Opinion
November 20, 1951.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Dade County, Charles A. Carroll, J.
J.W. Watson, Jr., and Olavi M. Hendrickson, Miami, for appellant.
Myron H. Lewis and Samuel Steen, Miami, for appellees.
The complainants labeled this a suit for declaration of rights and judgment but ancillary to it is a condemnation proceeding. The lands involved in the condemnation suit were a portion of lots 20 and 21, Block 3, Carter's addition to Coconut Grove. It is admitted that the title was in appellees, that pursuant to Section 73.01, F.S.A. and Chapter 10847, Sp.Acts of 1925, being the City Charter of Miami, the City filed condemnation proceedings to acquire title to said lands, that judgment in said cause was entered June 9, 1948, that said judgment was paid by the City, whereby it received a fee simple title to the lands.
July 5, 1949, one year and twenty days after the entry, payment and acceptance of the final judgment in the condemnation suit, the instant suit was brought on the theory that the City had in fact occupied the condemned lands since 1924, that the verdict in the condemnation suit was a consent verdict, that the judgment in the condemnation case involved nothing but conveyance of title to the lands, that the occupancy of the lands by the City prior to the condemnation proceedings constituted an implied or constructive landlord and tenant relationship, that if such relationship was absent the city was a trespasser, that the Court should declare the rights of the parties and order an accounting of the amount due plaintiffs for use of the lands prior to condemnation.
There was a motion to dismiss and an answer to the bill. On final hearing the chancellor found that no clear and definite showing was made by the city that the final judgment entered in the condemnation proceedings included or was intended to include any claim against the city for its use and occupation of the property. The court also found that plaintiffs' claim for use value in a landlord and tenant relationship, not based on an instrument in writing, was applicable, that the value was limited to the period prior to the date of the payment made by the city to the plaintiff under the condemnation judgment which was within the space of three years next preceding the filing of this cause of action, the amount of which was $695 plus interest at six per cent from July 5, 1949. This appeal was prosecuted from that decree. Appellees filed cross assignments of error challenging the amount of damages awarded them.
The point for determination is whether or not a condemnation judgment duly paid and accepted, is a complete defense to an action for damages under an alleged landlord and tenant relationship or under an alleged trespass where such action is filed subsequent to the said condemnation judgment, and based on facts existing prior thereto.
Appellant contends that the judgment in the condemnation case is res judicata of the point raised here because (1) said judgment vested the city of Miami with a fee simple title to the lands involved and when appellees accepted the compensation awarded by the jury they were divested of all right, title and interest in said lands. (2) In their answer filed in the condemnation suit, appellees raised and had adjudicated the same questions that are raised in the present suit and should not be permitted to adjudicate them again.
Appellees counter with the contention (1) that the present cause of action did not accrue until the landlord and tenant relationship terminated, which was at the time title passed by condemnation, and being so, the statute of limitation was improperly invoked by the lower court. (2) The present suit was timely brought because appellees' rights under landlord and tenant relationship had not previously been adjudicated and that the court was correct in awarding them compensation for the use of their lands. (3) The answer filed in the condemnation suit should not bar recovery in this suit because the question of recovery for use and occupancy under a landlord and tenant relationship was not adjudicated in the condemnation proceeding.
In his final decree, the chancellor found that no "clear and definite showing has been made by the defendant herein or otherwise, that the judgment entered into on the 9th day of June, 1948 in condemnation for acquisition of the premises herein included or was intended to include any claims against the City for use and occupation of the portion of the land involved for 20 years prior to taking the land involved herein."
The jury in the condemnation suit awarded appellees $5,000 for the lands (3,070 square feet) and $500 for attorney's fees. Since the issue raised in the instant case was squarely presented, by the pleadings in the condemnation case, it would seem that the burden was on appellees to show that the judgment in the condemnation case did not contemplate the claim for use or rental in the landlord and tenant relationship. A fee simple title assumes that all claims against the lands have been cleared. If that was in fact done, appellees should not be permitted to litigate that claim again.
Appellees also contend that under Bruce v. Seaboard Airline Ry. Co., 52 Fla. 461, 41 So. 883, they were authorized to bring this suit because the City of Miami took the lands as a result of the condemnation suit burdened with their claim under landlord and tenant relation. They also contend that the evidence and the pleadings in the condemnation suit show that nothing more than the title was intended to be conveyed. Appellees further contend that this action did not accrue until the final judgment in the condemnation suit, despite the fact that the chancellor applied Section 95.11(5) (e), F.S.A., being the three year limitation on contract not founded on an instrument in writing.
We do not think Bruce v. Seaboard Airline Ry. Co., rules this case or has any relation to it. It is our view that appellees' claim under landlord and tenant relationship was included and settled in the condemnation suit. The statute so required and the parties were on notice of the statute. The judgment and the payment thereof in the condemnation suit was res adjudicata and a complete bar to the instant suit.
The judgment appealed from is accordingly reversed.
Reversed.
CHAPMAN, HOBSON and MATHEWS, JJ., concur.