Summary
In City of Oxford v. Spears, 228 Miss. 433, 87 So.2d 914 (1956) suit was brought against the City for damages because of maintaining a nuisance by polluting a water course running through plaintiff's land in discharging raw sewage in the stream.
Summary of this case from Phillips v. Davis Timber Co., Inc.Opinion
No. 40198.
June 11, 1956.
1. Municipalities — nuisance — pollution of water course with sewage — evidence sustained finding for plaintiff against city.
In suit against city for damages for maintaining a nuisance by polluting a watercourse running through plaintiff's land with raw sewage, evidence supported finding that defendant city created and maintained a nuisance during six years prior to filing of suit by polluting such watercourse, so that plaintiff was entitled to recover damages therefor.
2. Waters — nuisance — damages — evidence — insufficient to sustain recovery for loss of cattle — instructions.
In such case, where evidence was sufficient to show only a possibility that two or more of plaintiff's cows died from drinking contaminated water, defendant was entitled to instruction that plaintiff was not entitled to recover any damages because of death of any of his cattle.
3. Damages — pollution of stream — nuisance — measure of damages.
If, by reason of conduct of defendant in maintaining a nuisance by polluting a stream, the land is rendered unfit or less valuable for use as pasturage or other purposes for which it is adapted with stream running through it unpolluted, in absence of other items of special damages, the measure of damages of owner of land is the diminution of market value of the property if the injury is of a permanent nature, or diminution in rental or usable value if injury is of temporary nature.
4. Damages — pollution of stream — nuisance — special or incidental damages.
Landowner whose land is rendered unfit or less valuable for use as pasture or other purpose for which it is adapted with stream running through it unpolluted, by reason of defendant's conduct in maintaining a nuisance by polluting the stream, is entitled to recover such special or incidental damages separate and distinct from depreciation of value of property or of depreciation in rental or usable value of the property as he may be able to prove, including annoyance, inconvenience and sickness.
5. Damages — pollution of stream — abatable nuisance — measure of damages.
Where proof showed an abatable nuisance, damages should have been limited to depreciation of rental or usable value of land for the six year period ending with filing suit, plus any special or incidental damages sustained and proven, and plaintiff could not recover for loss of profits in his cattle business as an element of the damage.
6. Pleading — counterclaim — properly stricken.
Where counterclaim did not arise out of and was not connected with the situation, occasion, transaction or subject matter upon which plaintiff's action was based, counterclaim should have been stricken. Sec. 1483.5, Code 1942.
7. Nuisance — instructions — that city could obtain prescriptive right to maintain nuisance — improper.
Where proof was sufficient to support finding that during period involved the pollution of the watercourse was such as to amount to a nuisance, instruction which, in effect, told jury that city could obtain prescriptive right to maintain a nuisance was improper.
Headnotes as approved by Gillespie, J.
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Lafayette County; T.H. McELROY, Judge.
J.W. Price, Oxford, for appellant.
I. The Court erred in admitting into evidence the map which was plaintiff's Exhibit 6 to the testimony of the plaintiff, S.E. Spears.
II. The Court erred in granting plaintiff the following instruction: "The Court instructs the jury for the plaintiff that if you find for the plaintiff, your verdict may be in the following form: `We, the jury, find for the plaintiff and assess his damages at $6,583.00,' writing your verdict upon a separate piece of paper, and inserting in the blank space the amount which you find from the preponderance of the evidence the plaintiff has been damaged, not to exceed $21,000.00."
III. The instructions, the granting or refusing of which has been assigned as error, are as follows:
A. The Court erred in granting the plaintiff the following instruction: "The Court instructs the jury for the plaintiff that you may not award the City of Oxford any damages on the counterclaim of the City filed in this case."
B. The Court erred in refusing the defendant the following instruction: "The Court instructs the jury for the defendant that the jury should consider separately the claim of the City of Oxford, Mississippi, against the plaintiff, S.E. Spears, and if the City is entitled to damages, it should so state and state the amount of its verdict. The Court further instructs the jury for the defendant that at the same time the jury should consider separately the claim of the plaintiff, S.E. Spears, and if he is entitled to damages it should so state and state the amount thereof in the same verdict."
C. The Court erred in refusing the defendant the following instruction: "The Court instructs the jury for the defendant that the statute of limitations does not run against the City of Oxford, Mississippi."
IV. The Court erred in refusing the defendant the following instruction: "The Court instructs the jury for the defendant that the plaintiff in this case is not entitled to recover any damages because of the death of any of his cattle."
