Opinion
No. 05-15-00033-CV
04-06-2016
CITY OF DALLAS, VINCENT GOLBECK, AND STEPHEN WORDEN, Appellants v. ROBERT GRODEN, Appellee
On Appeal from the 95th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-14-01521
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang-Miers, Brown, and Schenck
Opinion by Justice Lang-Miers
In this interlocutory appeal, the City of Dallas and two former City employees appeal the trial court's denial of their pleas to the jurisdiction and motions to dismiss. We reverse the trial court's order and render judgment in favor of appellants.
The City moved to strike exhibits contained in the appendix of Groden's brief on appeal asserting the exhibits contained matters not in the appellate record. By separate order, we deny the motion. However, in resolving this appeal, we have not considered any documents not contained in our appellate record.
I. BACKGROUND
We limit our discussion of background facts to those that are pertinent to our disposition of the issues on appeal. For many years Robert Groden operated a business from a portable table in Dealey Plaza where he sold magazines containing his research and writings about the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Sometime in 2010, former City of Dallas District Park Maintenance Manager Stephen Worden proposed a meeting between himself, former City of Dallas Assistant Police Chief Vincent Golbeck, the City attorney, and the Sixth Floor Museum concerning "the vendor situation" in Dealey Plaza. In June 2010, Golbeck received a complaint about vendors in Dealey Plaza. He asked a Dallas police officer to respond to the complaint. The officer went to Dealey Plaza where he saw Groden selling magazines. The officer called Worden to verify that Dealey Plaza was a city park and, after being told it was, the officer arrested Groden and charged him with violating a City ordinance that proscribed his activity.
In his petition, Groden asserted that he "is a recognized expert in photographic and cinematographic analysis and has been for almost half a century"; "he was a key expert in the analysis of materials relating to the assassination of President Kennedy" for Congress's House Select Committee on Assassinations; he "has immersed himself in the study of the assassination of President Kennedy" for the last fifty years, "including writing five (5) best-selling books on the subject"; "[h]e is recognized as the world's leading expert on the photographic evidence in the JFK case"; "[h]e served as the chief consultant to Oliver Stone throughout the filming of the movie, 'JFK'"; "[h]e is recognized as a leading critic of the Warren Commission"; "[h]e was the first person to bring the Zapruder film to national television in 1975"; and "[h]is efforts that year proved instrumental in motivating Congress to reopen the investigation of the JFK assassination[.]" He asserted that he developed extensive research on the assassination of President Kennedy and "legally rented and procured a parking space in a public parking lot adjacent to the area known as Dealey Plaza" "[i]n an effort to market and distribute the materials he has developed . . . to inform the public of what he has learned about the JFK assassination[.]" He stated that he set "up a portable table on the grassy knoll area of Dealey Plaza" for over sixteen years and "displays the items he has for sale that relate to his analysis of the artifacts of the JFK assassination" including "a printed 48-page 'Memorial Edition' of a magazine-style publication entitled JFK The Case for Conspiracy, [and] an enhanced DVD edition of [his] publication entitled 'JFK: The Case for Conspiracy, The Assassination and Medical Evidence.'"
The record showed that another officer removed a different vendor from Dealey Plaza before the officer who arrested Groden arrived at Dealey Plaza.
The original complaint against Groden did not cite the specific City ordinance he was alleged to have violated, but it alleged that Groden unlawfully occupied "public property . . . located within the territorial limits of the City of Dallas . . . for the purpose of offering goods for sale." The City subsequently amended the complaint against Groden to specifically allege a violation of section 32-10 of the Dallas City Code, which at that time prohibited the sale of merchandise in areas under the control of the park board without a written agreement or permit.
Groden contested the charge and moved to dismiss it on several grounds. The municipal court ultimately dismissed the charge on the basis that "it does not believe it has jurisdiction over the case as presented." The dismissal was affirmed on appeal.
