND Const 1963, art I sec 2?
The respondent urges the Court to dismiss the habeas petition on the grounds that the petitioner has not exhausted state remedies for his claims and because his claims are not cognizable on habeas review.
II. A.
The doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies requires state prisoners to present their claims to the state courts before raising those claims in a federal habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) and (c); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). "[S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. Thus, state prisoners in Michigan must present their claims to both the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court before presenting them in a federal habeas corpus petition. Mohn v. Bock, 208 F. Supp.2d 796, 800 (E.D.Mich. 2002).
The respondent alleges that the petitioner's "cruel and unusual punishment" claim is not exhausted because the petitioner first presented the claim to the Michigan Court of Appeals in a motion for reconsideration. Even assuming that the respondent is correct, federal courts may consider unexhausted claims if the habeas petition is denied. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Because the Court concludes that the petition does not warrant relief, the Court will adjudicate the petitioner's claim on the merits rather than dismiss the entire habeas petition for failure to exhaust state remedies.
B.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) is applicable here because the petitioner filed his habeas petition after the AEDPA was enacted on April 24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA "places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). Federal courts may grant the writ of habeas corpus only if the state court's adjudication of the petitioner's claim on the merits —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2).
Under the "contrary to" clause [of § 2254(d)(1)], a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause [of § 2254(d)(1)], a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.
In evaluating a state court decision under the "unreasonable application" clause, the Supreme Court further stated that a federal habeas court "should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 411. "Under § 2254(d)(1)'s `unreasonable application' clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. The Supreme Court also clarified that the phrase "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," refers only to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 412. In determining what constitutes clearly established federal law, therefore, a federal habeas court must look to pertinent United States Supreme Court precedent.
Lastly, a federal habeas court must presume that state court factual determinations are correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A habeas petitioner may rebut this presumption only with clear and convincing evidence. See Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998).
C. 1.
The petitioner alleges that his sentence violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law. Specifically, he claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to address properly his objections to the presentence report and by imposing a sentence that is based on inaccurate information.
The Court may grant the writ of habeas corpus only if the petitioner "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) and 2254(a). Consequently, the petitioner's arguments that the trial court abused its discretion when scoring the sentencing guidelines and violated state law in other ways are not grounds for habeas relief. Austin v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 298, 300 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984)) (violations of state law).
The petitioner's claim about the information relied on by the trial court is cognizable because he possessed a constitutional right not to be sentenced on the basis of "misinformation of constitutional magnitude." Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 556 (1980) (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972)); see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (stating that reliance on "extensively and materially false" information which the prisoner had no opportunity to correct violates due process of law). However, the kind and source of information relied on at sentencing is largely unlimited. Tucker, 404 U.S. at 446. To prevail on his federal constitutional claim, the petitioner must demonstrate that the disputed information was materially false and that the trial court relied on the information. Collins v. Buchkoe, 493 F.2d 343, 345-46 (6th Cir. 1974).
The petitioner objects to the content of his presentence report, which indicates that the videotape documented the petitioner's predatory style and method of "grooming" his victim by gradually eliminating the barriers of touch before the sexual assaults began. The presentence report also indicates that the petitioner "dubbed several scenes on tape, copying certain `scenes' over and over." The presentence report alleges that the petitioner brought the victim to "an area of greater danger" (his home) and that he had multiple victims. The petitioner received points under the offense variables portion of the presentence report for having engaged in two or more sexual penetrations and three or more contemporaneous crimes.
The petitioner has not demonstrated that this information was materially false. The videotape apparently depicted the sexual assaults in an explicit manner, and according to the probation officer and a state trooper, multiple victims were identifiable on the tape. The petitioner's niece gave a statement indicating that the assaults occurred monthly for five years. The petitioner himself admitted during an interview that the sexual incidents with his niece occurred on a monthly basis. Although the petitioner denied molesting anyone else, the presentence report noted that (1) two other victims were visible on the videotape; (2) the petitioner's daughter intimated that the petitioner had molested her; and (3) a police report dated October 18, 1994 indicated that the petitioner sexually touched a neighborhood girl.
The petitioner also has not demonstrated that the trial court relied on improper considerations at sentencing. The trial court mentioned another criminal sexual misconduct case in which a defendant killed two girls after being paroled. The trial court said, however, that the two cases were similar only because both cases involved criminal sexual misconduct charges and videotapes.
The trial court went on to say that it had reviewed the file carefully and viewed the videotape twice, once at the bond hearing and again at the plea. Before sentencing the petitioner, the trial court asserted that its primary considerations in imposing a sentence were the protection of society, the disciplining of the petitioner, and sending a message to others. These were appropriate considerations. Moreover, the trial court was not prohibited from considering information about the petitioner's life and characteristics. Williams, 337 U.S. at 247; see also United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (holding that a sentencing court may consider conduct underlying acquitted charges as long as the conduct was proved by a preponderance of the evidence).
The Court finds no indication in the record that the trial court relied on materially false information. Accordingly, the petitioner's allegation that his sentence was based on incorrect information does not entitle him to habeas relief.
2.
The petitioner's remaining arguments are that his sentence was disproportionate to the offense and the offender and it constituted cruel or unusual punishment under the United States and Michigan Constitutions. The petitioner contends that he had no criminal record and that his minimum sentence greatly exceeded the sentencing guidelines of eight to twenty years. He alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by unduly emphasizing punishment, rather than rehabilitation, and that his minimum sentence of sixty years essentially rendered him ineligible for parole since he would be ninety-six years old at his earliest eligibility date.
The petitioner's allegations that his sentence was disproportionate under state law and a violation of the Michigan Constitution are not grounds for habeas relief. Austin, 213 F.3d at 300. As for the petitioner's federal constitutional claim, a plurality of the Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment contains no requirement of strict proportionality between the crime and sentence. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991). The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime. Id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring); United States v. Hopper, 941 F.2d 419, 422 (6th Cir. 1991). "[S]uccessful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences" should be "exceedingly rare." Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
In Harmelin, the Supreme Court upheld a life sentence without the possibility of parole for possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine. In Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982), the Supreme Court upheld a sentence of forty years in prison for possession and distribution of less than nine ounces of marijuana. And in Rummel, the Supreme Court held that a mandatory life sentence under a state recidivist statute did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Rummel was convicted of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses, a crime punishable by at least two years, but not more than ten years in prison. His two prior felonies consisted of (1) fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80.00 worth of goods and services, a felony punishable by two to ten years in prison and (2) passing a forged check for $28.36, a crime punishable by two to five years in prison.
The petitioner received the equivalent of life imprisonment for a heinous crime. Life imprisonment is the authorized statutory maximum sentence for one convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520b(1). "A sentence within the statutory maximum set by statute generally does not constitute `cruel and unusual punishment.'" Austin, 213 F.3d at 302 (quoting United States v. Organek, 65 F.3d 60, 62 (6th Cir. 1995)).
Moreover, the victim was under the age of thirteen and stated that the sexual abuse occurred monthly for five years. She sought counseling after the assaults and may never fully recover from any psychological trauma inflicted by the petitioner's criminal conduct.
The Court concludes on the basis of Harmelin, Davis, and Rummel that this case is not the type of exceedingly rare situation that justifies overturning a legal sentence. The petitioner's sentence is not disproportionate to the offense or the offender and does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
III.
The sentence of the trial court was neither contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the petitioner's writ for habeas corpus is DENIED.