V. The Court erred in refusing the defendant the following instruction: "The Court instructs the jury for the defendant that the plaintiff in this case is not entitled to recover any damages for loss of profits in the operation of his cattle business."
VI. The Court erred in refusing the defendant the following instruction: "The Court instructs the jury that if you should find for the plaintiff, you cannot under the law return a verdict for more than nominal damages."
VII. The Court erred in refusing the defendant the following instruction: "The Court instructs the jury for the defendant that they should render a verdict in favor of the defendant."
VIII. The Court erred in overruling defendant's motion to set aside the verdict and grant the defendant a new trial.
Collation of authorities: Pope v. Ivy, 117 Miss. 501, 78 So. 367; Yazoo M.V. RR. Co. v. Boone, 11 Miss. 881, 72 So. 777; Masonite Corp. v. Steede, 198 Miss. 530, 21 So.2d 463; Kress Co. v. Sharp, 156 Miss. 693, 126 So. 650, 68 A.L.R. 167; City of Meridian v. Tingle, 226 Miss. 317, 84 So.2d 388; Hodges v. Town of Drew, 172 Miss. 668, 159 So. 298; Thompson v. City of Philadelphia, 180 Miss. 190, 177 So. 39; Sec. 104, Constitution 1890; Secs. 721, 1483.5, 1530, Code 1942; 15 Am. Jur., Damages, Sec. 20; 17 C.J. 755; 25 C.J.S., Damages, Sec. 27.
Fant Bush, Holly Springs; Dale Wilson, Prentiss, for appellee.
I. Cited and discussed the following authorities: Pope v. Ivy, 117 Miss. 501, 78 So. 367; Lenoor v. Peoples Bank of Laurel, 87 Miss. 559, 40 So. 5; Orr v. Columbus G. Ry. Co., 210 Miss. 63, 48 So.2d 630; Carruth v. Griffis, 220 Miss. 541, 71 So.2d 478; Masonite Corp. v. Steede, 198 Miss. 530, 21 So.2d 463; Laurel Equipment Co. v. Matthews, 218 Miss. 718, 67 So.2d 258; Hodges v. Town of Drew, 172 Miss. 668, 159 So. 298; City of Vicksburg v. Richardson, 90 Miss. 1, 42 So. 234; Thompson v. Winona, 93 Miss. 591, 51 So. 129; City of West Point v. Womack, 178 Miss. 808, 174 So. 241; Thompson v. City of Philadelphia, 180 Miss. 190, 177 So. 39; City of Jackson v. Robertson, 208 Miss. 422, 44 So.2d 523; City of Meridian v. Sullivan, 209 Miss. 61, 45 So.2d 851; Forbes v. City of Durant, 209 Miss. 246, 46 So.2d 551; City of Jackson v. Cook, 214 Miss. 201, 58 So.2d 498; City of Meridian v. Tingle, 226 Miss. 317, 84 So.2d 388; Secs. 1483.5, 3374, 3374-113, Code 1942; Chap. 249, Laws 1952; 20 Am. Jur., Sec. 739 p. 616; Vol. I, Alexander's Miss. Jury Instructions, pp. 21, 24.
The most important question presented by this appeal is whether loss of profits is a proper element of damage for the pollution of a water course running through plaintiff's land, rendering the water unfit for plaintiff's cattle to drink.
Appellant, City of Oxford, was sued by appellee for damages alleged to have been sustained in the six years next before suit was filed. Appellee alleged appellant maintained a nuisance by discharging raw sewage into a water course that ran through appellee's land; that the water of the stream was rendered unfit for cattle to drink. It was also charged that offensive odors pervaded appellee's farm and his home thereon situated. Damages were claimed for loss of profits resulting from appellee being forced to go out of the cattle business and for offensive odors.
The proof justified the jury in finding the facts as next stated. Appellee purchased 153 acres of land in 1933. The north boundary of appellee's land is the southern city limits of the City of Oxford. Burney's Branch runs diagonally across appellee's land for a distance of about one-half mile. This stream never runs dry. When appellee bought the property, this was a clear stream carrying pure water. The first appellee noticed that the water was contaminated from sewage was before World War II. After that, the contamination got worse from year to year. Since appellee bought the property, the sewerage outfall has been changed three times, each time bringing the outlet closer to his property, and within the year the suit was filed, the outfall was moved to the north property line of appellee's land. Beginning about 1947, there has been a large increase in the amount of the flow of sewage into Burney's Branch by reason of the growth of the city in the area served by the sewerage system emptying therein, and the amount has increased each year. At least a part of the time during the six years preceding the filing of this suit, the sewage about equalled in volume the amount of water flowing in the creek. The water was rendered unfit for cattle. The minimum health and safety requirements when raw sewage is emptied into a stream is that the volume of water in the stream should be twenty times the volume of sewage. The odors from the sewage were offensive in the areas near the branch, and were noticable upon the hill where appellee lived and operated a store. It was especially bad when he was working in the fields near the branch in hot weather.