In 2014, Groden filed this lawsuit against Golbeck, Worden, the Sixth Floor Museum, and others alleging claims for malicious prosecution, conspiracy to maliciously prosecute, and declaratory relief. Groden alleged that in the past fifteen years, the Sixth Floor Museum and others "engaged in a conspiratorial campaign to harass and intimidate [him] by requesting, issuing, and serving legally invalid citations, tickets, complaints, and charges against [him], and improperly dragging [him] into court only to have each and every case thrown out and dismissed because they were without legal merit." He alleged that the Sixth Floor Museum, employees of the Museum, Golbeck, and Worden conspired to "hatch[]" a "'clean up' initiative, no vendor policy, and a 'crack-down' in Dealey Plaza" to rid Dealey Plaza of all conspiracy theorists. He alleged that as a result of this initiative, he was arrested in violation of his constitutional rights and prosecuted for over two years under a City ordinance that did not apply to his activities. In subsequent amendments to his petition, he alleged that Golbeck's and Worden's acts were ultra vires and outside the scope of their employment with the City.
Two of the City employees that Groden sued were the court specialists who took the complaint and amended complaint against Groden from the arresting officer or prosecuting attorney and filed them with the courts. Groden dismissed his claims against those two employees, and they are not parties to this appeal.
Golbeck and Worden claimed immunity and sought dismissal of all of Groden's claims alleged against them. The trial court held hearings and, between hearings, Groden filed his fourth amended petition adding the City as a defendant. He alleged that the City was complicit in the conspiracy and malicious prosecution, but he stated that he did not seek tort damages against the City. Construing this amended petition to allege the same tort claims against both the City and its employees, the City moved to dismiss the claims against its employees. The City also filed a plea to the jurisdiction seeking dismissal of all claims against the City based on its claim of governmental immunity.
The court held another hearing in which it heard argument on all the motions to dismiss and pleas to the jurisdiction and took the matter under advisement. Before the court ruled, Groden amended his petition a fifth time. In the fifth amended petition, Groden stated that he was not asserting and had never asserted tort claims against the City and that he sought only declaratory relief from the City. Without hearing further argument, the trial court issued an order denying all relief sought by the City, Golbeck, and Worden, and this interlocutory appeal followed.
II. APPELLATE JURISDICTION
We initially questioned our jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeals filed by Golbeck and Worden because it was unclear whether Groden sued them in their individual or official capacity. We asked the parties to brief the jurisdictional issue in their appellate briefing.
We have jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals only if a statute explicitly so provides. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2007). The statute at issue here is section 51.014(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which authorizes interlocutory appeals when a court
(5) denies a motion for summary judgment that is based on an assertion of immunity by an individual who is an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state;TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(5), (8) (West Supp. 2015).
. . . .
(8) grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit as that term is defined in Section 101.001 [of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.]
In this case, Golbeck and Worden filed a motion to dismiss the tort claims against them. In Austin State Hospital v. Graham, 347 S.W.3d 298, 301 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam), the supreme court held that section 51.014(a) applies to the assertion of immunity regardless of the procedural vehicle in which it was raised.
Groden contends that we do not have jurisdiction of Golbeck's and Worden's interlocutory appeals because he sued them individually and there is no statutory authority for an interlocutory appeal by an employee sued in the employee's individual capacity. He also argues that they are former employees to whom the interlocutory appeal statute does not apply. The City, Golbeck, and Worden contend that section 51.014(a) authorizes a government employee's interlocutory appeal from the denial of an assertion of immunity regardless of the capacity in which the employee was sued.
Initially we note that Groden does not cite authority to support his argument that section 51.014(a) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal for a former government employee, and we have found none. And it is undisputed that Golbeck and Worden were employed by the City at the time of the events giving rise to Groden's claims; indeed, it is their alleged conduct that forms the basis of his claims for conspiracy and malicious prosecution. We conclude that this argument is without merit.
