1. The burden of proving the affirmative defense that defendant is entitled to statutory exemptions from traffic regulations rests upon defendant, and in order that a defendant may claim exemptions applicable to emergency vehicles the conditions of the emergency-vehicle statute must be met. Accordingly it cannot be said as a matter of law that an ambulance requested of a defendant's hospital is "responding to an emergency call" so as to be entitled to exercise the privileges of the emergency-vehicle statute where there is no evidence as to the substance or nature of the call for the ambulance as received and acted upon by the hospital.

2. No reversible error appears in the admission of evidence over objection where evidence to the same effect is subsequently elicited from the same witness without objection and is also subsequently elicited by the objecting party.

3. In a wrongful death action it is not error to allow in evidence a photograph of the deceased taken shortly after death for the purpose of proving that the deceased died of injuries received in a collision for which the defendant is sought to be held responsible.

4. Where counsel is charged under Code § 81-1009 with making statements in the hearing of the jury of prejudicial matters not in evidence, and the trial court sufficiently takes the corrective measures prescribed by the Code section, the granting or denial of a motion for mistrial rests in the legal discretion of the trial court.

5. Under the circumstances of this case there was no abuse of discretion in overruling a motion for mistrial made when a witness identified a statement as one he had given to an insurance adjuster.

6. Where a municipal ordinance is relied upon as establishing applicable speed limits, and the parties instead of proving the ordinance (and including it in the record on appeal), attempt orally at the trial to stipulate the speed limits as fixed by the ordinance but are unable to agree completely thereon, this court is in no position to reverse the trial court for failure to charge the particular speed limit contended for under the ordinance where the court charged the stipulation to the jury to the extent apparently agreed upon.

7. Where the trial court instructs the jury in a wrongful death action that in the event the jury finds for the plaintiffs the form of their verdict would be, "We, the jury, find for the plaintiff in the sum of so many dollars, not to exceed the sum sued for . . . ," the italicized portion of the charge is not objectionable as an indication or expression of opinion by the court as to the value of the life of the deceased.

8. In a wrongful death action it is not error to fail to charge the jury that after finding the full value of the life of the deceased, they should then reduce that amount to its present cash value. It is not the "full value of the life," the statutory measure of damages, which must be reduced, but only properly reducible items which aid the jury in arriving at the full value.

9. The verdict was not, as contended, excessive as a matter of law.

10. The recharge of the court on the standard of care applicable to appellant was not so vague, confusing, or misleading on the grounds urged as to constitute reversible error.

ARGUED JANUARY 8, 1968 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 20, 1968 — REHEARING DENIED MARCH 7, 1968 — CERT. APPLIED FOR.

The four children of Mrs. Dicie Bazzell brought suit against the City of Macon and Mrs. DeWeese Weaver for the wrongful death of Mrs. Bazzell, a widow, who was killed when the city's ambulance, in which Mrs. Bazzell was being transported, was in collision with Mrs. Weaver's automobile at the intersection of Napier and Pio Nono Avenues in Macon.

The petition alleged that John Joiner, an employee of the city, drove the Macon Hospital ambulance into the intersection at a speed of approximately 50 miles per hour in disregard of a red or stop traffic light and into the path of Mrs. Weaver's automobile, which had approached on an intersecting street at a speed of approximately 35 miles per hour. It was alleged that the city owned and operated the Macon Hospital and its ambulance service and that Joiner was operating the ambulance in the course of his employment with the city. Negligence per se was charged against the city in speeding and in disregarding the red traffic signal.

The city answered, alleging that the sole proximate cause of the collision and death of Mrs. Bazzell was the negligence of Mrs. Weaver, the other defendant, and setting up the affirmative defense that its driver was operating an authorized emergency vehicle as defined by Code Ann. § 68-1502 (e) and was entitled, under Code Ann. § 68-1604, to proceed through the red traffic light in question.

The evidence adduced at the trial showed that on the morning of the collision the decedent suffered a painful condition in her back or hip and felt unable to travel in an automobile for treatment. Henry Smith, one of decedent's sons, went across the street to the home of Mrs. Pierce, reported his mother's condition to her, and asked her to call an ambulance. He did not, however, tell her that it was an emergency. Plaintiffs attempted on three separate occasions to place Mrs. Pierce on the stand to testify as to her telephone conversation with the clerk at the hospital when she called for the ambulance, but the city objected in each instance and the objections were sustained. Paul Vogen, assistant administrator of the hospital, testified that a Mrs. Whitehead had received the call at the hospital and had filed out the dispatch slip for the ambulance. He further testified that standard procedure is for the clerk receiving the call to fill out the dispatch slip as "emergency" or "non-emergency" on the basis of the information received from the person calling. Mrs. Whitehead was available at the trial as a witness, apparently under subpoena of the city, but she was not called to testify by any of the parties as to the substance of her conversation with Mrs. Pierce. Thus the record is silent as to the substance and nature of Mrs. Pierce's call for the ambulance as received by the hospital.