(Hn 1) The evidence was ample to justify a finding that appellant created and maintained a nuisance during the six years prior to the filing of this suit, and that appellee was entitled to damages therefor.
(Hn 2) Appellant requested an instruction that plaintiff was not entitled to recover any damages because of the death of any of his cattle. Considered in the light most favorable to appellee, the evidence was sufficient only to show a possiblity that two or more of appellee's cows died from drinking contaminated water. Appellant was entitled to the instruction under the proof of the case.
Appellant requested and was refused an instruction that told the jury plaintiff was not entitled to recover any damages for loss of profits in the operation of his cattle business. This action of the lower court is assigned as error. It would not serve any useful purpose to consider whether appellee's proof was sufficient to establish loss of profits in connection with his cattle business which he says he had to abandon as a result of the pollution of the stream. Loss of profits is not the proper measure or element of damage for pollution of a water course.
(Hn 3) The rule is well settled by the authorities generally that if, by reason of conduct of the defendant in maintaining a nuisance by polluting a stream, the land is rendered unfit or less valuable for use as a pasture, or other purposes for which it is adapted with the stream running through it unpolluted, in the absence of other items of special damages, the measure of damages of the owner of the land is the diminution of the market value of the property if the injury is of a permanent nature, or the diminution in the rental or usable value if the injury is of a temporary nature. Southland Co. v. Aaron, 221 Miss. 59, 72 So.2d 161; Southland Co. v. Aaron, 80 So.2d 823; 56 Am. Jur., Waters, Sec. 422; 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, Sec. 175. Cf. The Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Company v. Mulholland, 84 So.2d 504.
(Hn 4) In addition, the landowner is entitled to recover such special damages as he may be able to prove. These special or incidental damages are elements of damage separate, distinct, and independent of the depreciation of the value of the property or of the depreciation of the rental or usable value of the property. Included in the category of special or incidental damages are annoyance, discomfort, inconvenience, and sickness. 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, Sec. 175, p. 979. There may be others.
(Hn 5) The proof did not establish permanent damage to appellee's land. It showed an abatable nuisance. Damages, therefore, should be limited to depreciation of the rental or usable value of the land for the six-year period ending with the filing of the suit, plus any special or incidental damages sustained and proven.
(Hn 6) Appellant complains of an instruction to the effect that the jury could not award appellant damages on its counterclaim. Appellant filed a counterclaim demanding $50,000.00. It charged that appellee had fenced a certain tract of land owned by appellant, and since 1933 used said tract of land as a hog lot and contaminated the land with animals to the damage of the City. This assignment fails for two reasons: (1) The counterclaim did not arise out of, and was not connected with, the situation, occasion, transaction, contract, or subject matter upon which the plaintiff's action was based; the counterclaim should have been stricken; it was not germane to the main action; Sec. 1483.5, Mississippi Code of 1942. (2) Appellant failed to show any damages for which appellee was responsible.
(Hn 7) Appellant was given an instruction to the effect that appellant could acquire an easement to discharge sewage into Burney's Branch by doing so for a period of ten years, and limited plaintiff's recovery for such use to the extent of the increase over the use made during the prescriptive period. Since this case was tried below, we have decided City of Meridian v. Tingle, 84 So.2d 388, in which we said that a municipality could not acquire by prescription the right to maintain such nuisance. The proof was ample to support a finding that during the period involved the pollution of Burney's Branch was such as to amount to a nuisance, and it was error to give an instruction which, in effect, told the jury that appellant could obtain a prescriptive right to maintain a nuisance. This question was not made an issue on this appeal and this observation is made for the reason that this case must be retried.
For the reasons stated, the judgment is affirmed as to liability and reversed on the question of damages, and remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages only.
Affirmed as to liability: reversed and remanded for new trial on the issue of damages only.
McGehee, C.J., and Lee, Arrington and Ethridge, JJ., concur.