Opinion
CASE NO. 10-24415-CIV-LENARD/O'SULLIVAN
02-21-2013
C.L. and D.L., individually, and as parents and next friends of A.L., Plaintiffs, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, Defendant.
ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendant School Board's Motion to Strike DE 60, DE 68, and DE 70, or in the Alternative, Motion for Leave to Re-file Motion for Judgment on the Record (DE 62) & Defendant's Statement of Material Facts (DE 69) (DE# 73 at 1, 9/12/12). The defendant seeks to strike the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment (DE# 60), the plaintiffs' statement of material facts (DE# 68) and the plaintiffs' notice of filing exhibits from the administrative record (DE# 70) on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to file the actual administrative record and only filed copies of some, but not all of the exhibits received by the Administrative Law Judge. See Defendant School Board's Motion to Strike DE 60, DE 68, and DE 70, or in the Alternative, Motion for Leave to Re-file Motion for Judgment on the Record (DE 62) & Defendant's Statement of Material Facts (DE 69) (DE# 73 at 1, 9/12/12). Additionally, the defendant notes that the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment (DE# 60) cites to exhibits that either were not admitted during the DOAH proceeding or were not filed on the docket in this case. Id. at 2. Alternatively, the defendant seeks leave to re-file its motion for summary judgment (DE# 62) and statement of material facts (DE# 69). Id. at 4.
The plaintiffs acknowledge that some pages of the documents previously filed were missing due to clerical errors and have since corrected the problem by filing an Amended Notice of Filing Exhibits from Administrative Hearing (DE# 79, 9/18/12). Additionally, the plaintiffs agree to strike Exhibit T, pages 809 and 837, acknowledging that these pages have not been made part of the record. See Plaintiff[s'] Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike DE 60, DE 68, and DE 70 (DE# 78 at 6, 9/18/12) (stating that "Defendant notes that Plaintiff cited to two documents in his Motion for Summary Judgment and his Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Record, which had not, in fact, been entered into evidence. After reviewing the record, Plaintiff concedes that the citations were incorrect and agrees that they should be stricken from the relevant documents. These are citations to Plaintiff[s'] Exhibit T, pages 809 and 837. The citations were in error.").
On February 8, 2013, the Court granted The School Board's Unopposed Motion for Acceptance of the Administrative Record from the Florida Division of Administrative Hearings (DE# 91, 2/8/13), see Order (DE# 92, 2/8/13), and the defendant filed the administrative record on February 15, 2013. The administrative record totals approximately 3,629 pages. Because the administrative record was filed after the parties filed their dispositive motions, the citations in the parties' motions and statements of undisputed facts do not correspond to the newly filed administrative record. Additionally, the plaintiffs agree that their motion for summary judgment (DE# 60) cited to documents which were not part of the record. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant School Board's Motion to Strike DE 60, DE 68, and DE 70, or in the Alternative, Motion for Leave to Re-file Motion for Judgment on the Record (DE 62) & Defendant's Statement of Material Facts (DE 69) (DE# 73 at 1, 9/12/12) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part in accordance with this Order. It is further
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiff[s'] Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law (DE# 60, 8/28/12) and the Defendant School Board's Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record (DE# 62, 8/28/12) are DENIED without prejudice to renew. Any renewed dispositive motions and corresponding statements of undisputed facts shall be filed no later than Thursday, March 23, 2013 and shall contain citations to the newly filed administrative record. The responses shall be filed no later than Thursday, April 4, 2013. A reply may be filed no later than Monday, April 15, 2013. For the convenience of the Court, the parties' briefs shall cite to the newly filed administrative record using the numbers automatically assigned by the Court's CM/ECF system, e^, Transcript (DE# _ at _, 2/15/13). The deadlines set by this Order shall not be extended by the additional time provided for in the Local Rules or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is further
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that any renewed dispositive motions shall include the following:
