Opinion
No. WD 63201
December 14, 2004
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Andrew County, Missouri, The Honorable Patrick K. Robb, Judge.
Before Lowenstein, P.J., Howard and Hardwick, JJ.
Both the City of St. Joseph, Missouri (City), and the Village of Country Club, Missouri (Village), seek to involuntarily annex the same unincorporated area of land in Andrew County, Missouri. City approved a resolution of intent to annex the land. One week later, Village approved a resolution of intent to annex the same area of land in Andrew County and also proposed an ordinance to annex it. At issue is which of the two has exclusive jurisdiction to proceed with the annexation procedures.
City filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that it had exclusive jurisdiction to proceed with annexing the unincorporated area of land when it passed a resolution of intent to annex the area. The Circuit Court of Andrew County concluded that Village took the first valid step toward annexation of the disputed area pursuant to section 71.015 when it proposed the annexation ordinance, so it entered judgment for Village. City appeals, claiming the court erred in so concluding.
Statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri (RSMo) 2000.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
On May 16, 2003, City petitioned the Circuit Court of Andrew County for a declaratory judgment and injunction. Specifically, City prayed for the court's declaration that it, not Village, took the first valid step under section 71.015 toward involuntary annexation of an unincorporated area in Andrew County when it passed a Resolution of Intent to Annex the area. City further sought to enjoin Village from holding a June 10, 2003 public hearing on its proposed annexation ordinance until there was a full and final resolution of the litigation. The court denied its motion for a temporary restraining order, and the public hearing was held.
On June 19, 2003, a hearing was conducted on City's Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunction. The parties submitted the case on the following stipulated facts:
The parties attached and incorporated by reference all supporting exhibits.
1. [City] is a municipal corporation formed as a Constitutional Charter City, organized and existing under the laws of the State of Missouri.
2. [Village] is a municipal corporation formed as a Village, organized and existing under the laws of the State of Missouri.
3. On March 31, 2003, [City] adopted a Resolution of Intent with regard to the extension of its city limits over certain land within Andrew County and Buchanan County, Missouri. . . .
4. On April 7, 2003, [Village's] Board of Trustees . . . adopted a Resolution of Intent to Annex [the same] unincorporated areas in Andrew County, Missouri. . . .
5. On April 7, 2003, [Village's] Board of Trustees . . . also introduced for first reading Ordinance Number 363, providing for the annexation of certain unincorporated land in Andrew County. . . .
6. In accordance with Village of Country Club Ordinance 363, a public hearing is scheduled on June 10, 2003, regarding the proposed annexation by [Village], of certain real property located in unincorporated Andrew County, Missouri.
7. Pursuant to § 71.015, RSMo., [Village] has sent Notice of the public hearing, by certified mail, to all fee owners of record within the area proposed to be annexed not less than thirty (30) nor more than sixty (60) days prior to the scheduled date of the public hearing. . . .
The trial court subsequently entered judgment for Village, declaring in relevant part:
Section 71.[015(2)] makes introducing an ordinance that meets the criteria set out in the statute the first valid step toward involuntary annexation of an area of land. This action starts in motion the procedures required for a valid annexation of land to be accomplished.
* * *
. . . The doctrine of prior jurisdiction has long been established in Missouri, and as between two municipalities competing for the same territory, the one, which undertakes the first valid step toward annexation, has priority. . . . The first reading of a valid ordinance of annexation constitutes the date of commencement of such procedures within the meaning of said doctrine. [Village's Ordinance No. 363 met all the requirements of Section 71.015.1(2), so it took the first valid step toward annexation of the land.]
(Citations omitted.) Thus, the trial court ordered that Village "has the right to proceed with their efforts to annex the area exclusive of [City's] efforts to annex the same land." City subsequently filed its notice of appeal to this court, and an injunction was issued, enjoining Village from further proceeding with annexation by filing a declaratory judgment action pursuant to 71.015.1(5).
