Opinion
04-21-00413-CV
08-24-2022
THE CITY OF LAREDO and CITY OF LAREDO MUNICIPAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Appellants v. Tony H. MORENO, Appellee
From the 49th Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas Trial Court No. 2021-CVK-001767D1 Honorable Joe Lopez, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Irene Rios, Justice Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Irene Rios, Justice
In this interlocutory appeal, appellants City of Laredo and City of Laredo Municipal Civil Service Commission (collectively referred to as "the City") challenge the trial court's denial of their plea to the jurisdiction alleging appellee Tony H. Moreno lacked standing to sue the City. We affirm.
When referring to an appellant individually, we will refer to it as either the City of Laredo or the Commission. Otherwise, appellants will be referred to collectively as "the City."
Background
For approximately twenty years, Moreno worked for the City of Laredo; but on July 6, 2021, while serving as the City of Laredo's Water Treatment Superintendent, he received a letter terminating his employment. Moreno alleges his termination stemmed from the City of Laredo having to issue boil water notices around July 4, 2021 due to low chlorine levels detected within its distribution system.
The July 6, 2021 termination letter alleged Moreno failed to (1) perform his job duties, and (2) meet productivity goals or standards. In his petition, Moreno alleges the City of Laredo recognized Moreno as a civil service employee who could only be terminated for "just cause."After being notified of his termination and pursuant to the Commission's rules, Moreno appealed the City of Laredo's termination decision to the Commission. On August 18, 2021, the Commission conducted a hearing that included testimony from several witnesses and Moreno. After deliberating in an executive session, the Commission upheld Moreno's termination. As required by the Commission's rules, on August 20, 2021, the Commission provided Moreno its signed written order affirming his termination.
On December 2, 2013, the City of Laredo adopted the "Municipal Civil Service Rules and Regulations of the City of Laredo" ("the rules") establishing procedures for handling personnel actions, and also creating the Commission to "[h]ear appeals in the case of any employee in the classified civil service who has been subjected to any disciplinary action, including . . . termination[.]" It is undisputed Moreno is a classified civil service employee.
Moreno filed suit against the City. In his petition, Moreno contends the City violated its own rules by failing to provide him with an adequate termination letter that included the specific violations notifying him of why the City of Laredo terminated him. Moreover, Moreno alleged the Commission's order also failed to identify facts supporting its decision to affirm his termination, instead indicating "none" in this blank and failed to make credibility determinations regarding the witnesses' testimonies both of which are required by the City's rules. Claiming his employment with the City of Laredo was a vested property right, Moreno's petition asserts the Commission's order affirming his termination is void because the City violated his due process rights provided by the United States and Texas Constitutions. In addition to allegedly suffering damages from being terminated, Moreno also requested the City reinstate him as the City of Laredo's Water Treatment Superintendent.
In response, the City filed its plea to the jurisdiction claiming the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Moreno failed to assert a "current vested property right, a violation of due process, or entitlement to have [the trial court] reinstate him to his former position." Following a hearing, the trial court denied the City's plea to the jurisdiction. The City appeals.
The City also appealed the trial court's granting Moreno his application for temporary injunction on September 9, 2021; however, on appeal, the City does not argue this issue. Therefore, we do not address the trial court's grant of the temporary injunction in this appeal.
Standard of Review
A plea to the jurisdiction challenges the trial court's authority to determine the subject matter of a specific cause of action. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000); City of San Antonio v. Rogers Shavano Ranch, Ltd., 383 S.W.3d 234, 241 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2012, pet. denied). In determining whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction, our analysis begins with the live pleadings. Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the plaintiff's pleadings, the court must determine, by construing the pleadings liberally in the plaintiff's favor, whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts affirmatively demonstrating the trial court's jurisdiction to hear the case. Tex. Dep't. of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). We construe the pleadings liberally, taking all factual allegations as true, and look to the pleader's intent. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150. Whether a pleading alleges facts that affirmatively demonstrate a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226.
In reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction, we also may consider evidence submitted by the parties and must do so when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150; Bland Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 555. "We do not adjudicate the substance of the case but instead determine whether a court has the power to reach the merits of the claim." Satterfield & Pontikes Constr., Inc. v. Tex. S. Univ., 472 S.W.3d 426, 430 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied). "Our ultimate inquiry is whether the particular facts presented, as determined by the . . . review of the pleadings and any evidence, affirmatively demonstrate a claim within the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction." Tex. Dep't of State Health Servs. v. Balquinta, 429 S.W.3d 726, 738 (Tex. App.-Austin 2014, pet. dism'd).
Applicable Law
Generally, Texas law does not provide the "right to judicial review of an administrative order unless a statute provides a right or unless the order adversely affects a vested property right or otherwise violates a constitutional right." Cont'l Cas. Ins. Co. v. Functional Restoration Assoc., 19 S.W.3d 393, 397 (Tex. 2000). When an administrative body's decision adversely affects a vested property right or a constitutional right, an inherent right of appeal exists. See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972) (recognizing procedural due process is implicated if the person has a protected property interest giving the person "the right to some kind of prior hearing"); see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[No] state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]"); Tex. Const. art. I, § 19 ("No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities . . . except by the due course of the law of the land."). "Generally, the implicated [c]onstiutional provisions are [f]ederal due process or [s]tate due course of law." Civil Serv. Comm'n of City of El Paso v. Ledee, 68 S.W.3d 702, 706 (Tex. App.-2001, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) (citing Tex. Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 525 (Tex. 1995); Brazosport Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 342 S.W.2d 747, 751 (Tex. 1961).
Employees who are not considered at-will employees-because of contractual employment or other express rules or policies limiting the conditions under which an employee can be terminated-have vested property interests in their continued employment. See Rosow v. City of San Antonio, 734 S.W.2d 659, 660-61 (Tex. 1987); see also Davis v. City of San Antonio, 739 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987) (citing Bueno v. City of Donna, 714 F.2d 484, 492 (5th Cir. 1983)), rev'd on other grounds, 752 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. 1988).
Analysis
Here, the Commission's rules lack a specific provision outlining an employee's right to judicial appeal. And, based on our search, we find no statute providing for judicial review either. Thus, for the trial court to have jurisdiction over this case, Moreno must demonstrate the City's decision adversely affected a vested property right or his constitutional rights.
Moreno has a vested property interest in his continued employment with the City, and pursuant to the City's rules, he could only be terminated for "just cause." See Rosow, 734 S.W.2d at 660-61. Moreno alleges the City violated several of its own rules when (1) initially terminating him from employment, and (2) affirming his termination in its order following the Commission's hearing. Moreover, Moreno's petition specifically provides that because of the facts surrounding his termination, the City adversely affected his vested property right in his employment and deprived him of due process. More specifically, Moreno asserts the City failed to provide him with a termination letter stating the specific violations as required by the rules of why he was terminated. He also alleges the Commission's order failed to identify facts supporting its decision to affirm his termination and failed to make credibility determinations, as required by the City's rules. Therefore, construing the pleadings in favor of conferring jurisdiction, we conclude Moreno pled sufficient facts for the trial court to deny the City's plea to the jurisdiction. See Ledee, 68 S.W.3d at 706-07; see also Cont'l Cas. Ins. Co., 19 S.W.3d at 397.
While not designated as a separate appellate issue, the City contends the trial court lacks jurisdiction because Moreno was afforded due process and is barred from bringing a cause of action seeking an impermissible review of the City's administrative decision to terminate him. However, "a court does not reach the merits of a case when considering a plea to the jurisdiction." Ledee, 68 S.W.3d at 706-07; see also Cty. of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002).
We overrule the City's issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled the City's issue on appeal, the judgment of the trial court denying the City's plea to the jurisdiction is affirmed.