Joiner testified that as he came in to work at the hospital on the morning in question, he was met at the back door by a Mrs. Watkins who told him there was an emergency in the Bellevue section. He was given a dispatch slip marked "emergency" and proceeded to decedent's address under emergency conditions in accordance with his instructions. Upon arrival he was advised by Smith that something was wrong with his mother's hip and that she had had the same trouble before. She was placed on the stretcher which had been elevated to a sitting position because she was unable to lie back, and the stretcher was loaded aboard the ambulance. Joiner then proceeded on the return trip to the hospital with siren and light in operation, continuing to treat the call as an emergency in accordance with his prior instructions from the hospital. He testified under intense questioning that until his instructions were countermanded by higher authority, he had no discretion to treat the call as anything but an emergency call. There seems to be no dispute in the record that on the return trip to the hospital, when the collision occurred, Joiner proceeded on Napier Avenue into the intersection through a red light facing him and that Mrs. Weaver had the green light on Pio Nono Avenue, the intersecting street. There was a conflict in the evidence as to the speed of the vehicles and as to whether the intersection was a "blind" intersection or not.

Verdict and judgment were in favor of plaintiffs against the city only, and the city appeals.

EBERHARDT, Judge.

1. One of the crucial issues in the case below was whether the ambulance driver was operating an "authorized emergency vehicle . . . responding to an emergency call" so as to be entitled to the privileges set forth in Code Ann. § 68-1604. That section provides:

"(a) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call, . . . may exercise the privileges set forth in this section, but subject to the conditions herein stated.

"(b) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may: . . .

"2. Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation.

"3. Exceed the speed limits specified in this law so long as he does not endanger life or property. . .

"(d) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety of others."

It is not disputed that the ambulance was an authorized emergency vehicle as defined by Code Ann. § 68-1502 (e), or that the siren and light were in operation as required by Code Ann. § 68-1604 (c). The controversy centers around whether the driver was "responding to an emergency call" within the meaning of Code Ann. § 68-1604 (a) so as to be entitled to exercise the privileges afforded emergency vehicles. Enumerations of error 6, 8 and 9 complain that the court erred in failing to give in charge defendant city's requests numbers 2, 7 and 8. These requests, if given, would have instructed the jury that the evidence conclusively showed that Joiner was responding to an emergency call and that the rules respecting the operation of emergency vehicles should be applied by the jury; that whether the ambulance was being operated in response to an emergency call depended solely upon instructions received from the hospital and could not be determined by consideration of the evidence as to the nature of the illness of the decedent, Joiner not being competent or qualified to make any independent determination as to the nature or extent of the illness; and that Joiner had no alternative to consider the call anything but an emergency call until his instructions were countermanded by competent authority. Plaintiffs contended below and here that the issue of "emergency call" was one of fact for the jury, and the trial court so charged. On the other hand defendant city contends, as stated in the brief, that "there was only one party involved in this case which could have or should have determined whether or not the call was an emergency call, that being Mr. Joiner's superior at the Macon Hospital." It is argued that since Joiner's superior instructed him to treat the call as an emergency, the instructions he received were conclusive on the issue.

There was no error in refusing to give the requested instructions. While we find no authority in our own courts on the issue involved here, the general rule which has been applied elsewhere is that whether a vehicle is driven in response to an emergency call depends not upon whether there is an emergency in fact but upon the nature of the call received and the situation as presented to the mind of the driver. Head v. Wilson, 36 Cal.App.2d 244 ( 97 P.2d 509); Coltman v. City of Beverly Hills, 40 Cal.App.2d 570 ( 105 P.2d 153); Gallup v. Sparks-Mundo Engineering Co., 43 Cal.2d 1 ( 271 P.2d 34); Stucker v. McMains, 71 Cal.App.2d 35 ( 161 P.2d 997); Lakoduk v. Cruger, 48 Wn.2d 642 ( 296 P.2d 690). See also Delgado v. Brooklyn Ambulance Service Corp., 29 Misc.2d 454 ( 211 N.Y.S.2d 297); Bravata v. Russo, 41 Misc.2d 376 ( 245 N.Y.S.2d 702); Simkins v. Barcus, 168 Pa. Super. 195 ( 77 A.2d 717); White v. City of Casper, 35 Wyo. 371 ( 249 P. 562). In making this determination "it is not only material, but essential, to consider such facts as disclose the nature of the call which was being answered. This involves both a statement of the substance of the call as it came into the hospital and the substance or terms of the call as communicated to the driver of the ambulance." Head v. Wilson, 36 Cal.App.2d 244, 251, supra.

