Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:97CV-841-S
July 27, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment made by the Defendant, Alcan Aluminum Corporation ("Alcan"). Plaintiff, Mary Ann Clark, asserts a claim under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KRS Chapter 344, for alleged racial discrimination by Alcan, her former employer. In her Complaint, Clark alleges Alcan discriminated against her because of her race by denying her various job assignments and promotions during her employment with Alcan. For the reasons that follow, Alcan's motion will be granted.
FACTS
Alcan hired Clark in 1978 as a receptionist and PBX operator in the accounting department. In 1979, she was moved to the production control department, where she remained during the rest of her employment with Alcan. Clark alleges that Alcan began discriminating against her in November, 1992, when Alcan allegedly transferred Clark from a "career path position" to a position in customer service. Clark further alleges that from November, 1992, until November, 1995, she was subjected to harassment by supervisors in the form of unsatisfactory evaluations, and that Alcan refused to consider her for promotions. According to Clark, she was forced to leave employment with Alcan on November 13, 1995.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A party's failure to establish an element of proof essential to his case and upon which he will bear the burden of proof at trial constitutes a failure to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Further, the non-moving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Plaintiff's response in this case consists of little more than 24 excerpts from Plaintiff's deposition. The majority of Plaintiff's arguments are devoted to the summary judgment standard. No effort is made to identify any disputed issue of material fact or link any of the deposition excerpts to an alleged factual dispute. The Court has considered the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, but does not find any genuine issue of material fact precluding a grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant.
In a discrimination case, a plaintiff first bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case by showing that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, (3) she was qualified for the position, and (4) that she was treated differently from similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected class. Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 800 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then a defendant has the opportunity to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment action. If such a reason is articulated, the plaintiff may rebut with evidence that the reason is pretextual. At all times, the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff. Id.
Alcan's first argument is that any claims prior to November 15, 1992, are barred by the five-year statute of limitations that applies to claims under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. KRS 413.120(2). Clark does not dispute that any claim regarding her transfer of November 1, 1992 is barred by the statute of limitations. Further, Clark has not pointed to any specific facts which refute Alcan's claim that her transfer was part of a reorganization within the company, in which six employees were reassigned, rather than as a result of racial discrimination. Therefore, Clark's claims regarding the November 1, 1992 transfer will be dismissed.
Clark's remaining claims are that she was passed over for promotions and that she received negative performance evaluations because of her race. Clark has not established a prima facie case for either claim. Although there is no dispute that Clark is a member of a protected class, she has not shown any specific promotions she was denied, let alone that she was qualified for those promotions and that she was treated differently from those employees who were not members of her racial minority. She has failed to meet her burden of proof on this claim, and it will be dismissed.
Clark's claim regarding her negative performance evaluations also fails to meet that burden. Although she has shown that she received negative performance evaluations, she has not shown she was qualified to receive higher evaluations, or that similarly situated employees outside of the protected class were evaluated differently from her. Furthermore, even if Clark had met her burden, Alcan asserts that the negative performance evaluations Clark received were not the result of racial discrimination, but rather because Clark did not perform her job satisfactorily. Alcan has submitted documentation outlining problems with Clark's job performance, particularly her relationships with Alcan's customers. Included in this documentation, which was attached to Clark's performance evaluations, are customer complaints regarding the services provided by Clark on behalf of Alcan. Clark rebuts these assertions with only speculative comments from her deposition.
For example, the eighth excerpt cited from Clark's deposition states:
Did you feel that this was based on your race?
Yes, a lot.
You strongly believed that?
Yes.
Why did you strongly believe that this was because of your race?
Maybe they did not like the way I looked or the color of my skin, I don't know. I just feel that way because no one else was treated like I was.
Clark Depo. Vol. I., at 55-56.
Clark's "feelings" and speculation as to why she received unsatisfactory evaluations are insufficient to rebut the evidence presented by Alcan that shows a legitimate reason for those negative evaluations. In Harker v. Federal Land Bank of Louisville, 679 S.W.2d 226 (Ky. 1984), the Kentucky Supreme Court, in upholding a grant of summary judgment in an age discrimination case, held that a plaintiff in a Kentucky Civil Rights Act case must show "cold hard facts," "specific evidence" and "hard proof" to create an inference that discrimination was a factor in an adverse employment decision. Clark has not met that burden. Accordingly, her claims regarding her negative performance evaluations will be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's claims are either barred by the statute of limitations or are not supported by sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. In addition, Defendant has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment actions Plaintiff complains of, and Plaintiff has failed to rebut these reasons. Plaintiff's Complaint will be dismissed by separate order.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth in the memorandum opinion entered this date and the court being otherwise sufficiently advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion of the Defendant for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in its entirety.
This _____ day of ____________________, 2000.