I. The Prior Jurisdiction Doctrine
In Mayor of Liberty v. Tindall, 918 S.W.2d 361, 362 (Mo.App. W.D. 1996), this court considered a similar "'tug of war'" between the City of Liberty and Jackson County, which both sought to annex the River Bend community. In addressing which took precedence — Liberty's ordinance proposing annexation of River Bend or River Bend's residents' petition for incorporation filed with the Jackson County Legislature — we applied the common law doctrine of prior jurisdiction, which, as set forth in the trial court's conclusion above, provides:
When two public bodies assert jurisdiction over the same territory in annexation proceedings, the one that took the first valid step toward annexation will prevail regardless of which one completes its proceedings first. "[W]hen there is a statute governing the annexation, and the statute prescribes the procedure to be followed, then the doing of the first thing required by the statute marks the beginning of the proceedings."
Id. at 363 (quoting State ex inf. Nesslage v. City of Lake St. Louis, 718 S.W.2d 214, 219 (Mo.App.E.D. 1986) (other citations omitted)).
The appellants in Tindall "assert[ed] that for years Liberty had issued 'holding ordinances' to preserve its claim to River Bend, and that the February 8 ordinance was but another of these invalid annexation ordinances"; they insisted Liberty's mere proposal of an annexation ordinance was not a valid step. Id. at 362-63. This court disagreed. In applying the doctrine of prior jurisdiction, we consulted section 71.015, RSMo 1994, which governed Liberty's involuntary annexation procedures. Specifically, we consulted 71.015.1(2), which begins, "The governing body of any city, town, or village shall propose an ordinance setting forth the following" and then delineates the required contents of the ordinance in subdivisions (a) through (e). Id. at 363. Considering this statutory language, we concluded:
[Section 71.015, RSMo 1994] makes proposing an ordinance the first valid step toward involuntary annexation. This action starts in motion the remaining procedures required by the statute. Lake St. Louis, 718 S.W.2d at 219 (the court found that the city took the first valid step under § 71.015 by passing an enabling resolution proposing annexation). Liberty took the first valid step on February 8, 1993, by adopting Ordinance No. 6521 [(proposing Liberty's annexation of River Bend)] which set in motion procedures which led to the adoption of an annexation ordinance on March 22, 1993.
Residents of the River Bend area did not file their petition to incorporate until March 9, 1993, more than a month after Liberty's first step on February 8, 1993. The circuit court correctly concluded that Liberty had established prior jurisdiction and was entitled to proceed with the annexation of River Bend.
Id. A. CITY'S ARGUMENT:
In its sole point relied on, City claims that the trial court erred in holding Village took the first valid step toward annexing the land, "because [City] had established prior jurisdiction to annex the property in that [City] had adopted a Resolution of Intent to Annex the property on March 31, 2003, which was prior to the Village of Country Club's adoption of its Resolution of Intent on April 7, 2003." City acknowledges that the prior jurisdiction doctrine should be applied to determine this dispute. But, citing City of Joplin v. Village of Shoal Creek Drive, 434 S.W.2d 25, 29 (Mo.App. 1968), City argues that the adoption of a Resolution of Intent to Annex is the first valid step, or, what City calls the "first public procedural step," toward annexation pursuant to section 71.015. Thus, because City was first in time to pass a Resolution of Intent to Annex the disputed area of land, it has exclusive jurisdiction to proceed. City insists its argument is supported by:
(1) the plain language of section 71.015.1(1);
(2) Missouri case law authority of City of Kirkwood v. Allen, 399 S.W.2d 30, 38 (Mo. banc 1966); . . . Lake St. Louis, [ 718 S.W.2d at 219]; and [ Tindall, 918 S.W.2d at 363]; and
(3) the widespread understanding of annexation procedures accepted throughout the State of Missouri as set forth in the Missouri Municipal League and Missouri Municipal Attorney's Association's Annexation Laws in Missouri (July 1993) and Volume II of Local Government (Mo. Bar. 3rd ed. 2002).