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Texas has discussed the availability of interlocutory appeal by government employees. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d at 840-46. The court explained that the employee who is sued individually may assert official immunity and appeal the denial of that assertion of immunity under section 51.014(a)(5). Id. at 843, 845-46 (stating "the words of Section 51.014(a)(5) offer no indication or suggestion that it applies to any entity other than a state official . . . . This stands to reason because an official sued in his individual capacity would assert official immunity as a defense to personal monetary liability" (emphasis added)). The court said that the employee who is sued in his official capacity may appeal the denial of an assertion of immunity under section 51.014(a)(8). Id. at 844, 845-46. We interpret Koseoglu to allow an interlocutory appeal from the denial of an assertion of immunity by a government employee regardless of the capacity in which the employee was sued. See id. at 840-46. Consequently, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeals of Golbeck and Worden.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a claim of governmental immunity challenging the trial court's jurisdiction de novo. See Austin State Hosp. v. Graham, 347 S.W.3d 298, 301 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam); Harris Cty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004). We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff, look to the pleader's intent, and determine whether the pleader has alleged facts affirmatively demonstrating the court's jurisdiction. Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2015). If the jurisdictional plea challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we will consider the evidence relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry. Id. If the jurisdictional evidence raises a fact issue, the issue must be resolved by the factfinder. Id. However, if the evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact issue, the trial court must rule on the plea as a matter of law. Id.
IV. CLAIMS AGAINST THE CITY
A. Tort Claims
In Texas the state and its political subdivisions are immune from suit unless the Legislature has waived immunity. Dallas Cty. Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1998). The Legislature has waived governmental immunity from suit for certain claims asserted under the Tort Claims Act. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001-.109 (West 2011 & Supp. 2015); Molina v. Alvarado, 463 S.W.3d 867, 870 (Tex. 2015).
The City construed Groden's fourth amended petition to allege tort claims against the City, and the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction seeking dismissal of those claims based on governmental immunity. However, before the trial court ruled on the City's plea to the jurisdiction, Groden filed a fifth amended petition in which he stated:
While Plaintiff maintains that Defendant City of Dallas was complicit in the wrongful acts that give rise to Plaintiff's causes of action, Plaintiff does not assert
any tort claims herein against Defendant City of Dallas or seek damages from the City. The causes of action for damages below are brought only against the other Defendants.
Construing this assertion according to Groden's stated intent, we conclude that it shows Groden did not assert tort claims against the City. To the extent the City interpreted the fourth amended petition otherwise, those claims were nonsuited in this fifth amended petition. If Groden intended to reserve tort claims against the City for the actions of any of its employees, he did not say so, and he did not establish that the City's immunity was waived. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying the City's plea to the jurisdiction on Groden's tort claims against the City.
B. Declaratory Judgment Claims
The City also sought dismissal of Groden's claims against it for declaratory and injunctive relief.
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is a procedural device for deciding cases already within a court's jurisdiction; it does not enlarge a court's jurisdiction. City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368, 378 (Tex. 2011). Although the Act waives governmental immunity for claims challenging the validity of a municipality's ordinances, it does not waive immunity for claims that challenge a government officer's application of a statute to the plaintiff or that seek "'a declaration of his or her rights under a statute or other law.'" City of McKinney v. Hank's Rest. Grp., L.P., 412 S.W.3d 102, 112 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.) (quoting Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam)); see also City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 373 n.6 (Tex. 2009).
Groden sought declarations that Golbeck and Worden unlawfully arrested him, the City court specialists falsified complaints against him, City employees unlawfully applied City ordinances to his activity, his constitutional rights were violated, he had the right to distribute materials related to the Kennedy assassination, and any future arrests and searches "based upon substantially similar code provisions and/or false complaints will violate his Texas Constitutional Rights." See Hank's Rest. Grp., L.P., 412 S.W.3d at 111-12. And he sought to "enjoin the City of Dallas from its unconstitutional practices."
