City v. Freedom of Information Comm

Full title: CITY OF STAMFORD ET AL. v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION ET AL

Court: Appellate Court of Connecticut

Date published: Jul 2, 1996

42 Conn. App. 39 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996)

678 A.2d 512

Opinion

(15139)

Argued April 26, 1996

Released July 2, 1996

Appeal by the plaintiffs from a decision by the named defendant ordering the disclosure of a report filed by an attorney retained by the plaintiff's board of finance, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk and tried to the court, Dyer, J.; judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the named plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Kenneth B. Povodator, assistant corporation counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Daniel M. McCabe, corporation counsel, for the appellant (named plaintiff).

Victor Perpetua, with whom, on the brief, were Mitchell W. Pearlman, general counsel, and Barbara Housen, commission counsel, for the appellee (defendant).

PER CURIAM.

The defendant freedom of information commission ordered the plaintiff city of Stamford to release a report to the opposing party in a legal action that was pending in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk.

Stamford appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes §§ 4-183 and 1-21i (d). The trial court held that the plaintiffs¹ had not sustained their burden of proving the applicability of the statutory exemptions.

1 The appeal was brought in the name of both the city of Stamford and the board of finance of the city of Stamford. For convenience, we refer to both appellants as Stamford.

Stamford's central claim on appeal to this court is that the report is exempt from disclosure as a record pertaining to strategy and negotiations with respect to pending claims pursuant to General Statutes § 1-19(b)(4) and as a record affecting the rights of litigants under the state discovery laws pursuant to General Statutes § 1-19b(b)(1).

We have fully reviewed the records and briefs and considered the oral arguments of the parties. Having applied the appropriate standard of review, we conclude that the trial court properly concluded that Stamford did not present sufficient evidence to support either exemption. We also conclude that the record does not support Stamford's claims that the freedom of information commission improperly conducted the hearing.