The core issue is what constitutes the "first valid step" toward involuntary annexation under section 71.015. From our citation to Tindall above, it would appear at first glance that we have already decided the issue when we held that "[Section 71.015, RSMo 1994] makes proposing an ordinance the first valid step toward involuntary annexation. This action starts in motion the remaining procedures required by the statute." 918 S.W.2d at 363. But, as more fully explained below, close consideration of City's arguments demonstrates that this issue was not specifically considered by this court in Tindall, nor does it appear to have been specifically considered by other Missouri courts. Thus, we feel the issue requires further consideration and clarification of what the first valid step toward involuntary annexation is under section 71.015. To clarify what we mean by this, we begin by setting forth in more detail each of City's arguments that its Resolution of Intent to Annex is the first valid step for involuntary annexation under section 71.015.
(1) "Plain Language" of Section 71.015 : Section 71.015.1 governs the procedures City and Village must follow to involuntarily annex land. Although this subsection contains nine subdivisions, the first two are most relevant to the dispute on appeal. These subdivisions of section 71.015.1 provide:
(1) Before the governing body of any city, town, or village has adopted a resolution to annex any unincorporated area of land, such city, town, or village shall first as a condition precedent determine that the land to be annexed is contiguous to the existing city, town, or village limits and that the length of the contiguous boundary common to the existing city, town, or village limit and the proposed area to be annexed is at least fifteen percent of the length of the perimeter of the area proposed for annexation.
(2) The governing body of any city, town, or village shall propose an ordinance setting forth the following:
(a) The area to be annexed and affirmatively stating that the boundaries comply with the condition precedent referred to in subdivision (1) above;
(b) That such annexation is reasonable and necessary to the proper development of the city, town, or village;
(c) That the city has developed a plan of intent to provide services to the area proposed for annexation;
(d) That a public hearing shall be held prior to the adoption of the ordinance;
(e) When the annexation is proposed to be effective, the effective date being up to thirty-six months from the date of any election held in conjunction thereto.
(City's emphasis). In Tindall, this court construed the language of 71.015.1(2) to determine whether Liberty's proposal of an ordinance was a valid step. Id. at 362-63. In this case, City argues that the emphasized "clear and unambiguous language" of section 71.015.1(1) indicates:
Although a condition precedent to adoption of the resolution to annex is that the governing body must determine that the area to be annexed is contiguous to the existing municipal limits, there can be no doubt that Subdivision I contains an explicit requirement that a resolution to annex indeed must be adopted.
City further asserts, "[t]he adoption of a resolution of intent to annex is just the type of public step that the Prior Jurisdiction Doctrine has in mind in its 'first in time, first in right' holding," and "[t]he Village is well aware [of this] . . . as evidenced by its adoption of [its] Resolution of Intent to Annex."
(2) Missouri Case Law: City next argues its conclusion that the first public procedural step is a Resolution of Intent to Annex is recognized in Missouri case law. In support, it cites the following cases:
(a) City of Kirkwood v. Allen , 399 S.W.2d 30, 38 (Mo. banc 1966): In rejecting the City of Kirkwood's argument that it did not have to comply with statutory amendments to annexation procedures passed after it had initiated its annexation proceedings under section 71.015 because it had completed the "final legislative act" by adopting an ordinance of annexation prior to the statutory amendment, the supreme court stated in Kirkwood:
The declaration of intention to annex the area involved in this case (in the form of an ordinance but when only a resolution was required) could not be the final legislative act as contended by the City of Kirkwood. It was the first step in the legislative procedure of annexation, and only that.
Id. (City's emphasis). City acknowledges that this case was decided under a former version of section 71.015 RSMo 1959, which then provided that "[w]henever the governing body of any city has adopted a resolution to annex any unincorporated area of land, such city shall, [seek a declaratory judgment in the county where the area is located] authorizing such annexation." (City's emphasis.) This version did not include the requirement that an ordinance be proposed. Nevertheless, City argues that both the prior version and the current version of section 71.015 "require the adoption of a resolution before the next public procedural step. The Missouri General Assembly has not altered the initial procedural step, although it has altered the second and subsequent steps."