For example, Groden also sought declarations that Golbeck and Worden "acting individually, outside of their official capacity . . . violated [his] Texas Constitutional rights by seizing, searching, arresting, charging, and prosecuting him based upon falsified complaints and inapplicable local ordinances"; that he "has the right to distribute JFK materials at Dealey Plaza free from unlawful seizures . . . ."; that the City's policy of "bas[ing] criminal prosecutions upon false Complaints not based on personal knowledge of the affiants . . . [is] in violation of law"; that section 50-158 (formerly 50-156) of the City code violated his rights under the Texas constitution; that section 32-10 of the City code violated his rights under the Texas constitution."
But these claims for declaratory relief do not challenge the validity of the City ordinance pursuant to which Groden was arrested. Instead, his claims seek retrospective relief or challenge a government official's application of the ordinance to Groden's specific activity. The City retains its immunity from claims seeking interpretations of ordinances or declarations that City employees violated the law. See Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 621; Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372-73; City of Dallas v. Tex. EZPawn, L.P., No. 05-12-01269-CV, 2013 WL 1320513, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 1, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). And Groden does not allege a specific waiver of immunity that applies to these claims for declaratory relief. See Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 622; Tex. EZPawn, L.P., 2013 WL 1320513, at *2-3. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying the City's plea to the jurisdiction on these claims for declaratory relief.
Additionally, Groden's claim for injunctive relief against the City for its "unconstitutional practices" is likewise barred. The City retains its immunity from claims for injunctive relief based on allegations that government officials are violating the law or exceeding their powers under the law. Hank's Rest. Grp., L.P., 412 S.W.3d at 117. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying the City's plea to the jurisdiction on these claims for injunctive relief.
To the extent Groden sought a declaration that section 101.106(f) violates the open courts provision of the Texas constitution because it "fails to provide any remedy against governmental employees for their intentional torts," we disagree.
The open courts provision states that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13. The supreme court held in Thomas v. Oldham, 895 S.W.2d 352, 357-58 (Tex. 1995), that the predecessor to section 101.106 did not violate the open courts provision of the Texas constitution. And although an open courts challenge to the current version of section 101.106(f) was not made in the Franka v. Velasquez case, the supreme court nevertheless expressed its opinion in that case that "restrictions on government employee liability have always been part of the tradeoff of the [Tort Claims] Act's waiver of immunity, expanding the government's own liability for its employees' conduct, and thus 'a reasonable exercise of the police power in the interest of the general welfare.'" 332 S.W.3d 367, 385 (Tex. 2011) (quoting Tex. Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 520 (Tex. 1995)). Relying on the supreme court's reasoning in Franka, many of our sister courts have addressed constitutional challenges to section 101.106(f) and concluded that it does not violate the open courts provision of the Texas constitution. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Pechacek, No. 02-12-00383-CV, 2014 WL 1096018, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 20, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); Williams v. Nealon, 394 S.W.3d 9, 12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied); Hintz v. Lally, 305 S.W.3d 761, 773 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); Villason v. O'Rourke, 166 S.W.3d 752, 766-77 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, pet. denied), disapproved of on other grounds by Tex. Dep't of Aging & Disability Servs. v. Cannon, 453 S.W.3d 411 (Tex. 2015). We agree with their analysis. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying the City's plea to the jurisdiction on this claim for declaratory relief.
The predecessor statute stated, "A judgment in an action or a settlement of a claim under this chapter bars any action involving the same subject matter by the claimant against the employee of the governmental unit whose act or omission gave rise to the claim." Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 959, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3242, 3305 (amended 2003) (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.106).
V. CLAIMS AGAINST GOLBECK AND WORDEN
Groden sued Golbeck and Worden for malicious prosecution, conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution, and declaratory relief.
A. Tort Claims
Groden alleged that Golbeck's and Worden's actions in having him arrested and prosecuted were ultra vires and outside the scope of their employment with the City. He alleged that Golbeck ordered him "arrested despite knowledge that there was no legal authority to do so" and that Worden "participated in the creation and implementation of the plan to wrongfully arrest and maliciously prosecute" him. Groden contended that at all relevant times, both Golbeck and Worden acted out of selfish ambition and for the benefit of the Sixth Floor Museum.