In this case the record is silent as to the substance or nature of the call as it came in to the hospital, and consequently there is no basis upon which to rest the contention that the instructions issued by defendant city's hospital to its ambulance driver constituted the sole determining factor which established conclusively that the ambulance was "responding to an emergency call." If, as contended by the city, the clerk at the hospital was the only person who could have or should have determined that the call was an emergency, some basis must appear in the record to justify the determination actually made by the clerk. It is not enough that the clerk truly believed that an emergency existed — the clerk must have had reasonable grounds for such belief. Cf. Delgado v. Brooklyn Ambulance Service Corp., 29 Misc.2d 454, supra; Bravata v. Russo, 41 Misc.2d 376, supra; Gallup v. Sparks-Mundo Engineering Co., 43 Cal.2d 1, supra.

The burden of proving the affirmative defense that the defendant is entitled to statutory exemptions from traffic regulations rests upon defendant ( Myerholtz v. Garrett, 111 Ga. App. 361, 362 (2) ( 141 S.E.2d 764)), and in order that a defendant may claim exemptions applicable to emergency vehicles the conditions of the emergency-vehicle statute must be met. Poole v. City of Louisville, 107 Ga. App. 305, 306-307 ( 130 S.E.2d 157). The condition of the statute involved here is that the ambulance must have been "responding to an emergency call." Hence the trial court did not err in refusing to require the jury to find that the ambulance was "responding to an emergency call" so as to be entitled to the statutory exemptions claimed under defendant's affirmative defense, but properly left it as a question of fact for the jury. Accordingly Enumerations of error 6, 8 and 9 are without merit.

Similarly, Enumeration of error 7, complaining of the court's failure to give the city's request to charge number 6 is without merit. This request states that the speed limit on Pio Nono (Napier?) Avenue was 35 m.p.h. for vehicular traffic other than the ambulance. Since the ambulance was not exempt from the speed regulations as a matter of law, there was no error in failing to give the requested charge.

2. Enumeration of error 1 complains that the court erred in allowing, over defendant's objection, testimony of Smith as to whether or not he advised Joiner that the trip to the hospital with decedent was an "emergency run." Assuming for the purposes of argument that the evidence was inadmissible and that proper objection was made, evidence to the same effect was elicited from the same witness by counsel for plaintiff without objection, as well as by defendant's counsel, subsequent to the testimony complained of. Hence no reversible error appears. Lowe v. Athens Marble c. Co., 104 Ga. App. 642, 643 ( 122 S.E.2d 483); Weston v. City Council of Augusta, 114 Ga. App. 804 (1) ( 152 S.E.2d 700); Hopper v. McCord, 115 Ga. App. 10 (1) ( 153 S.E.2d 646).

3. Enumeration of error 2 complains that the court erred in admitting into evidence a photograph of deceased taken after the collision, lying on the stretcher to which she had been strapped in the ambulance. Defendant contends that the admission of the photograph was highly prejudicial and calculated to inflame the minds of the jury in view of the fact that counsel had stipulated that she was dead. Counsel for the city did not stipulate, however, that deceased died from injuries received in the collision, a vital issue to plaintiffs' case. Later in the trial, counsel for co-defendant, in cross examining Dr. Campbell, who performed an autopsy on deceased, sought to prove that death resulted from organic heart disease rather than from injury. Thus the photograph was relevant and material to show the severity of the impact of the collision and the nature and extent of the injuries, thereby indicating the cause of death. This enumeration of error is without merit. Cagle Poultry c. Co. v. Busick, 110 Ga. App. 551 (1b) ( 139 S.E.2d 461).

4. Enumeration of error 3 complains that the court erred in refusing to grant a motion for mistrial made when counsel for plaintiffs stated in a colloquy with the court: "Your Honor, my questions now are not related to any wreck that the Macon Hospital ambulance may or may not have had. My question now is of this witness's knowledge of the propensity of emergency vehicles to have wrecks, and I think this witness will admit. . . ." The colloquy occurred during a discussion of defendant city's objections to a question asked by plaintiff's counsel of Joiner as to his knowledge of the number or percentage of wrecks involving emergency vehicles. This question was part of a line of questioning on cross examination as to the ambulance driver's knowledge and experience in operating emergency vehicles. The question was not answered and was withdrawn during the colloquy.