(b) Lake St. Louis , 718 S.W.2d at 219: The Eastern District applied the prior jurisdiction doctrine in this case to determine whether the City of Lake St. Louis, proceeding under section 71.015 RSMo 1986 (involuntary annexation), or the Town of Dardenne Prairie, proceeding under section 71.012 RSMo 1986 (voluntary annexation), was "first in time" in its annexation proceedings. In deciding the issue, the court states, "[w]ith regard to involuntary annexation by Lake St. Louis under § 71.015, the first valid step for annexation was the passage of its enabling resolution on May 5, 1982. This action starts in motion the remaining procedures required by the statute." Id. (City's emphasis.) Because the city passed its resolution before the Town of Dardenne Prairie received all of the petitions for voluntary annexation, the city had established prior jurisdiction. Id. at 219-20. Thus, City argues its resolution trumps Village's proposed ordinance.
City further argues the Eastern District also found in State ex inf. Nesslage v. Village of Flint Hill, 718 S.W.2d 210 (Mo.App.E.D. 1986), that the adoption of a "resolution of intent" was the first valid step toward involuntary annexation under section 71.015. "urges this Court to follow the Eastern District's holdings."
(c) Tindall , 918 S.W.2d at 362-63: City claims the Tindall case, which Village relies upon heavily, "actually can be read to support the position of either party." Village relies on this court's holding set forth above concerning the proposal of an ordinance as the first valid step. City counters that the City of Liberty took the "very unusual" action in Tindall of simultaneously passing a resolution and filing an ordinance; hence, this court's interchangeable reference to the document encompassing the two as a "ordinance" in one passage and a "resolution" in another. City argues that in Tindall we "relie[d] upon" Lake St. Louis "as authority that the 'ordinance at issue' was the first valid step but, as demonstrated [by City's above-outlined argument about Lake St. Louis,] that case clearly held that the first valid step was the passage of a resolution." (City's emphasis.)
(3) "Widespread understanding of annexation procedures accepted throughout the State of Missouri": Finally, City argues:
[I]t is the widespread understanding of annexation procedures accepted throughout the State of Missouri, as set forth in the Missouri Municipal League and Missouri Municipal Attorney's Association's Annexation Laws in Missouri (July 1993) and Volume II of Local Government [chapter on municipal boundary adjustments] (Mo. Bar 3rd ed. 2002), that adoption of a resolution of intent to annex is the first valid step towards annexation under Section 71.015.
To support its argument, City details the chronology of events and practice forms these two sources provide as guides for municipalities seeking to involuntarily annex land. Both sources discuss a municipality's adoption of a resolution of intent to annex. City claims that Village also "modeled its procedure in accordance with the practice guides, . . . [so] it is obvious that the Village itself recognizes the accepted procedure and chose to follow it." City insists: "The MML Technical Bulletin and the Missouri Bar's deskbook are accepted state-wide practice guides that are used by the bench and bar alike. It is appropriate to recognize the role these practice guides have and to give deference to their interpretation."
B. "FIRST VALID STEP":
Did City's "Resolution of Intent to Annex" constitute the "first valid step" toward annexing the disputed area of land in Andrew County? As previously explained, despite this court's extensive research, we found no case squarely addressing the issue, at least not as framed by City. Ultimately, this issue requires our interpretation of section 71.105, in light of the common law doctrine of prior jurisdiction. Because such interpretation is a question of law, we need not defer to the trial court's decision on the issue. Hemann v. Camolaur, Inc., 127 S.W.3d 706, 713 (Mo.App.W.D. 2004). Our goal is to
"ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words used in their plain and ordinary meaning." When construing a statute, the Court considers the object the legislature seeks to accomplish and aims to resolve the problems addressed therein.
State ex rel. Nixon v. QuikTrip Corp., 133 S.W.3d 33, 37 (Mo. banc 2004) (quoting Wolff Shoe Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 762 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo. banc 1998)).
1. Cases Applying the Doctrine of Prior Jurisdiction: The doctrine of prior jurisdiction has generally been described as follows:
[W]here two or more bodies or tribunals have concurrent jurisdiction over a subject matter, the one first acquiring jurisdiction may proceed, and subsequent purported assumptions of jurisdiction in the premises are a nullity. This principle of the common law is based upon the general public policy of the promotion of the orderly administration of government and justice. Thus, the first of two or more annexation proceedings prevails over those subsequently commenced relating to the same territory.