In their motion to dismiss, Golbeck and Worden contended, among other things, that they acted within the scope of their employment and were entitled to dismissal pursuant to subsection (f) of the election-of-remedies provision in the Tort Claims Act. Once Golbeck and Worden moved to dismiss under subsection (f), it was incumbent on Groden to either dispute that Golbeck and Worden acted within their official capacities or concede that he had sued them in their official capacities only. See Molina, 463 S.W.3d at 871. Groden chose the former and argued that subsection (f) did not apply because he sued Golbeck and Worden for "intentional misconduct" and "ultra vires acts" that were outside the scope of their employment. Accordingly, whether subsection (f) applies to Groden's tort claims turns on whether Groden alleged conduct by Golbeck and Worden that was within the general scope of their employment.
1. Scope of Employment
The Tort Claims Act's election-of-remedies provision "favors the expedient dismissal of governmental employees when suit should have been brought against the government." Tex. Adjutant Gen.'s Ofc. v. Ngakoue, 408 S.W.3d 350, 355 (Tex. 2013). The "apparent purpose" of this provision "was to force a plaintiff to decide at the outset whether an employee acted independently and is thus solely liable, or acted within the general scope of his or her employment such that the governmental unit is vicariously liable." Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 657 (Tex. 2008).
Subsection (f) of the election-of-remedies provision states that claims asserted against an employee must be dismissed if the complained-of conduct was within the general scope of employment and the plaintiff could have sued the government. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106(f); see Alexander v. Walker, 435 S.W.3d 789, 791-92 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam). When the Legislature enacted subsection (f), it sought to "foreclose[] suit against a government employee in his individual capacity if he was acting within the scope of employment." Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 381; see also Fink v. Anderson, 477 S.W.3d 460, 465-66 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
The Tort Claims Act defines "scope of employment" to mean "the performance for a governmental unit of the duties of an employee's office or employment and includes being in or about the performance of a task lawfully assigned to an employee by competent authority." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.001(5). An official acts within the scope of his authority if he is discharging the duties generally assigned to him. Anderson v. Bessman, 365 S.W.3d 119, 124 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). An act is not within the general scope of employment if it was "within an independent course of conduct not intended by the employee to serve any purpose of the employer." Alexander, 435 S.W.3d at 792.
Golbeck presented evidence that an assistant police chief has the general duty to enforce city laws and ordinances and arrest those who violate them. DALLAS, TEX., DALLAS CITY CHARTER XII, § 2 (2011). He presented evidence that he was responding to a complaint about vendors selling at Dealey Plaza when he instructed a police officer to go to Dealey Plaza and investigate the complaint. The evidence showed that the officer went to Dealey Plaza, observed Groden for several minutes, and then arrested him for violating a City ordinance. And enforcing the City's laws and ordinances serves the purpose of the City. See Alexander, 435 S.W.3d at 792.
Worden presented evidence that his duties as District Park Maintenance Manager included directing complaints or issues related to the parks in his district to the appropriate City official. It was undisputed that Worden proposed a meeting between himself and others, including the City attorney, to discuss "the vendor situation we have in Dealey Plaza." Meeting to discuss a course of conduct concerning persons or businesses that may be in violation of a City ordinance is conduct that serves the purpose of the City. See id.
Groden did not allege that the City ordinance pursuant to which he was arrested was invalid. Instead, Groden's real complaint about Golbeck's and Worden's actions appears to be based on his belief that they and others conspired "to harass and intimidate" him by charging him with the violation of an ordinance that did not apply to his activities and, more specifically, that Golbeck and Worden were personally motivated to have him arrested and prosecuted. He alleged, for example, that Worden was interviewing for a job at the Sixth Floor Museum when Worden proposed the meeting about vendors in Dealey Plaza and that Worden's actions were motivated by his desire to get the job. Groden also alleged that while Golbeck's "motivations are less clear, it is clear that Defendant Golbeck was also beholden to Defendant Sixth Floor Museum and acting on its behalf." Groden contended that Golbeck acted out of his "self-serving desire to gain media attention" as he gave media interviews regarding "the unconstitutional 'crack-down' on conspiracy theorists in Dealey Plaza."