1. It is well settled that a section 504 plaintiff must show intentional discrimination in order to recover compensatory damages. Wood v. President and Trustees of Spring Hill College in City of Mobile. 978 F. 2d 1214, 1219 (11th Cir. 1992). However, the plaintiffs in the instant case acknowledge that they are not seeking monetary damages on their section 504 claim. See Plaintiff[s'] Response to Defendant's Motion in Limine to Preclude Supplemental Evidence of IDEA Claim (DE 77) and Motion in Limine to Preclude Trial De Novo of Plaintiffs' Section 504 Claims (DE 76) (DE# 85 at 5, 10/1/12) (stating "Defendant seems to argue that "damages" are the only remedy a Plaintiff might seek. In this case, Plaintiff is seeking a declaration by this Court that Defendant's actions were discriminatory and an Order that they cease to discriminate in this way.") (emphasis added). At least one court has observed that "[t]he standard a plaintiff must meet to receive declaratory (or injunctive) relief under § 504 in the special education context differs from the deliberate indifference standard used to evaluate § 504 monetary damages claims." H. v. Montgomery Cnty Bd. of Educ. 784 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1269 (M.D. Ala. 2011). Unfortunately, the court in Montgomery did not articulate what that different standard is. Instead, the court denied cross motions for summary judgment on the plaintiff's section 504 claim, stating that "[d]ue to the legal uncertainty in this area of law, and the parties' failure to inform the court the standard under which it is to evaluate this claim, the court concludes that neither party has met its summary judgment burden to inform the court of the basis for its motion, with respect to [the plaintiff's] claim for declaratory relief." Id. at 1269-70 (emphasis added). Accordingly, any renewed dispositive motion shall include legal argument on whether the plaintiffs must show intentional discrimination in order to prevail on their claim under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act where they are not seeking monetary damages. If not, the moving party shall advise the Court of the appropriate standard that should be applied in the instant case.
2. On the plaintiffs' section 504 claim, any renewed dispositive motion shall address whether the Court should use a judgment on the administrative record standard of review similar to the standard of review applicable to an IDEA claim where a dispositive motion may be granted even when there are disputed facts or whether the traditional summary judgment standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 applies. See, e.g., K.I, v. Montgomery Public Schs., 805 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1292 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (applying Rule 56 standard to a motion for summary judgment on a section 504 claim).
3. The defendant argues that "[e]ven if this Court were to agree with the ALJ's recommended finding that the principal of Mandarin Lakes intentionally discriminated against A.L. (which Defendant contends is not the case . . .), that does not mean that Defendant School Board intentionally discriminated." Defendant School Board's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (DE# 75 at 5-6, 9/14/12). Thus, the defendant appears to argue that the principal's actions cannot be attributed to the School Board. Any renewed dispositive motion shall address whether the principal's actions may be attributed to the School Board. In a non-education context, the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether the actions of medical personnel could be attributed to a hospital for purposes of establishing deliberate indifference in a section 504 claim. Liese v. Indian River Cnty Hosp. Dist., 701 F. 3d 334, 350 (11th Cir. 2012). The parties shall address whether the Court should adopt the standard of Liese or if a different standard is appropriate in the instant case.
4. The plaintiffs are seeking injunctive relief on their section 504 claim. See Plaintiff[s'] Response to Defendant's Motion in Limine to Preclude Supplemental Evidence of IDEA Claim (DE 77) and Motion in Limine to Preclude Trial De Novo of Plaintiffs' Section 504 Claims (DE 76) (DE# 85 at 5, 10/1/12). "To issue a permanent injunction under . . . the Rehabilitation Act, the Court must apply the same factors as it would in any other case in which a plaintiff sought a permanent injunction." Wilson v. Broward Cnty. Fla., No. 04-61068-CIV, 2008 WL 708180, *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2008). Neither party included an analysis of these factors in their original briefs. In Montgomery Cnty Bd. of Educ, the court denied cross motions for summary judgment on a section 504 claim where "[n]either party mentioned the factors for injunctive relief in their briefs], despite the fact that a party asking for summary judgment bears the 'responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion." Montgomery Cnty Bd. of Educ, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 1269. Thus, any renewed dispositive motion on a claim of injunctive relief shall include legal analysis on the factors for awarding such relief and an application of those factors to the instant action.
DONE AND ORDERED, in Chambers, in Miami, Florida, this 21st day of February, 2013.
______________________
JOHN J. O'SULLIVAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
United States District Judge Lenard
All counsel of record