. . . .
The jurisdictional priority based on priority in time ordinarily is determined by the time of the commencement or initiation of the proceedings, and not by the time of completion, nor by another time or date. However, in some instances a time other than the time the proceedings are commenced is said to be determinative of jurisdictional priority. The taking of the first mandatory public procedural step in the statutory process for incorporation or annexation of territory ordinarily fixes the date of the commencement of the proceedings, for the purposes of the rule as to jurisdictional priority.
2 EUGENE McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 7.22.20, at 508-09 (3rd ed. 1996). The general principle of this doctrine was recognized by Missouri courts as early as 1932. State ex inf. Goodman v. Smith, 53 S.W.2d 271, 272-73 (Mo. 1932) (discussing other states' applications of the doctrine of prior jurisdiction in municipal annexation proceedings and concluding under Missouri law, "it is evident that the county court of Pike county did not have jurisdiction or authority to incorporate the town of Elmwood so long as the annexation proceedings of the [Louisiana] city council covering the same territory were pending.")
In Willard Reorganized School District No. 2 of Greene County v. Springfield Reorganized School District No. 12 of Greene County, 248 S.W.2d 435, 443 (Mo.App. 1952), the appellate court held that "in a dispute between two political subdivisions as to which may annex a given territory, the one which first took a valid step toward effecting the annexation assumes jurisdiction which it retains throughout, regardless of which one first takes the steps which finally complete the annexation." (Emphasis added.) Missouri courts subsequently commonly speak of determining the "first valid step" in deciding jurisdictional priority disputes in competing annexation proceedings. For example, in State ex inf. Walker v. Cainsville Reorganized School District R-1 of Harrison County, 331 S.W.2d 629, 630 (Mo. 1960), our supreme court, citing Willard, quotes the finding in Walker Reorganized School District R-4 v. Flint, 303 S.W.2d 200, 206 (Mo.App. 1957) that "'[i]t is well-settled that where two public bodies each claim jurisdiction over the same territory by virtue of consolidation proceedings or by annexation proceedings, the one which takes the first valid step to accomplish the consolidation or annexation has the superior claim regardless of which one completes its proceedings first.'" (Emphasis added.)
Subsequent cases have uniformly discussed the necessity of determining the "first valid step" in involuntary annexation proceedings under section 71.015. However, our research did not find any particular guidance with what was meant by "first valid step." Even though there is a long line of cases applying the doctrine, a close reading demonstrates somewhat of a quagmire in that they seem to interchangeably refer to a "resolution" and "ordinance," despite the line of cases expressly distinguishing between the two. While a "Resolution of Intent to Annex" may indeed be the first step both City and Village took in seeking to annex the area of land in Andrew County, the question is not which took the "first step." The question is: which took the first valid step under section 71.015?
2. "Valid": Our goal is to glean the legislative intent behind section 71.015, which governs the competing involuntary annexation proceedings at issue, to determine what the "first valid step" is thereunder. In looking at the plain language of section 71.015.1(1) set forth above, it does, indeed, mention a "resolution to annex." But, it appears this was simply carried over from the former version of section 71.015, which was rewritten in 1980. We do not agree with City's argument that mention of a "resolution" in section 71.015.1(1) is "plain and ordinary" statutory language that mandates a "resolution to annex" as the first valid step under the doctrine of prior jurisdiction.
Prior to the 1980 amendment, section 71.015 RSMo 1978 read:
Whenever the governing body of any city has adopted a resolution to annex any unincorporated area of land, such city shall, before proceeding as otherwise authorized by law or charter for annexation of unincorporated areas, file an action in the circuit court of the county in which such unincorporated area is situated under the provisions of chapter 527, RSMo, praying for a declaratory judgment authorizing such annexation. The petition in such action shall state facts showing:
(1) The area to be annexed;
(2) That such annexation is reasonable and necessary to the proper development of said city; and
(3) The ability of said city to furnish normal municipal services of said city to said unincorporated area within a reasonable time after said annexation is to become effective.