But these allegations do not allege an independent course of conduct that served no purpose of the City. As long as an employee is engaging in duties generally assigned to him that serve any purpose of his employer, the conduct may simultaneously benefit the employee or a third party without taking it outside the scope of employment. See Fink, 477 S.W.3d at 470-71; Anderson, 365 S.W.3d at 125-26. Because the allegations and jurisdictional evidence showed that Golbeck and Worden were engaged in duties generally assigned to them, we conclude that Groden's suit is based on conduct within the general scope of their employment. See Alexander, 435 S.W.3d at 792.
2. Claims Could Have Been Brought Against the City
We next consider whether Groden could have sued the City under the Tort Claims Act. The supreme court has stated "that, barring an independent statutory waiver of immunity, tort claims against the government are brought 'under this chapter . . .' for subsection (f) purposes even when the [Tort Claims Act] does not waive immunity for those claims." Id. (quoting Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 379-80). This is true even if the claims alleged are intentional torts. See id. (claims included conspiracy and malicious prosecution against sheriff's employees). Accordingly, Groden's tort claims against Golbeck and Worden could have been brought against the City under the Tort Claims Act even though the Act did not waive immunity for those claims. See Alexander, 435 S.W.3d at 792; Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 379-80.
Because Groden's suit against Golbeck and Worden was based on conduct within the general scope of their employment and could have been brought under the Tort Claims Act against the City, his tort claims are considered to be against Golbeck and Worden in their official capacities, and they were entitled to dismissal of the claims. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106(f); Stinson v. Fontenot, 435 S.W.3d 793, 794 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam); Alexander, 435 S.W.3d at 792. Consequently, the trial court erred when it denied the motion to dismiss.
B. Declaratory Judgment Claims
Groden also sought a declaration that "Golbeck and Worden, acting individually, outside of their official capacity, . . . violated [his] Texas Constitutional rights by seizing, searching, arresting, charging, and prosecuting him based upon falsified complaints and inapplicable local ordinances." Groden does not challenge the validity of the ordinance under which he was arrested and prosecuted; he complains about Golbeck's and Worden's actions under that ordinance, specifically, that the ordinance did not apply to his activities, Golbeck and Worden knew the ordinance did not apply to him, and they arrested and prosecuted him anyway.
A suit for declaratory judgment does not alter a suit's underlying nature. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 370. The underlying nature of Groden's suit against Golbeck and Worden is one for monetary damages. Indeed, Groden seeks up to $500,000 in damages for the alleged violation of his constitutional rights. But we previously concluded in our analysis of Groden's tort claims that he did not allege any actions by Golbeck and Worden that were outside the general scope of their employment, and Groden complains about those same actions in his claim for declaratory relief. Groden may not avoid dismissal of his claims for which Golbeck and Worden have immunity by filing the claims in the form of a request for declaratory relief. See id. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying Golbeck's and Worden's plea to the jurisdiction on Groden's claim for declaratory judgment.
VI. CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court's order denying the motions to dismiss and pleas to the jurisdiction filed by the City, Golbeck, and Worden, and we render judgment dismissing with prejudice Groden's claims against them.
/Elizabeth Lang-Miers/
ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS
JUSTICE 150033F.P05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 95th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-14-01521.
Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers. Justices Brown and Schenck participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the December 24, 2014 order of the trial court overruling appellants' pleas to the jurisdiction and denying appellants' motions and supplemental motions to dismiss is REVERSED and judgment is RENDERED that appellee Robert Groden's claims against appellants City of Dallas, Vincent Golbeck, and Stephen Worden are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
It is ORDERED that appellants City of Dallas, Vincent Golbeck, and Stephen Worden recover their costs of this appeal from appellee Robert Groden. Judgment entered this 6th day of April, 2016.