If this was an improper statement by counsel of prejudicial matters not in evidence as contemplated by Code § 81-1009, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for mistrial, since he substantially followed the procedure as set forth in that section. The judge interrupted counsel for plaintiffs during the colloquy as he was withdrawing the question, stating, "If, of course, you don't plan on going into it, that's fine, but in any event I can see no relevancy in this case in what happened or what he might know about some other vehicles, and I would sustain the objection to that type question and instruct counsel that it has no bearing in this case." The court went on to instruct the jury not to consider anything that the witness might or might not know about other people being involved in other wrecks and further instructed them to confine their deliberations to the facts of the particular occurrence in question.

Where counsel is guilty of improper conduct under Code § 81-1009 and the court takes the corrective measures there prescribed, the granting or denial of a motion for mistrial rests in the legal discretion of the court. Cf. Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Coxwell, 93 Ga. App. 159, 168 (10) ( 91 S.E.2d 135); Ga. Power Co. v. Puckett, 181 Ga. 386, 393 (3-5) ( 182 S.E. 384). We disagree with defendant city's contention that the corrective measures were not sufficiently taken, and consequently the holdings of Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Coxwell, 93 Ga. App. 159 (10), supra, Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. McDonald, 103 Ga. App. 328 (3) ( 119 S.E.2d 356) and Ga. Power Co. v. Puckett, 181 Ga. 386, 393 (3-5), supra, where little or no corrective action was taken, are not in conflict with but support, what we here hold. See also Mathews v. Mathews, 222 Ga. 311 (2) ( 149 S.E.2d 666).

Enumeration of error 2 is without merit.

5. Enumerations 4 and 5 assign error on the overruling of defendant city's motion for a mistrial made after counsel for the co-defendant, Mrs. Weaver, elicited testimony from the ambulance driver regarding a statement taken by an insurance adjuster. The questions and answers were as follows: "Q. Who is J. M. Weaver? A. Who is who? Q. J. M. Weaver? All right now, in this particular statement right here, have you seen this before? A. It looks like the statement that I gave the insurance adjuster at the hospital." Defendant city contends that this testimony tended to show that the Macon Hospital had a policy of liability insurance in effect which might afford protection to the hospital, in violation of Code Ann. § 56-2437 (2) which provides: ". . . No attempt shall be made in the trial of any action brought against a municipal corporation, county or any other political subdivision of this State to suggest the existence of any insurance which covers in whole or in part any judgment or award which may be rendered in favor of the plaintiff. . ."

The statutory provision is a salutary one and should be scrupulously observed by all, but under the circumstances here these enumerations of error are without merit. The witness' answer does not on its face suggest that the Macon Hospital had a policy of automobile liability insurance but only indicates that the statement was taken at the hospital, the witness' place of employment. The answer does not state that the adjuster was employed by the motor vehicle insurance carrier of the hospital — so far as the answer reveals, the adjuster could have been employed by a company in which the deceased held a policy of some type of insurance, or by the automobile insurance carrier of the co-defendant. As a matter of fact counsel for defendant city stated to the court below that the adjuster was employed by the separate automobile insurance carriers of both defendants, a fact reiterated in the briefs. Since both defendants had insurance in two different companies we cannot construe the witness' answer as singling out the City of Macon for insurance coverage. This is not a case where plaintiffs' attorney emphasized by invidious intention and design the fact that the city or anyone else was insured in any manner — the question to which the answer was given was asked by counsel for co-defendant who represented a company also employing the adjuster, and the answer was to some extent volunteered by defendant city's employee and principal witness in identifying the statement. Furthermore, the court instructed the jury to disregard the witness' response, particularly in regard to the matter of whom he gave the statement to.

In view of the foregoing we cannot hold that the court abused its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial, and Enumerations 4 and 5 are without merit. See Steinmetz v. Chambley, 90 Ga. App. 519 (5) ( 83 S.E.2d 318); Sutherland v. Woodring, 103 Ga. App. 205, 214 (3) ( 118 S.E.2d 846); Southern Poultry Co. v. Fletcher, 113 Ga. App. 374 ( 147 S.E.2d 870); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 (3) ( 171 S.E. 225); Bramlett v. Hulsey, 98 Ga. App. 39, 42 (2) ( 104 S.E.2d 614).