Such action shall be a class action against the inhabitants of such unincorporated area under the provision of section 507.070.
Our legislature rewrote section 71.015 in 1980 to add the ordinance requirement now found in 71.015.1(2). Prior to this amendment, section 71.015 RSMo 1978 did not specifically delineate required contents for a "resolution to annex" unincorporated areas of land. It simply provided that "[w]henever the governing body of any city has adopted a resolution to annex any unincorporated area of land," it must first file a declaratory judgment action seeking the court's approval of the proposed annexation before proceeding. The statute then specifically outlined what facts the declaratory judgment petition was required to state.
The 1980 amendment provided much more detailed requirements or "steps" that were to be "satisfied" by particular municipalities in involuntary annexation proceedings prior to seeking a declaratory judgment approving the annexation. Section 71.015.1(1) provides:
Section 71.015.1 designates its application to "any city, town, or village, not located in any county of the first classification which has adopted a constitutional charter for its own local government, [which] seek[s] to annex an area to which objection is made." For simplification purposes only, we generally refer to the annexing jurisdiction as the "municipality" or the "annexing municipality."
Subsequent amendments to section 71.015 do not have any substantive effect on our discussion of the 1980 amendment to the statute. Unless otherwise noted, we quote from the current version of the statute (RSMo 2000), which incorporates both the 1980 version and subsequent, non-relevant amendments, for simplification purposes.
Before the governing body of any city, town, or village has adopted a resolution to annex any unincorporated area of land, such city, town, or village shall first as a condition precedent determine that the land to be annexed is contiguous to the existing city, town, or village limits and that the length of the contiguous boundary common to the existing city, town, or village limit and the proposed area to be annexed is at least fifteen percent of the length of the perimeter of the area proposed for annexation.
(Emphasis added.)
The 1980 amendment to section 71.015 also retained the facts required prior to the amendment to be included in a petition for declaratory judgment. But, instead of requiring the facts to be in a petition for declaratory judgment, the legislature chose, in what is now section 71.015.1(2), to require the annexing municipality to include these and a few additional facts in its proposed ordinance. Again, section 71.015.1(2) requires:
The governing body of any city, town, or village shall propose an ordinance setting forth the following:
(a) The area to be annexed and affirmatively stating that the boundaries comply with the condition precedent referred to in subdivision (1) above;
(b) That such annexation is reasonable and necessary to the proper development of the city, town, or village;
(c) That the city has developed a plan of intent to provide services to the area proposed for annexation;
(d) That a public hearing shall be held prior to the adoption of the ordinance;
(e) When the annexation is proposed to be effective, the effective date being up to thirty-six months from the date of any election held in conjunction thereto.
It appears from both the prior and current versions of the statute that these facts or elements were of utmost importance to the legislature.
The legislature directs in section 71.015.1(1) that as a condition precedent to proceeding with involuntary annexation of property, the annexing municipality must determine that the area to be annexed meets the contiguousness requirements. Once that condition precedent is met, the legislature directs in section 71.015.1(2), that the annexing municipality "shall propose an ordinance setting forth the following." Since the legislature rewrote the statute in 1980, it has specifically required the proposal of an "ordinance" by the annexing municipality. Our courts have long held there is a distinction between a "resolution" and an "ordinance." See Julian v. Mayor of Liberty, 391 S.W.2d 864, 866-67 (Mo. 1965) (explaining a "resolution" is "something less formal than" an "ordinance[.]" "[G]enerally, it is a mere expression of the opinion or mind . . . A resolution is not a law," and "it need not be in any set or particular form." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); and State ex rel. Gove v. Tate, 442 S.W.2d 541, 542 (Mo. banc 1969) (discussing a long line of cases differentiating between a "resolution" and an "ordinance" and quoting Julian, 391 S.W.2d at 867, in holding that "[a] resolution 'will not suffice when action on the part of a municipality is required to be taken by ordinance.'").
