Opinion
January 13, 1950.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Palm Beach County, C.E. Chillingworth, J.
Alley, Drew, Burns Middleton, C. Robert Burns and E. Harris Drew, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Gedney, Johnston Lilienthal, and Harry A. Johnston, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Blocks 5, 6, 9, 10 and 13 of Sunshine Park Addition Number Two, West Palm Beach, Florida, form one contiguous tract of land approximately 1200 feet in length from north to south and 150 feet in width from east to west, bounded on the east by the Florida East Coast Railway right of way, on the west by Florida Avenue, on the north by Ardmore Road and on the south by Belvedere Road; subject to one or more streets crossing said property from east to west. On September 16, 1946, the said City of West Palm Beach passed a zoning ordinance changing Blocks 5, 6, 9 and 10 of said property and Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Block 13 of said property from the classification as an industrial district to a residential district and changed Lots 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Block 13 from an industrial district to a business district.
This suit was brought in the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County to declare void and to enjoin the said city from enforcing the said ordinance of September, 1946, as to the said above described property, and the final decree in the case dated May 4, 1949, held the said ordinance invalid and enjoined the City of West Palm Beach from enforcing the same as to Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Block 13 and all of Blocks 5, 6, 9 and 10 of said Sunshine Park Addition Number Two in the said City of West Palm Beach and made no change in said ordinance as to Lots 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Block 13 of said property.
At a pretrial conference held before the circuit judge prior to the trial and final hearing it was agreed by the parties to this suit (Tr. p. 18) that from 1926 to 1946 the property involved in this suit was classified as industrial and that by said ordinance of 1946 it was changed principally to a residential property as hereinbefore stated.
From a careful study of the record we are convinced that the change made by said ordinance of 1946 so far as it changed the classification of Blocks 5, 6, 9 and 10 and Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Block 13 of said Sunshine Park Addition Number Two from "industrial" to "residential" was, as stated by the circuit judge, a drastic change.
We also note that the circuit judge in the final decree appealed from refrained from any attempt to classify the property for zoning purposes, but left the question of appropriate zoning classification for further action by the municipal authorities, and this with the understanding, of course, that such further classification should be fair and reasonable and would be subject to review by the proper court.
The final decree appealed from appears to be reasonable and fair to all parties concerned and the same is hereby affirmed.
ADAMS, C.J., and HOBSON, J., concur.
CHAPMAN, J., concurs specially.
The record discloses that the property involved has a frontage on the railroad right of way of approximately 1254 feet. A witness having knowledge of land values in the area testified that the property if zoned industrially had a value of approximately from $60.00 to $75.00 per front foot and if zoned as residential B the front foot value would range from $5.00 to $7.00. It will be observed that the effect of the rezoning ordinance dated September, 1946, reduced the value of the property from $60.00 to $75.00 per front foot to the sum of $5.00 to $7.00 per front foot. It is the writer's view that our courts should diligently strive to sustain the conclusions reached by those in authority when functioning in behalf of the units of local self government up to the point where fundamental rights are contravened, when the rule should be abrogated.
Ownership of property is guaranteed by our State and Federal Constitutions. If a doubt exists as to the power attempted to be exercised by a municipality, then it is the duty of the courts to resolve that power against the municipality. Municipal corporations created and established by the Legislature pursuant to Section 8 of Article 8 of the Constitution of Florida, F.S.A., are authorized to enact ordinances regulating the use of property in behalf of the public interest only in a constitutional manner. See Anderson v. Shackelford, 74 Fla. 36, 76 So. 343, L.R.A. 1918A, 139; Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Amos, 104 Fla. 609, 141 So. 153; Blitch v. City of Ocala, 142 Fla. 612, 195 So. 406; Hunter v. Green, 142 Fla. 104, 194 So. 379; Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So.2d 642, and similar cases.
I concur in the opinion and judgment as prepared by Associate Justice REGISTER.