6. The court charged the jury that the parties had stipulated that the speed limit on Napier Avenue up to the beginning of the intersection was 35 m.p.h. Counsel for plaintiffs and for the city both excepted, and the court recharged that the stipulation of the parties was that the speed limit on Napier was 35 m.p.h. to Pio Nono Avenue and 30 m.p.h. from Pio Nono onward. It is contended that the court erred in the charge in that it did not inform the jury what the speed limit was at the point of impact in the intersection itself.

There is no merit in this contention. The speed limits in question were fixed by a municipal ordinance which was not introduced into evidence and proven. It does not appear in the record on appeal. The parties in their oral stipulation during the trial were unable to agree what the ordinance provided in regard to the speed limit at the point of impact in the intersection, and the only basis which the judge could have used to charge the jury was the stipulation itself. The judge charged this as he understood it and as we understand it, and hence no error appears. We share the sentiment expressed in the trial judge's remark: "Well, I can't see how you can stipulate to agree to something when one of the parties is disagreeable to it."

Enumeration 13 is without merit.

7. The court in its charge instructed the jury that in the event they found for the plaintiff the form of their verdict would be, "We, the jury, find for the plaintiffs in the sum of so many dollars, not to exceed the sum sued for. . ." The italicized portion of the charge is not an indication or expression of opinion by the court as to the value of the life of the deceased in violation of Code § 81-1104. Service Wholesale Co. v. Reese, 91 Ga. App. 366, 368 (4) ( 85 S.E.2d 625); National Upholstery Co. v. Padgett, 111 Ga. App. 842, 845 (3) ( 143 S.E.2d 494).

8. Enumeration 11 complains that the court erred in its charge as to the value of the life of the deceased by failing to instruct the jury that after finding the full value of the life of the deceased, they would then reduce that amount to its present cash value. Plaintiffs contend, on the other hand, that the law does not require reduction to present cash value of a sum representing the full value of the life of a mother where there is no proof before the jury of earnings or earning capacity and no direct proof of monetary value of services and where instead the jury was instructed to determine the full value of the life in the light of the jurors' own observations and experience and to the satisfaction of their own consciences.

There is no evidence in the record as to earnings or earning capacity of the deceased or as to the monetary value of her services. The court charged the jury that in measuring the value of the mother's life they were not confined to any inflexible rule; that they might consider the age of the mother, which was 64, her health, life expectancy, and habits; that the value of the life of a mother is not determined solely by the amount of money, if any, she may have earned as a worker for wages, or the actual domestic services that she may have performed for the benefit of her children; that the jury was not required to view a mother as a servant, for the law recognizes that the children's privilege of having their mother with them is a privilege which is incalculably precious to them and is an element which could be considered; that a mother performs services of a peculiar nature which can be performed by no other person and which are invaluable and incapable of exact proof; that the value of a mother's services is not dependent upon proof of any particular services which are particularly performed by a mother but may be determined from the fact of the relationship and all the facts and circumstances of the family and their living conditions, and from the jurors' own experience and knowledge of human affairs; and that the facts of the case should guide the jurors in estimating for themselves in the light of their own observations and experience, and to the satisfaction of their own consciences, the amount which represented the full value of the life of the deceased. This constituted the entire charge on damages, and it is not challenged in any respect other than for failure to instruct the jury to reduce the full value of the life to its present cash value.