It is clear from the statute that the legislature set forth a very detailed and elaborate structure for a municipality to accomplish an involuntary annexation of territory. There is the condition precedent regarding the contiguousness of the land to be annexed. § 71.015.1(1). The statute requires the municipality to propose of an ordinance setting forth detailed information and to formally announce a public hearing on the ordinance. §§ 71.015.1(2) and (3). Additionally, section 71.015.1(5) requires the annexing municipality to file a declaratory judgment action to (a) ensure compliance with the contiguousness requirement; (b) demonstrate the annexation is reasonable and necessary to the proper development of municipality; and (c) demonstrate that the municipality can furnish appropriate services to the area. Also, at least one election must be held on the issue of annexation. § 71.015.1(6). It is clear that the legislature intended to require a municipality to approach involuntary annexation with careful attention to its consequences and with respect to the rights of, and the need for information by, the citizens in both the annexing municipality and the proposed annexation area.
We do not mean to disparage in any way City's efforts in this matter. The record reflects that City approached this annexation with extensive and professional planning and care.
The mention of a "resolution" in section 71.015.1(1) is somewhat vague. The timing to adopt one is not entirely clear. Regardless, the resolution mentioned would appear to amount to no more than an announcement of a general intent to annex sometime in the future. There are no statutory requirements for the content of such a resolution, nor does it require the municipality to follow through with any additional actions.
On the other hand, as set forth above, section 71.015.1(2) (a) through (e) delineates very specific requirements for the municipality's proposed ordinance, including: (a) a statement of compliance with the contiguousness requirements of section 71.015.1(1); (b) that the action is reasonable and necessary for the municipality's development; (c) that the annexing municipality has a detailed plan for services in the area to be annexed; (d) that a public hearing shall be held on the ordinance prior to the its adoption; and (e) the proposed effective date of the annexation. The ordinance is the triggering mechanism for the requirements of Section 71.015; it ensures the annexing municipality is genuinely serious about the annexation. To allow an annexing municipality to acquire prior jurisdiction with a bare resolution of intent would frustrate the thoughtful process installed by the legislature that calls for the demonstration of detailed planning and careful consideration. A general resolution does little more than place an area on notice that it is under consideration for possible annexation. This brings us back to the question: what is the "first valid step" within the context of 71.015?
City's March 31, 2003, Resolution No. 28755, entitled "A RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING THE INTENT OF THE CITY OF ST. JOSEPH WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN UNINCORPORATED AREAS PROPOSED FOR ANNEXATION BY THE CITY," explains that it "desires to express its intent to designate the area currently outside of the existing City corporate limits as shown on Exhibit B for future annexation into the City." After setting forth some background of the procedures City has already taken in considering the possibility of annexation, the resolution reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF ST. JOSEPH, MISSOURI, AS FOLLOWS:
[SECTIONS 1 and 2 set forth the legal description of the area of land it intends to annex in Andrew County.]
SECTION 3: That City staff will soon be presenting to the City Council an Annexation Study, for its further consideration, and that such Annexation Study will in all probability recommend that annexation occur in four separate phases (1A through 1D), as more specifically noted on Exhibit C, which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.
SECTION 4: That due to the City Council's desire to obtain input from the public on the City's intent to annex the Proposed Annexation Area, it has chosen to formalize its clear intent, by approval of this resolution.
We found no case of particular assistance in explaining what was meant by "valid." The American Heritage Dictionary, 3rd College Edition, 1490 (1993), speaks of the term "valid" as generally describing something that has "legal force." Black's Law Dictionary 1550 (6th ed. 1990), defines "valid" as: "[h]aving legal strength or force." The proposal of an "ordinance," as described and required by 71.015.1(2), certainly fits these definitions more readily than a resolution.
The manifest intent of the legislature under section 71.015 is for the annexing municipalities to approach involuntary annexation with deliberation and care as reflected by the required contents of a proposed ordinance. Accordingly, we hold that the first mandatory public step or the "first valid step" toward involuntary annexation for the purpose of the prior jurisdiction rule is the municipality's proposal of an ordinance as required by section 71.015.1(2). Thus, Village has exclusive jurisdiction to proceed with the involuntary annexation procedures of the unincorporated area of land in Andrew County described in its proposed ordinance.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.