This enumeration of error is without merit. In a wrongful death action the statutory measure of damages is "the full value of the life" ( Code § 105-1308), and we know of no authority in law which requires that the "full value" itself, once arrived at, must be reduced anymore than "market value," once arrived at, must be reduced in cases where that measure of damages is applicable. In arriving at the "full value" the jury may take into consideration various items which must themselves be reduced to present cash value, such as the lifetime income of the deceased, if any, or the value of services rendered by a deceased wife or mother where there is direct evidence of the monetary value of such services. See Standard Oil Co. v. Reagan, 15 Ga. App. 571 ( 84 S.E. 69); Har-Pen Truck Lines, Inc. v. Mills, 378 F.2d 705 (5th Cir.). Defendant argues as if the value of the services of deceased in this case is synonomous with "the full value of the life." But the jury is not bound to find that such items reduced to present cash value constitute solely the full value of the life, as they are aids only in making this determination. Rhodes v. Baker, 116 Ga. App. 157, 162 (4) ( 156 S.E.2d 545). In addition to the proven monetary value of a mother's services reduced to present cash value, the jury may add an additional amount, under the rule in Metropolitan St. R. Co. v. Johnson, 91 Ga. 466 ( 18 S.E. 816), by taking into consideration the value of many services rendered by a mother hardly capable of exact proof. Standard Oil Co. v. Reagan, 15 Ga. App. 571, 598, supra. There are, of course, situations in which the plaintiff relies altogether on proof of earnings, or of earning capacity, when it is proper to reduce the whole sum. Under the evidence and charge of the court in this case, the determination of the value of the services of deceased did not depend upon mathematical computation based upon direct evidence of the monetary value of the services but was in effect left to the enlightened conscience of an impartial jury. It therefore seems to be an open question, under the rationale of Collins v. McPherson, 91 Ga. App. 347 ( 85 S.E.2d 552), whether in a case such as this the value of a mother's services themselves, as only one element going to make up the full value of the life, should be reduced to present cash value. See, however, Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Keating, 45 Ga. App. 811, 819 (10) ( 165 S.E. 873), companion case reversed in 177 Ga. 345 ( 170 S.E. 493). In any event the exception to the charge and the enumeration of error are insufficient to require reversal, as they are directed to the failure to charge on the reduction to present cash value of the "value of the life" rather than of the value of the services. It is not the "full value of the life," the statutory measure of damages, which must be reduced, but only properly reducible items which aid the jury in arriving at the full value.

9. A verdict of $50,000, approved by the trial judge and awarded to four children as the full value of the life of their 64-year-old mother in "medium health" who provided services for them and actively cared for two of the children who lived with her, one of whom was an epileptic, is not, as contended, excessive as a matter of law so as to require the reversal of the overruling of a motion for new trial, particularly where the jury is authorized to make its verdict under the type of charge as set out in the preceding division of this opinion. For cases approving verdicts in various amounts in wrongful death actions, see Steinmetz v. Chambley, 90 Ga. App. 519, supra; Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Bell, 100 Ga. App. 438 ( 111 S.E.2d 734); Hospital Authority v. Adams, 110 Ga. App. 848 ( 140 S.E.2d 139); Har-Pen Truck Lines, Inc. v. Mills, 378 F.2d 705, supra, a case originating in the Middle District of Georgia.

10. In its charge to the jury, the court stated: "The defendant City of Macon contends among other things that it was not slightly negligent in any of the ways claimed by the plaintiffs, and if you find this contention to be the truth of this case the plaintiffs could not recover from the defendant City of Macon." The city excepted to the "charge on extraordinary diligence and the charge as to slight negligence," there being no proof that the deceased was a passenger for hire. The court then recharged the jury: "Now in addition, members of the jury, you will recall that I charged you on two different duties of care in this case, one duty of care for one defendant and one duty of care for the other defendant. Now I charge you to disregard the duty of care I charged you as regards to the City of Macon and instead that the duty of care developing on the City of Macon is the same duty of care insofar as the law is concerned as the defendant Mrs. DeWeese Weaver, and that is the rule of ordinary care and diligence which I charged you regarding Mrs. Weaver. So you will disabuse your minds of any different standards of liability I placed on the City of Macon than the same duty of care that would be on Mrs. DeWeese Weaver. Now you will keep in mind the other elements of the charge heretofore given you. They are still in effect, and those statutes and those other things in the charge that relate to the burden of proof and the preponderance of the evidence and all of the other elements of the charge are still in effect and these are the only two things that I am changing in the charge heretofore given you."

The recharge was not so vague and confusing as to constitute reversible error on the ground that the court did not specifically charge the jury to disregard its previous charge concerning the duty of extraordinary care and diligence owed by the city, or on the ground that the recharge did not make it clear to the jury what they were or were not to disregard in connection with the court's former charge. These were the only grounds of objection stated on the trial. "Although on appeal plaintiffs argue additional grounds of objection to this charge, review of the charge enumerated as error is limited under Code Ann. § 70-207 (a) strictly to the ground of objection stated on the trial. Georgia Power Co. v. Maddox, 113 Ga. App. 642, 643-646 ( 149 S.E.2d 393)." Palmer v. Stevens, 115 Ga. App. 398, 405 ( 154 S.E.2d 803).

Enumeration 12 is without merit.

Judgment affirmed. Bell, P. J., Jordan, P. J., Hall, Pannell, Deen, Quillian and Whitman, JJ., concur. Felton, C. J., dissents from the judgment and from the ruling in Division 8 of the opinion but concurs in all of the other rulings by the majority.